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This study contributes to the existing literature on the agricultural reforms that took 
place in Central and Eastern European countries during the transformational period (1990-
2004) and on the agricultural development in  Europe in general in the long-term (1960-
2004).   
The thesis explores the history of the agricultural transformations in Poland and Belarus 
through a detailed analysis of the agricultural production and productivity dynamics, aiming 
to answer (i) whether the reforms succeeded or failed in terms of agricultural production and 
agricultural productivity; and (ii) what were the determinants of the agricultural reforms’ 
success or failure.  
The research is centered on a comparative analysis of Polish and Belarusian agricultural 
performance, but it also incorporates the other CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 






















List of acronyms (abbreviations)  
AWU Annual Work Unit (estimated by Eurostat) 
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries – in the context of this PhD research 
this includes the following seven countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
FSU Former Soviet Union countries – in the context of this PhD research this 
includes the following three countries: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
V4  Vysiegrad Four countries -  in the context of this PhD research this includes the 
following four  countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
WB World Bank 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
PSE Producer Support Estimate  (estimated by OECD) 
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CHAPTER 1. General introduction.  
 This “Introduction Chapter” provides general information about the thesis, and consists 
of a description of the research background, an explanation of the selection of country cases, a 
literature overview, data description, methodology and thesis outline sections.  
 
1.1. The research background and scope of the analysis  
In 1989, a transformation process was launched to set the centrally-planned agricultural 
sectors of Central and East European countries onto a path of sustainable economic growth. 
The key elements of these reforms were privatization, liberalization of markets and prices and 
the creation of market institutions. Fifteen years later, these tasks were essentially 
accomplished: privatization (i.e., adoption of privatization laws and the implementation of 
privatization) was implemented, liberal, free-market economic principles were introduced, the 
old centrally-planned institutional structure was dismantled, and a new institutional 
framework emerged and started to function. Thus, in a formal “bureaucratic” sense, the 
transformation process could be considered a success.  
But can the transformation process be considered a success in terms of its (reforms’) 
efficiency? This question is important because the ultimate goal of the transformation was to 
transform the (presumably) inefficient centrally-planned agricultural system into a more 
efficient, market-oriented one. But has this happened? Have the implemented reforms resulted 
in substantial efficiency improvements in agricultural performance?  Further, what factors 
drove the success or failure of the reforms?   These are the research questions I would like to 
address to in my thesis.   
To be more precise, the research questions in this work might be formulated as – (1) 
whether the reforms succeeded or failed in terms of two standard measures of economic 
efficiency: agricultural production and agricultural productivity, or in other words, an 
assessment of reform outcomes in terms of agricultural production and agricultural 
productivity; and (2) what were the determinants of the agricultural reforms’ success or 
failure?  
These two standard measures of the economic performance (production and 
productivity) were chosen due to their dual (Socialist, “centrally-planned” and liberal, “free-
market”) nature and relevance.  Output (agricultural production) is usually considered to be 
relevant to the centrally-planned economy measurement of agricultural performance because 
according to conventional wisdom, the main objective of agricultural policies in pre-transition 
 2 
CEE countries was to produce as much output as possible in order to achieve self-sufficiency 
vis-a-vis agricultural products.  
Agricultural productivity is considered to be relevant to the free-market economy   
measurement of agricultural performance because it refers not only to the simple increase in 
quantity of agricultural output per unit of selected input, but also refers to the efficiency with 
which agricultural producers use the available resources in order to produce a given quantity 
of output, which is relevant to the main “cost-minimization” (“profit-maximization”) target of 
a free-market economy. Moreover, some scholars even suggest that output is a misleading 
indicator of reform success/failure “because the decline of the agricultural output (in most 
transition economies) has been a necessary consequence of the market liberalization” (Lifert 
& Swinnen, 2002, p.12). 
1
 
Therefore, the use of both “Socialist” and “free-market” measures of success provides 
the possibility to assess the reform outcomes from two points of view – from the “centrally-
planned economy” standpoint by using the output indicator as a measure of reform success or 
failure, and from the “free-market economy” vantage point by using the productivity indicator 
as a measure of reform outcomes.    
  Regarding transformational periodization, we note that although the “program of 
political and economic reforms” (so-called “perestroika and glasnost” policy) was launched 
by Michail Gorbachev in March 1985 (Barry, 2001, p.1202)  the majority of the political 
science scholars studing the CEEC post-communist transformations  (e.g., Aslund, 2012; 
Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Roland, 2000;   Stark and  Bruszt, 1998) as well as those studing 
the agricultural transformations in CEEC (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008;  Lerman et al., 2004; 
Spoor and Visser, 2001)   typically take the very end of the 1980s (and the beginning of the 
1990s) as a starting point of transformation period due to the   visible evidence of economic 
consequences of “perestroika,” as well as to the introduction at this point of the first market 
reforms. Also, logistical considerations of the availability of economic data in international 
organizations' databases (starting from the beginning of the 1990s 
2
) are probably taken into 
consideration when determining the starting date of the transformation period.   Considering 
                                                          
1
 Lifert & Swinnen (2002, p. 28) and Macours & Swinnen (1999) argue that the absence of decline in GAO  
“more likely reflects the failure of reform, rather than the reform success”. To support this idea, they refer to the 
case of the  transition economies with  the lowest declines in the  agricultural output (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Belarus), which according to the World Bank  grading system of agricultural reforms progress were 
considered as least reformist. This controversy will be discussed in more details further, within the Section 2.2. 
and Section 2.3. (CEEC chapter)  of this PhD thesis.  
2
For example, until the end of the '80s the only widely available statistical data pertained to the USSR as a 
whole, but not to each separate republic.    
 3 
all the above arguments, then, the beginning of the 1990s was taken as the starting point of 
the transformation period for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
1.2. The selection of the countries’ case studies (the geographical scope of the 
research)  
The geographical scope of this research is mainly focused on two countries – Poland 
and Belarus- the former, from the so-called Eastern Bloc countries in the CEEC region and 
the latter, from the FSU.  
The choice of these countries was determined by the following reasons: (i) a 
considerable similarity in performance level between the countries, (ii) differences in the 
transformational reforms agendas between the countries and (iii) geographical proximity. 
(i) In the CEEC countries, the results of the agricultural transformation were not as 
brilliant as it was expected at the beginning of the reforms’ process. This is especially true in 
light of the successful history of the East Asian transformational economies (China, Vietnam 
and so on). 
The choice of Poland and Belarus as country cases for the research was determined by 
their relatively good performance (in terms of agricultural output and productivity) compared 
to the other CEE countries.  Poland achieved the best results among the V4 countries (Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), and Belarus was top-ranking among the FSU 
countries (Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) as well as among some V4 countries. Thus, an 
analysis of the processes of the agricultural transformation in the selected countries might 
shed light on why some transformational countries (especially in the CEEC region) are more 
successful than others in terms of agricultural performance, and might provide useful insights 
into the determinants and driving forces of the successful performance. 
(ii)  The two countries chosen for the research differ substantially in terms of their 
reforms agenda – Poland followed a fast-paced “Big-Bang” approach, while Belarus adopted 
a path of gradual reform. Hence, an analysis of the agricultural transformations in these two 
countries would provide the possibility of evaluating of the extent to which the reform agenda 
impacted on agricultural performance, as well as single out the current reforms’ outcomes 
(1990-2004) from the long-term trends of agricultural development (1961-2004).   
(iii) The geographical proximity of these neighboring countries minimizes, as far as 
possible, the impact of agro-climatic differences on agricultural performance.  
The comparative analysis of these two countries is also placed into the context of a 
broader regional and time-span perspective. The processes of agricultural transformation in  
 4 
Poland and Belarus are compared with similar processes that took place in the other CEE 
countries –Czech Republic, Slovakia,  Hungary, Russia and Ukraine (Chapter 2) and selected 
developed Western countries - Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (Chapter 5). 
Therefore, while Poland and Belarus are usually considered to be the main outliers in 
the CEEC region
3
, placed into a broader regional context and wider time-span, they could be 
considered in fact the most representative cases, because they could provide the explanations 
not only for the Polish and Belarusian short-term transformation results, but also provide 
some useful insights into the bigger (in terms of the geographical scope and time-span)   
research puzzle. 
 
1.3. General literature overview  
A brief overview of the agricultural transformation literature enables us to 
distinguish the following shortcomings of the existing scholarship on the dissertation topic.  
While Belarus agricultural performance is a complete “terra incognita” in the English-
speaking scientific community, the numerous country-relevant studies for Poland (e.g., 
Zawalinska, 2004; Czyzewski, 2004) are too specific and lack a comparative approach. (A 
detailed analysis of the Polish country-relevant studies will be provided in Chapter 3) 
In their turn, complex cross-country studies (e.g., Macours and Swinnen, 2000a; 
Lerman, 2000; Csaki et.al, 1999) are too general because of their research scope: some 
studies cover more than 28 countries (Kim and An, 2007) and include not only the CEEC 
region, but also East and Central Asia (e.g., Macours and Swinnen, 2000a; Lerman, 2000).   
Other shortcomings of the existing scholarship on the dissertation topic include:  use of 
the micro-data from the surveus (e.g., Petric, 2002; Csaki and Lerman,  2001);  focuse on the 
selected groups of agricultural producers (e.g, Gardner and  Lerman, 2006; Lerman and 
Schreinemachers, 2002; Munroe, 2001; Brada and King, 1993);  particular product (crop or 
livestock) orientation (e.g., Tonini, 2007; Kuipers, 2013; Guba, 2000; Budzynski and 
Krasowicz, 2008; Krasowicz  and Kus, 2006);  specific variable selection (e.g., Latruffe et.al., 
2004;  Gorton and Davidova, 2008;  Dries and  Swinnen, 2002;  Swinnen et.al., 2005;   
Petrick  and  Kloss,  2012; Swinnen and Vranken, 2010).  
                                                          
3
 Poland due to the fastest reforms’  pace among CEEC and  existence of the private property for the agricultural 
land during the socialism, Belarus due to the slowest reforms’ pace among the CEEC. The detailed description of 
the Polish –Belarusian  controversy for the GDP dynamic vv. index of economic freedom (reforms progress) is 
provided by Chubrik (2003) 
 5 
All the above-mentioned limitations constrain the generalizability of the results. In 
contrast, in this thesis, the data (aggregated on macro-level) sidestep the pitfalls of both over-
specification and over-generalization.  
 
1.4. Data  
This section discusses the issue of the reliability of the agricultural data, and provides a 
general description of the data sources and types of variables used for the purposes of the 
research. 
The problem of quality and reliability of the agricultural data “has been topical for 
many years and the debate is still ongoing” (Tonini, 2007, p.18). Collecting, proceeding and 
estimating agricultural data is not an easy task even for normal, “non-transition” economies, 
because it “requires well-organized statistical offices with substantial resources and 
considerable good faith” (Federico, 2005, p.20). However the resources could “simply be not 
available” and “good faith may also be in short supply” (Federico, 2005, p.21). For example, 
“farmers may have an interest in not providing accurate information” because (i) they would 
like “to conceal some of their products for fear of the taxman,” as well as the “policies of 
compulsory delivery, as occurred in many LDCs in 1960-70s,” or (ii) farmers would have an 
“opposite incentive to over-report the output” due to the “massive adoption of price subsidies 
in many OECD countries since 1930s” (Federico, 2005, p.21).   
Besides the above-mentioned problems, which are common for all types of economies 
(non-transitional, transitional, developed, least-developed and so forth), there is also a set of 
specific “transitional statistic data” problems. These problems quite often are termed 
“politically-induced” statistical deviations in data measurement, and they are mainly related to 
the “manipulation” of figures “for political purposes” (Federico, 2005, p.21). These 
politically induced deviations are usually related to both the output and inputs sides.  
Regarding the output debate, there is agreement on the existence of an agricultural 
production decline at the beginning of the transformation. However, the scale and magnitude 
of the decline have been called into question. Alongside the purely technical difficulties 
associated with output measurement in a fast-growing private sector during transition, Liefert 
and Swinnen (2002) put forth that official statistical data overstated the magnitude of output 
decline due to over-reporting in the Socialist era.  According to these researchers, at that time 
the main goal was to produce as much agricultural output as possible: to reach the “Plan” 
goals in light of food security concerns. Consequently, agricultural producers over-reported 




p.44) defined two types of such over-reporting: (1) “write-ins” (“pripiski” in Russian), that is, 
”reporting higher output than one actually produced,” and (2) “manipulations with output 
structure registered as output growth but actually were only [reflected] increases in  prices” . 
In other words, the “write-ins” overstated the output while measuring it in “physical items” 
(kilograms, tons, litres, and so on) and price manipulations overstated the output, while 
measuring it in terms of prices.  Regarding the inputs issue, it is widely believed that in the 
Socialist period, “the inputs were often applied wastefully” and “the quantities of inputs used 
were often exaggerated by the agricultural producers” (Tonini, 2007, p. 146). The lack of the 
proper incentives due to the soft budget constraints could be considered as the main reason for 
the inputs wastage, while the exaggeration of the quantities of the used inputs could refer to 
the specificity of the centrally-planning system, where the centrally-planned inputs allocation 
(supply) was based on the quantity of the inputs used previously (in the preceding year, or the 
average sum of the previous years inputs’ consumption). Hence, farm managers were not 
interested in reporting the decrease of the inputs use (which might have happened for any 
reasons), because in doing so, the inputs’ supply to their farm could be reduced as a result. 
However, these arguments (both for output and input over-reporting) neglect the point 
that the scale of over-reporting (especially in regard to “write-ins”) in a very thoroughly 
controlled Socialist economy could not have been sufficiently high to affect the “output-
inputs” mis-measurement at the macro-economy level in a very significant way. 
In the transition period, the incentives were supposed to be changed in the opposite 
direction for both output reporting and input use. Regarding the former, it is assumed that 
producers under-reported their output to avoid taxes and to “strength[en] their arguments for 
more state support” (Lifert & Swinnen,  2002, p.4) . The latter argument could be especially 
applicable to Poland, with its predominantly family-run, privately owned and small-scale 
agriculture, while in less-reformed Belarus, the “old command incentives to overstate output 
indicators still persist[ed]”  (Wandel et.al., 2001, p.146) . Inputs, in turn, began to be applied 
in more productive ways. The issue of the exclusion of small, private enterprises from the 
reporting system also played its own role in the data bias.
4
 
Finalizing the issue of the transformation data quality and reliability, it is possible to 
conclude that until now, no rigorous studies have investigated this problem. Therefore 
scholars, experts and politicians, keeping  in mind that “imperfect data are better than no data” 
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 For example, “for Poland,  the dairy output and dairy cattle stock in subsistence farming were deducted from 
national aggregate dairy output and dairy cattle stock, so that only data for the commercial dairy sector were 
considered” for national data (Tonini,  2007,  p.149) 
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(Federico, 2005, p.21) still use the existing  official data just notifying about it 
“inadequateness”,  without the specification of  the scale and extent of the possible deviations 
in  the agricultural data.  
The main variables used for the purpose of this thesis are the following: variables 
aggregated on the  country-relevant  macro-level: (i) “GAO”-  Gross Agricultural Output; (ii) 
“land” - total agricultural or arable land for each country; (iii) “labor” – number of people 
working in the agricultural sector of each country or  rural population; (iv) “machinery” -
agricultural machinery (tractors in use) for each country; (v) “fertilizers” - fertilizer 




However, while the above-mentioned quantitative indicators have been a “very handy 
proxy,” they are not good markers of qualitative improvements, especially for labor, as well 
as for other inputs (Federico, 2005, p.59). Therefore indicators such as working hours, 
Average Working Units (AWU) and labor salary, mechanical draft force resources (in 
thousands of draft units) for tractors and land quality and land-use intensity were also used in 
the subsequent chapters of this study.  
The data for the research were mainly gleaned from two types of sources – the 
international organization databases (for the comparative CEEC analysis in Chapter 2) and the 
national (Poland and Belarus) statistical databases for the detailed Poland and Belarus 
country-level analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.    Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 consider the both types 
of sources.  
The international statistical data sources included the FAO (Food and Agriculture 
Organization), the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), the 
WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies) and the WB (World Bank).  
These datasets are usually derived from official national statistics, but collected data are 
processed and evaluated according to a unified methodology and similar standards, which 
makes them comparable across countries and allows them to be used for cross-country 
analysis (bearing in mind the above-noted issue of the quality and reliability of agricultural 
output-input data for CEEC transition economies).   
The Polish national statistical data sources were the Central Statistical Office of Poland 
(GUS) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Developments (MRiRW). Some specific 
data were also taken from agriculturally oriented agencies like the Agency for Restructuring 
                                                          
5
 More detailed descriptions of  the data used for the  empirical analysis will be provided  in the subsequent 
chapters  
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and Modernization of Agriculture and the Agricultural Property Agency. These data sources 
are commonly used by the Polish and international academic community and are generally 
considered reliable. 
 The data for the Belarusian-specific analysis (Chapter 4) were mainly taken from the 
State Statistical Committee (SSC) of the Republic of Belarus through the official statistical 
bulletins published by the central and regional branches of the SSC. Some data were obtained 
from Sakovich (2008c), a comprehensive compilation of Belarusian agricultural data collected 
from the State Statistical Committee, Belarus Ministry of Agriculture and archival sources.  
Generally, all Belarusian data may be considered consistent and reliable (with the 
exception of the some data inconsistency for the early transitional period 1990-1995), because 
no extensive debate exists in Belarusian academic literature regarding the reliability of 
agricultural data, which are collected and published by the State Statistical Committee.  
Belarusian “alternative” and independent public economists  do consistently make 
claims in popular press interviews about state authorities’ attempts to paint a relatively rosy 
picture for politically populist reasons, especially with such sensitive indicators as  output, 
prices, inflation and exchange rates (Dorohov, 2006; Leonid Zlotnikov objasnil…., 2014; V 
2009 godu…,2009). Thus far, however, these claims have not been supported by any rigorous 
research that is relevant to the agricultural sector or to the Belarusian economy as a whole.    
However some concerns about agricultural data consistency and quality were raised by 
Western scholars, which include (i) the estimation of the amount of the state support of the 
agricultural sector; (ii) the actual labor force use and costs; and (iii) the market costs and 
transparency of the input transfers, agricultural and social services provided by large 
corporate farms (former “kolhoz” ad “sovhoz”) to subsidiary households and farmers 
(Freinkman et al., 2005; Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009). The latter issue is very often raised 
by “domestic” Belarusian proponents of large-scale corporate (actually, still state-run) 
agricultural farms, when it comes to the assessment of households’ plots and private farmers’ 
productivity, profitability and competiveness. 
 The inconsistent, puzzling, and sometimes even actual absence of data on the real value 
(amount) of state support to the agricultural sector is probably one of the most important 
obstacles for those studying Belarusian agriculture. Belarus is the only country in the CEEC 
region for which PSE and NRA indexes have not been calculated.  This might be explained in 
two (possible) ways: (i) a not fully “transparent policy” (Freinkman et al., 2005, p. 204); and 
 9 
(ii) methodological problems. The variety of the channels of state support, 
6
 its’ levels  - 
national, regional, sub-regional and types - government expenditures, fiscal support, “debt 
rescheduling, credit write-offs, lower than average industry tariffs for electricity and heat” 
(Babicki et al., 2003, p.5) makes it difficult and sometimes even impossible to calculate 
accurately the amount of state support that is given to agriculture, not even taking into 
account the hyper-inflation and sharp jump in the currency exchange rates at the beginning of 
the transformation period. All these affect the accuracy, as well as cross-country and time-
span comparability of these calculations. Some attempts at state-support calculations were 
made by WB teams in their Belarus-specific country reports; however, their calculations were 
mainly done on the farm-level 
7
  and did not cover the entire period in question (but only 
2003-2007 period at the most).   
The issues of market costs and transparency of input transfers, agricultural and social 
services provided by large corporate farms to subsidiary households and farmers and actual 
labor force use and costs are mainly raised in the light of the impressive performance of 
private agriculture (especially household plots). Western scholars (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 
2009; Freinkman et al., 2005) argue that the productivity, profitability and competitiveness of 
household plots and private farmers would be downsized significantly if all the input transfers 
(ex. fertilizers and machinery use), social services (medical care, schooling and so forth) and 
undeclared family labor use
8
 were to be transparent, clearly calculated and properly (market) 
priced. While a frequent topic of discussion, these issues still lack even the most basic 
research, leaving us in the dark with regard to the size and scale of the problem. Finally, the 
general “disclaimer” regarding the quality and reliability of agricultural output-input data for 
CEEC transition economies (explained previously) could also be applied to the Belarusian 
data.  
 
1.5. Methodology outline  
Within the framework of the thesis, the success or failure of the reforms will be 
assessed in terms of agricultural production and agricultural productivity. For each of these 
standard measures of economic efficiency, a separate set of methodological instruments will 
be applied.  
                                                          
6
 Around 24-30 according to  Babicki et al. (2003)    
7
 Which includes the sample of more than 1500 large former soviet-type enterprises, but not all of them, and 
totally exclude the farmers and subsidiary household plots from the estimation.  (Cramon-Taubadel et al. , 2009) 
8
 For example people who permanently live and work in the cities very often come to villages to help their close 
relatives on weekend basis and  sometimes even take their vacation days during the “rush  agricultural periods” 
like harvesting and etc. 
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For the purposes of the agricultural production (output) analysis, the Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the production function will be used.  Although it has well–known 
limitations, this specification of the production function allows the use of the estimated results 
for productivity (TFP) calculation. The obtained results can then be compared with other 
studies, thus overcoming the problem of limited number of observations.  
For the purposes of the agricultural productivity analysis, the partial productivity and 
TFP (Total Factors Productivity) calculations will be applied. The partial productivity indexes 
will be calculated as agricultural output per factor unit (land, labor, machinery, livestock and 
fertilizers). This analysis, despite its common use, has been heavily criticized by economists 
for its potential to lead to misleading results (Zawalinska, 2004). For example, in some 
circumstances, an increase of partial productivity indicators could be caused by the simple 
inputs substitution or the fact that input fall even faster than output, rather than by 
productivity improvements.  To avoid this problem, the TFP will be estimated. 
 
1.6. Contribution to the field of the study    
This study contributes to the existing literature on agricultural reforms in CEE countries 
during the short-term transformational period (1990-2004), and on agricultural development 
in the European region in general in the long-term (1960-2004).  The research novelty is 
three-fold: choice of country cases, analyzed time-frame, and research conclusions. 
This is the first study to offer a comparative and systematic analysis of the rarely 
contrasted (due to different starting conditions and reform progress development) country- 
case studies of Poland and Belarus.  The results of this research indicate that these two 
countries are not reforms outliers (as they are frequently considered in the transformational 
literature), but rather represent typical examples of long-term developmental trends.   
Also, for the first time, Belarusian agricultural development, which previously was 





 ) or was part of comparative multi-country studies
11
 - become one of 
the main objects of the research.  In this way, the construction of a more complex and 
comprehensive transformational history puzzle is made possible, and the somewhat ignored 
Belarusian transformational historiography is incorporated into the transformational history 
discourse. 
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   For example -Csaki et.al., 1994; Csaki et  al., 2000; Freinkman et  al., 2005; Cramon-Taubadel et  al., 2009. 
10
   For example - Babicki et  al., 2003 and Babocki et al., 2004. 
11
   For example - Drager, 2000; Dzun and Tereszczuk, 2009;  Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006. 
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This research is the first in agricultural transformation literature to compare CEE 
countries' agricultural development with that of advanced Western European countries. 
Previous studies either limited their scope to the intra-CEEC comparisons (e.g., Csaki and 
Kray, 2005; Childress, 2002; Deininger, 2002; and Lerman, 2000) or contrasted CEE 
countries with other transformational countries from East Asia (China, Vietnam - e.g., 
Macours and Swinnen, 2002; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004; Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006). This 
allows us to overcome the shortcomings of the previous studies that solely took into account 
transformational countries, and to incorporate CEE agricultural transformation history into the 
wider context of European agricultural history.  
Although the research is mainly focused on the first fourteen years of the transformation 
(1990-2004), it also comprises a long-term comparative analysis (1960-2004), comparing 
the agricultural development of CEE countries and developed Western countries in the 
prolonged forty-four year period. This approach allows us to put agricultural transformation 
studies, which are usually limited to a short-term period of no more than 20-24 years, into a 
long-term perspective, and to move beyond “transformational specificity”.   
Thus, this study aims to fill a significant gap in the transformational literature, which is 
mainly concerned with establishing the interdependence of the reforms’ progress (reforms’ 
profundity)  and  the reforms’ outcomes (production and productivity dynamics), putting 
somewhat aside the  importance of capital endowment.
12
 In contrast, this study explores the 
interdependence of capital endowment and agricultural reforms outcomes, and provides 
empirical evidence of the significant impact of capital endowment on the outcomes of the 
reforms.   
 
1.7. Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter, which explains 
the research background and provides a literature overview, data and methodology description 
and general thesis outline.  
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of CEEC agricultural performance during the 
transformation period, with a focus on Polish and Belarusian agricultural performance 
compared to other CEE countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Russia and Ukraine).  
It starts with an outline of the CEE countries agricultural transformation history (Section 1) – 
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that concludes that Poland and Belarus are situated at opposite ends of the reformation 
continuum: Poland is the fastest reformer and Belarus is the slowest reformer among the 
studied seven countries.  Next, in Sections 2 and 3, an agricultural production and 
productivity evaluation is provided (using the results of the pooled regression for seven CEEC 
countries). The conclusion is that Poland is the best performer among the Vysiegrad-4 
countries (herein after "V4") and Belarus is the best performer among the Former Soviet 
Union (hereinafter –"FSU countries") as well as among some V4 countries.   
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 evaluate Polish and Belarusian agricultural performance.  
The “Poland Chapter” (Chapter 3) offers an analysis of Polish agricultural performance 
during the fifteen years of transformation vis-a-vis a “success or failure of reforms” 
assessment in terms of agricultural production and productivity.  It starts with an overview of 
Polish agricultural history in Section 1, evaluating the Polish transformation as fast-paced, 
well-developed and practically accomplished by 2004. After that, the Polish agricultural 
production and productivity analysis is provided in Sections 2 and 3. The results of this 
analysis allow us to consider the transformational results for Poland a “success” in terms of 
both agricultural production and productivity performance. 
 The “Belarus chapter” (Chapter 4) is dedicated to an analysis of Belarus agricultural 
performance during the transformational period.  The Chapter starts with an evaluation of the 
country’s transformation history (Section 1), assessing the Belarusian transformation as slow-
paced and underdeveloped.  Then, in Sections 2 and 3, an analysis of the Belarusian-specific 
features of agricultural production and productivity (based on the results of the Belarusian-
specific pooled regression) is provided, stating that the transformation results for Belarus 
could be considered a “success” in terms of agricultural production and productivity 
performance. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to a comparative analysis of Polish and Belarusian agricultural 
performance, and addresses the question of how two countries with such different 
transformational agendas (Poland following the “Big-Bang” approach and Belarus with its 
slow-paced reforms) achieved similarly successful transformational results in terms of 
agricultural production and productivity.  The answer is provided within the framework of the 
hypothesis that “the capital endowment has a more decisive impact on the reforms’ success 
(or failure) than the reforms’ profundity” and is supported by the empirical evidence. The 
observed differences in the speed and magnitude of the production and productivity dynamics 
 13 
are explained by the differences in the “institutions” in a broadly defined sense, 
13
 or to be 
more specific, by the transition economies discourse, the differences in the reforms’ paths and 
initial conditions (Swinnen, 2006).   
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 “institutions” –i.e. “a set of formal or informal rules to determine the initial ownership of the goods and factors 
(property rights) and to regulate the exchanges (contracts, markets, and other forms of distribution”  





































CHAPTER 2. CEEC agricultural performance during the transformation period. 
This chapter provides a general overview of CEEC agricultural performance during the 
transformation period, with a focus on Polish and Belarusian agricultural performance 
compared to other CEE countries. It analyzes the seven CEE countries' (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) agricultural performance during 
fifteen years of transformation in regard to the “success or failure of reforms” assessment in 
terms of agricultural production and productivity. It starts with an outline of the CEE 
countries' agricultural transformation history (Section 2.1). Next, agricultural production 
(output) dynamics will be analyzed in Section 2.2. Then, in Section 2.3 agricultural 
productivity improvements will be evaluated in terms of partial productivity indexes. After 
that, in the Section 2.4, a panel regression for the seven countries in question will be 
estimated in order to assess the impact of the changes in inputs use on GAO dynamic and to 
calculate the TFP indexes.  Finally, the concluding remarks (in the Conclusion) will briefly 
outline the main findings of the produced research.  
 
2.1. CEEC agricultural transformation history overview.  
This section is dedicated to a brief overview of the selected Central and Eastern 
European countries' agricultural transformation history (see the map of the CEEC region – 
Figure 2.1.). The section starts with a description of the basic elements (“cornerstones”) of 
the transformation process; next, a general overview of the evolution and outcomes of the 
transformation process within the framework of the established “basic elements” will be 
provided; and finally, concluding remarks outline the main findings of this section.  
The transition of ex-Socialist agriculture from a centrally-planned to market-oriented 
system is a complex, multidimensional process that consists of several inter-dependent 
elements. Summarizing the findings of the main, agriculture-relevant  transformation  
studies,
14
 it is possible to distinguish the following “basic elements” of the transformation 
process, which constitute the so-called “taxonomy of reforms”: (1) land reform;  (2) 
liberalization of the outputs and inputs markets (incl. agricultural price and trade polices 
liberalization, “the demonopolisation and privatization  of trade and food processing”, and the 
creation of the rural banking system);  (3) the establishment of the new  institutional structure 
relevant to the market economy  (Csaba and Nucifora, 2006, p. 2). 
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The next paragraphs of this section will provide a brief overview of the process and 
outcomes of the agricultural transformation in the seven countries in question within the 
framework of the above-mentioned “basic elements” of the transformation process. A more 
detailed evaluation of the Polish and Belarusian transformational history will be provided in 
Chapter 3 (for Poland) and Chapter 4 (for Belarus). 
Due to its political, economic and social significance, land reform was the most 
important (and highly prioritized) element of the reform agenda in all seven countries in 
question. While the land ownership structure might be considered homogeneous in all seven 
studied countries during the Socialist period,
16
 the scope, methods and pace of the 
transformational land reforms differed significantly among the countries. 
The process of land reform (land privatization) may be conceptualized along three 
dimensions  according to Deininger (2002, p.992):  “(i) the recognition of private property 
rights; (ii) the mechanism for the privatization of the land and its allocation to producers; (iii) 
the transferability of the land rights”. An analysis of the land reform (privatization) process in 
the seven countries in question highlights a huge heterogeneity with respect to the three 
above-stated dimensions. (see Table 2.1)  
All V4 countries in question”allow the full private ownership for the all types of land” 
(Deininger, 2002, p.992), but adopted different privatization strategies.  The Czech and 
Slovak republics generally chose “to privatize land by restitution [of] it to the former owners 
in the form of physical plots” (Deininger, 2002, p.992). Hungary adopted a “mixed strategy”: 
the “land was restituted to the former owners, but a portion if it was also distributed free in 
the interest of social equity” (Deininger, 2002, p.992). According to the national laws of the 
V4 countries, foreign physical or legal persons were not allowed to acquire ownership of 
agricultural land.  Even after the EU accession, foreigners generally were unable “to purchase 
agricultural land for a transitional period”, which was seven years for the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and twelve years for Poland (Swinnen and Vranken, 2008, p.i). However, 
“there are generally no restrictions on renting agricultural land by foreigners,” and the 
definition of the term “foreigners” in the legal restrictions provided some (restricted) 
loopholes for land acquisition (Swinnen and Vranken, 2008,p.i ).  
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 except for Poland, where private small-scale  family-rum farms constituted the 77% of the total land holdings 
Deininger (2002) 
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Table 2.1.  Land reform process
17
  





Poland all land sale of state land buy-and-sell, leasing 
Czech R. all land Restitution buy-and-sell, leasing 
Slovakia all land Restitution buy-and-sell, leasing 
Hungary all land Restitution and 
distribution 
buy-and-sell, leasing 
Russia all land Distribution buy-and-sell dubious, leasing 
Ukraine all land Distribution buy-and-sell dubious, leasing 
Belarus household plots 
only 
None buy-and-sell dubious, use 
rights non-transferable 
 
Regarding the countries of the FSU, all three countries in question chose land 
distribution as the method of privatization, but only Russia and Ukraine recognized (mainly 
formally) private property for all land. In contrast, in Belarus private property rights were 
recognized for household plots only.  
However, not only the scope and the mechanisms of land reform show the profound 
difference between the V4 and FSU countries. The outcomes of land reform (privatization) 
differ significantly between these two groups of countries as well.  While the privatization of 
land is practically accomplished in most V4 countries, the land reform progress in FSU 
countries seems rather dubious, especially while considering not only the adopted (but most 
often not implemented) land reform legislation, but the share of privately owned land, which 
is up to 80% on average in CEE countries (except for Hungary)
 
and less than 30% on average 
in FSU countries. (see Table 2.2) 
Table 2.2.  Land privatization progress
18
  
Private land (%) Poland Czech R.  Slovakia Hungary Belarus Russia Ukraine 
in 1990 72 5 5 6 7 2 7 
in 2000 77 80 99 54 17  13 26 
in 2003-04  78 81 99 60  16 18 32 
in 2009-10 81 90 99 60 12 31 43 
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 Source:  Adapted  from Deininger (2002, p.993) 
18
 Data   for 1990 and 2000 are from Deininger (2002). Data for 2003-2004 are from national Ministries of 
Agriculture. Data for years 2009-2010: for Russia are from - Agriculture, hunting and forestry in Russia (2011, 
p.72); for Hungary are  from   Hungarian Agricultural Statistics Yearbook (various years); for Belarus are from 
Belarusian Agricultural Statistics Yearbook ( 2012, p.64);  for Ukraine are from Ukrainian Statistical Yearbook 
of Agriculture (2012, p.80);  for Slovakia and Czech Republic are  from national Ministries of Agriculture;  for 
Poland are  from  Agricultural Statistics Yearbook of Poland (various years). 
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Thus, the analysis of the land reform process in the seven countries in question allows 
to come to the following conclusions regarding its methods, scope and progress: (i) land 
restitution in the V4 and land distribution in the FSU were the main privatization  methods;
19
 
(ii)  formally, the  scope of the land privatization (potential private ownership)  included the 
private ownership to all land in V4 and   some FSU (Russia and Ukraine), but actually in FSU 
“little more than the name of enterprise has changed”   (Deininger, 2002, p.993); (iii) the land 
reform progress is uneven between  these two groups of countries – V4  countries had mainly 
accomplished land privatization, while in FSU the process could be considered as still 
ongoing (or even stalled to some extent), (iv) the land reform progress differs substantially 
between Poland and Belarus. Among V4 countries, Poland is the country with the highest 
share of privatized land
20
 and also is one of the most reform-advanced countries. Belarus is 
the least reformed country among the European FSU countries.  
A detailed explanation of the slow progress of land reform in Belarus will be provided 
in Chapter 4, but in short, the slow progress of land reform are typically considered to be 
related to: (i) lack of governmental know-how regarding implementation of economic reform 
(ii) an absence of  financial resources to support the institutional restructuring; (iii) lack of 
interest in land-privatization among the main actors involved in this process  (central 
government, local  officials, directors and chief executives of the large state farms and 
(surprisingly) the peasants themselves. 
The liberalization of the outputs and inputs markets followed particular paths and 
had specific features in each of the seven studied countries due to the different initial 
conditions, chosen transformation policy and so on.  However, besides the specific 
differences, some common evolutionary trends in the processes of the market liberalization 
within the period in question (1990-2004) can be identified. Anderson and Swinnen (2008) 
did the most comprehensive analysis, which is as well the one most relevant to this work. 
They identified the following two periods during the process of market liberalization: the 
transition period (1989-2000) and the pre-EU accession period (2000-2004), referring mainly 
to the Central Eastern European countries (V4 and other mainly non-FSU countries)    
According to these researchers, the transition period was characterized by three main 
phases:  (1) the liberalization phase, (2) “the fire-brigade policy-making phase” and (3) the 
“policy- consolidation phase”, although they mentioned that, “in reality, there was no clear 
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 with  some exceptions 
20
 Although it is mainly because  Poland was the only socialist country with the predominantly private  small-
scale  and family-run agriculture 
 20 
separation among the phases and not all countries moved from one phase to the next at the 
same time” (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p. 57). 
 
 
The “liberalization phase” (1988-1992), for these researchers was marked by trade and 
price liberalization and a reduction of subsidies to producers and consumers, which resulted in 
a soaring of consumer prices, a decline in real incomes and a fall in domestic demand.  
During the second phase (“the fire-brigade policy making” in “the early to mid-1990s”
 
(Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p. 58) CEEC governments responded to the pressures of the 
social conflict (caused by plummeting incomes and soaring prices) by “introducing or re-
introducing price and trade interventions in order to protect consumers and producers against 
the negative … effects” (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p.58) 
During the “policy consolidation phase”
 
of the transition period (from the mid-1990s to 
2000), governments had “attempted to formulate more comprehensive agricultural policies for 
long-term intervention in agriculture. Most of the policy regimes passed through the various 
degrees of re-instumentalization to address domestic policy objectives, comply with 
international agreements, or, later, bring agricultural policies more in line with the policies of 
the EU. Some governments introduced policy instruments that already resembled the CAP 
prior to the MacSharry reforms” (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p.59) 
The pre-EU accession period (2000-2004) for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary could be considered, in Anderson and Swinnen's view, to be the onset of the EU 
policy convergence, narrowing “the gap in product quality and prices” between the CEEC and 
Western Europe and the rapid growth of the trade integration and foreign investment 
(Anderson and Swinnen, 2008, p.60). 
If one would were to apply this periodization framework to the FSU countries in 
question, it would be possible to conclude that FSU countries went through the “liberalization 
phase” and entered the “fire-brigade policy making phase” at the same time as the V4 
countries. However, after that the progressive onward movement through the following 
phases was slowed down substantially, and FSU countries got stuck in either the “fire-
brigade policy-making phase” or the “policy-consolidation phase” due to the FSU 
governments' inexperience, agricultural policy inconsistence (or even absence of the long-
term agricultural policy) and no perspective for the EU accession (and consequently no access 
to the EU pre-accession funds).     
Although Poland and Belarus followed the above-described tendencies in general,  there 
were  some country-relevant specificities of these processes, which will be discussed later in 
Chapters 3 and  4.    
 21 
Finalizing the analysis of the process of the liberalization of the outputs and inputs 
market, it is possible to conclude that although each country followed its own particular 
market liberalization approach, agricultural policy in all seven countries in question followed 
the same path: at the beginning of the transformation process in 1989, agricultural policy was 
oriented to build up the liberal  agricultural economy with low support and protectionist  
levels (Agricultural Situation and Prospects in CEEC, 1998), but during the transformation 
period this free-market agricultural policy gradually transformed into a  more protectionist 
and better regulated one.  
The establishment of a new institutional structure relevant to the market economy was 
a very complex and politically difficult task, which in general required (i) diminishing the role 
of government influence in the agricultural sector; (ii) the development and implementation of 
a new legal framework and (iii) a modification of the “education-research-extension” system. 
The change of the governmental role in agriculture mainly meant the replacement of 
its typical command-economy functions as the “establishment of mandatory targets for 




to functions more appropriate to a market economy such as the 
establishment of “the ground rules and facilitate[ing] the conditions for smooth and 
prosperous operation of markets and independent business organizations” (Csaki, 2002,  
p.16).  This task was supposed to be implemented by the modification of the former 
“command economy” Ministries of Agriculture, a dismantling of the former units related to 
central-planning and direct intervention missions and the establishing of new “market-
oriented” agencies and funds. 
 
An analysis of the process and outcomes of the diminishing of the government’s role in 
the agricultural sector shows that in V4 countries, this process was accelerated  from the very 
beginning of the 1990s and was almost accomplished by the turn of the century (it was also 
stimulated by the envisaged EU accession). The structures of the former Ministries of 
Agriculture were reorganized and new institutions (agencies, funds, payment units) 
responsible for the implementation and administration of particular goals of agricultural 
policy
21
 were established and began to operate.  However, in the FSU countries in question, 
the government and government-related institutions still performed the same functions as 
during the Socialist period, especially in Belarus and Ukraine. In Russia, some minor changes 
were implemented; the Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized and parts of its 
                                                          
21 like channeling the preferential credits to agriculture, agricultural product  intervention purchases and prices 
regulation, administration of the former state land (state farms)     
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responsibilities were transferred to the few newly created Federal Agencies in charge of rural 
development and agricultural markets.   
The development and implementation of the new legal framework also differed among 
the V4 and FSU countries. A glance at the chronology and typology of the adopted and 
implemented legislation reveals that in the V4 countries, this process underwent the following 
three phases: (i) adoption and implementation of the legislation essential for the transition 
from a centrally-planned to  market-oriented economy  (roughly 1988 -1995) (ii) adoption and 
implementation of legislation crucial for the operation of the newly established  market-
oriented  agricultural system  (roughly 1996-1999) and (iii) the harmonization of national 
agricultural legislation with EU norms and standards (1999-2004). Such an evolution of 
agricultural legislation (and further EU and CAP accession after 2004) allows us to assess the 
process of the development and implementation of the new legal framework for the V4 
countries in question, as it was mostly accomplished during the fifteen years of 
transformation. 
However, in the FSU countries, the process of development and implementation of the 
new legal framework was interrupted somewhere between the first and second above-
described V4 phases. As a result, the agricultural legislation (even fifteen years after the 
beginning of the transformation in the 1990s) still retained the main features of the former 
command economy.  
Regarding the process and outcomes of the reform (modification) of the “education-
research-extension” system, the seven countries in question could roughly be divided into 
three groups, according to a World Bank assessment report (Csaki and Zuschlag, 2004). The 
first group is comprised of the countries that already completed education and research 
system reorganization (or nearly completed, as for year 2004), and created a western-type 
extension system (e.g., Hungary and Czech Republic), where only some minor improvements 
needed to be introduced.    The second group is made up of the countries in which, despite the 
reform efforts, the educational, research and extension systems were still (as for year 2004) 
not fully relevant to  market economy conditions and required further improvements (e.g., 
Poland and the Czech Republic). The third group is comprised of all FSU countries in 
question ( Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) in which the adjustment of the agricultural education 
and research systems was very slow, had suffered from insufficient financing and in which a 
Western type of extension system had not been established yet. 
Finalizing the issue of the analysis of the institutional reforms, it is possible to 
conclude that profound differences exist between the V4 and FSU countries in terms of 
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the speed, scope and outcomes of this process, with practically accomplished 
institutional reforms in V4 countries and a very modestly transformed institutional 
system in FSU countries. 
The results of the above-provided analysis of the progress of the three main components 
of the transformation process (land reform, market liberalization and institutional changes) are 
supported by a numerical assessment of the reform progress provided by the Agricultural 
Reform Index of the World Bank.  This “Agricultural Reform Index” is a composite index 
that measures the progress of the following five transformational reforms: (i) land reform, (ii) 
“liberalization of agricultural markets” (price and market liberalization), (iii) “establishment 
of an institutional framework for marker agriculture”, (iv) “privatization and 
demonopolization of agricultural services” (agro-processing), and (v) “development of rural 
finance” (Lerman, 2007b, p.2). This Index has “a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 corresponds to a 
command economy and 10 to an economy with completed market reforms” (Lerman, 2007b, 
p.3).  
The most important limitation of this Agricultural Reforms Index, from our point of 
view, is its short time-span (only the years 1997-2005), which does not cover the beginning of 
the transformation period (1990-1996), when the most radical and important changes 
happened. Therefore, it revealed no significant dynamic changes (which took place in 1990-
1996), but provided a clear-cut picture of the final outcomes of the agricultural reforms and 
cross-country differences in it.  
 Other, more general limitations of this index include the “subjectivity of expert 
opinion”, statistical unreliability, limited cross-country comparability, vagueness of score 
attribution and so forth are well-described by Wandel et al. (2011). Therefore, although the 
Index does not provide much insight into the dynamics of the reform processes during the 
whole period in question, it could be used as a good benchmark for an assessment of the final 
results of the agricultural reforms by the end of 2005 year.   
The analysis of the Agricultural Reform Index during the 1997-2005 period confirms 
the “uneven reform progress”
 
(Csaki and Zuschlag, 2004, p.20) between the V4 and FSU 
countries, previously established in this section. (Figure 2.2. provides the results summary, 




Figure 2.2.  Status of agricultural reform 
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As  for years 1997-2003,  the V4 countries were the “fast reformers,” with a total score 
of reforms (Agricultural Reform Index) ranging from 9.0 for Hungary and 8.1 for Poland and 
Slovakia, with the FSU countries lagging far behind with a score of 5.7 for Russia, 5.6  for  
Ukraine and even 1.8 for Belarus. Starting from 2004, the V4 countries that joined the EU 
were no longer considered in this ranking, because according to the authors of the report, the 
V4 countries accession to EU had automatically assumed the completion of the market 
reforms in these countries.  The total score for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus remained 
practically unchanged for the subsequent 2004-2005 years.
23
 
Therefore, finalizing the issue of the reform processes and its outcomes in the 
seven countries in question, it is possible to come to following conclusions: (i) despite the 
specific reform path of each country,  in V4 countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic) the transition of ex-Socialist agriculture from a centrally 
planned to market-oriented system was practically accomplished by 2004, while in the 
FSU countries only “moderate progress” (Csaki et.al.,  2004, p.viii ) was achieved  by some 
countries (Russia, Ukraine) and practically no progress was observed  in Belarus; (ii) Poland 
and Belarus differ significantly in terms of the reform progress; Poland is among the best 
reformers in the CEEC region, while Belarus is the least-reformed country, not only among 
the V4, but also among the FSU countries.    
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  Based on Csaki et  al. (2006),  Csaki  and Zuschlag (2004) and Csaki and Nash (1998) data  
23
 The Agricultural Reform Index was only calculated for 1997-2005. Any evaluations have not been published 
since 2006.   
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2.2. CEEC agricultural production during the transformation period. 
This section analyzes the Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) production in the CEE 
countries.  It is organized in the following way: it starts with the rationale for using 
agricultural output as an indicator of the “success or failure” of the reforms; next, a detailed 
GAO dynamics analysis is provided; then, an overview of the reasons for the decline and slow 
recovery of the GAO provided in contemporary literature is presented; after that, a detailed 
analysis of the impact of price liberalization and subsidization policies as the  most commonly 
referred reasons for the initial GAO decline is offered; and finally, the concluding remarks 
end the section. 
Before starting the analysis of the agricultural output dynamic, I shall provide my 
rationale for using agricultural production (output) dynamics as the measure of the success of 
the reforms. 
 One of the primary goals of agricultural reform (as proclaimed by the politicians of the 
CEE countries) was the solving of the problem of food shortages (Childress, 2002) or deficits 
of some food products. It was expected that after the implementation of the market reforms, 
the liberalized agriculture would be able to produce more output, thereby solving the food-
shortage problem.  
 The theoretical background for this approach (although highly criticized by Aslund 
(2012) and Diamond (1999) is provided by Przeworski (1991), who argued that “democracy 
had to justify itself by material achievements” (Przeworski, 1991, p.32), and assumed “that 
people opted for democracy for the sake of economic welfare, not for political reasons” 
according to Aslund (2012, p.48).  
Hence, at the risk of oversimplification, the main goal of the agricultural reforms in the 
CEEC region as proclaimed by local politicians
 
and included in every reform agenda was not 
reform for the sake of reform, but rather, reform toward an increase agricultural output, in 
order to solve the food deficit/food shortage problem.  
 However, the implementation of market reforms in the CEE countries has not yet 
brought the expected fast and straightforward agricultural recovery. On the contrary, 
agricultural production initially experienced a steep decline, which was obvious when 
compared to the agricultural production increase (during the same period of time) in the 
developed countries.   
 This situation surprised many observers, because after the successful completion of 
agricultural reforms in the East Asia region (China, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar) it was 
expected that the CEE and FSU countries’ transformation would bring immediate growth and 
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recovery in agriculture (Brooks and Nash, 2002). The difference in the agricultural production 
dynamics between the East Asian and CEE (FSU) countries was remarkable.  During first 
decade of its transformation, the Gross Agricultural Output (GAO) rapidly increased in East 
Asian countries, but in all Eastern European and FSU countries it fell steeply (see Appendix 
2.2.). 
 However the speed of the GAO recovery (i.e., length of time between the beginning of 
the transformation and reaching the nadir of the GAO decline) differs susbstantially among 
the Eastern European and FSU countries. First, the GAO decline was halted in the Balkan 
countries (Albania, Romania, and Slovenia) - two to three years after the transformation 
began. Then, it was halted in most Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czech 
Republic) and in some FSU-Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan) - five to six years into the transformation. And finally, almost ten years into the 
transformation, the most prolonged and profound GAO decline was halted in Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). 
A country-relevant GAO dynamic analysis (Table 2.3 and Appendix 2.3.) clearly 
shows that every country from the CEEC region experienced an initial decline in gross 
agricultural production during the transformation period (the scale of which differs from 
country to country), which was then followed by an increase. 
 The Polish GAO decline can be considered small and fairly stable over the studied 
period. The Czech Republic’s and Slovakia’s GAO continued its downward slide till the turn 
of the century. Hungary’s GAO dropped at the beginning of the transformation period, and 
then began to recover. The GAO in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine had a steep downward trend 
till the end of 1990s,
   
 and then started to show signs of recovery (see Appendix 2.3.). 
The results of the GAO dynamic analysis allow us to come to the following conclusions 
with respect to the magnitude, speed, reform policy and regional differences of GAO declines. 
The magnitude of GAO decline varies substantially, from the 83.7% average GAO in Poland 
to 62.9% in Slovakia, and there is no substantial sub-regional difference in the average annual 
decline level between V4 and FSU countries: the maximum GAO average for Poland is 
83.7% and 80.1% for Belarus, the minimum GAO average for Slovakia is 62.9% and 65.9% 
for Ukraine. 
The period during which countries reached the minimum level of GAO very clearly 
reflects the type of the reform policy implemented during the transformation.  Countries such 
as Poland and Hungary that chose a “Big Bang” reform approach reached their bottom line 
faster than other countries and started to recover faster. Their GAO decrease was the lowest in 
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the CEEC region. All the FSU and some V4 countries (Czech Republic and Slovakia) that 
opted for a more gradual reform path  reached their  minimum GAO level almost a full decade 
after the transition , and the magnitude of their GAO decline was more profound, than in the 
“fast-paced” reforming countries. 
Table 2.3.  CEE countries' GAO and GDP dynamics
24
         
  
Hungary Poland Chech R. Slovakia Belarus Russia Ukraine 
GAO GDP GAO GDP GAO GDP GAO GDP GAO GDP GAO GDP GAO GDP 
1990 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1991 100.4 88 92.5 93 91.1 88 90.9 85 94.5 99 89.9 95 85.8 92 
1992 78.9 85 80.8 95 80.1 88 71.2 80 90.3 89 87.7 81 79.4 83 
1993 71.1 85 90.8 99 78.3 88 65.4 77 94.4 83 83.3 74 79.8 71 
1994 74 87 75.6 104 67.8 91 62.4 81 79.5 73 73.2 65 67.8 55 
1995 72.2 89 81.9 111 69.8 96 59.6 86 77 65 68.4 62 66.1 48 
1996 77.8 89 84.6 118 70.7 101 61.8 92 79.6 67 66.1 60 59.4 43 
1997 79 92 80 127 67.9 100 62 96 73.1 75 67.1 61 59.6 42 
1998 79.1 95 86.5 133 68.6 99 58.7 101 72.7 81 56.2 58 52.3 41 
1999 76.3 98 81 139 68.8 101 55.5 101 67.5 84 56.7 61 49.5 41 
2000 73.4 103 80.7 145 66.1 105 48 102 71 89 60.5 67 54 43 
2001 83.9 106 81.5 147 68 109 51.5 106 71.9 93 64.6 71 57.6 47 
2002 75.2 111 79 149 64.6 111 52.7 110 72.6 98 66.4 74 59.3 50 
2003 72 115 77.6 155 58.3 115 48.9 116 73.9 104 64.9 79 54.2 55 
2004 88.3 121 82.5 163 69.9 121 54.3 121 83.6 116 67.4 85 63.3 61 
GAO 
min 71.1   75.6   58.3   48   67.5   56.2   49.5   
GAO 
avg. 80.1   83.7   72.7   62.9   80.1   71.5   65.9   
2006 76.3 131 77 179 59.4 138 49.4 140 88 140 69.3 98 63.1 67 
2008 82.2 132 81.7 201 65 150 53.5 164 98.7 168 74.9 112 72.6 74 
2010 65 125 79.6 213 58.4 147 43.4 162 99.1 181 64 108 67.5 66 
 
The comparison of GAO and GDP dynamics during the period in question shows that 
GAO decline to some extent correlates with GDP decline. This interdependence was studied 
by Lerman (2000) and will be discussed in the next paragraphs, among the other explanations 
of GAO dynamic changes.  
Despite the clear differences in GAO dynamic, none of the studied countries, has not 
reached the pre-transition level of production neither by the end of the period in question 
                                                          
24 The GAO data for data for Hungary, Poland, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are from Fuglie (2012). The GAO 
data for Czech Republic and Slovakia for 1993-2010 are from FAO. The GAO data for Czech Republic and 
Slovakia for 1990-1993 are from National Statistical Datasets.  Available at:  http://faostat.fao.org   and     
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity/documentation-and-methods.aspx     
(Accesses: December 20, 2013).   For GDP (GDP in constant LCU) data are from WB database. Available at:   
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (Accessed:  May 2, 2014). 
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(year 2004), nor by the year 2010. Moreover, Czech Republic and Slovakia started to 
encounter the second phase of GAO decline after the 2004. 
Finalizing the assessment of the agricultural production (output) dynamic in the 
selected CEE countries in “absolute terms” (GAO dynamic measured in the comparable 
index numbers), it is possible to conclude that Poland, Hungary and Belarus performed 
better than the other countries in question - all of these countries have the lowest level of 
GAO decline and all show strong evidence of GAO recovery.   
Many reasons have been advanced to explain the collapse of output during the initial 
period of transformation and its slow recovery afterwards. These explanations can be divided 
roughly into the following groups: (i) mainly descriptive statements (demand-supply issues, 
multidimensional explanations, input-output prices ratio, inputs use decline, overall economy 
slowdown) and (ii) empirically supported explanations (econometric models that measured 
the impact of selected political and economic reforms on agricultural output). The next 
paragraphs of this section will provide a brief overview of these explanations, and after that, a 
more detailed analysis of the most common explanations of output decline (e.g., price 
liberalization, changes in subsidization policy and decline in inputs use) will be provided. 
Demand-supply related classification of the reasons for general GDP decline is provided 
by Roberts (1995, p.4). As to “demand-side” explanations, she assessed the “restrictive 
macroeconomic policies” discussed by Berg and Sachs (1992), the disruption of CMEA trade 
explored by Crane (1993) and a reduction of aggregate demand and a shift in the composition 
of the demand analysed by Charemza (1993) and Gomulka (1991). The “supply-side” 
explanations include the destruction of economic institutions and marketing mechanisms 
provided by Kornai (1994) and Williamson (1993), an increase in input prices and a lack of 
credit resources for purchasing necessary inputs explained by Calvo and Corricelli (1992). 
A set of multidimensional explanations specifically for CEEC agriculture is elaborated 
by Szelenyi (1998) and Cian and Pokrivcak (2007).   Szelenyi (1998) presented four causes for 
the initial collapse of agricultural production in post-Communist countries: (1) a problem-
ridden economy inherited from Communism; (2) the shrinking of international and domestic 
markets; (3) a doctrinaire application of the neo-liberal ideology of the new political class; 
and (4) a prevalence of “agrarian technocracy” interests which caused rapid privatization. 
Cian and Pokrivcak (2007) proposed the (1) disruption of the socialist exchange system; (2) 
price and trade liberalization; (3) subsidy cuts; (4) shift of the ownership rights from the state 
to private individuals; (5) the reduction of the farm size due to re-structuring; and (6) the 
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reduction of the inputs’ use (fertilizers, labor, tractors, land) as possible reasons for the 
agricultural decline. 
 The interdependence and extent of the influence of the all above-mentioned factors on 
the initial agricultural production decline by using an “output-input prices ratio” explanation 
is investigated in Ratinger et al. (2006) study. The authors imply that trade liberalization after 
transition coincided with low world agricultural prices and contributed to a worsening of 
agricultural terms of trade. The prices of agricultural output grew more slowly than input 
prices after liberalization.  For example, Dicke and Misala (1993) asserted that in 1990, in 
Poland, prices paid to farmers increased on average only 4 times, while prices for agricultural 
inputs increased 8 times.  In the early years of transition, price liberalization allowed 
agricultural input prices to rise to world market levels, with the presence of monopolies in the 
input industries serving to exaggerate this rise in prices. At the same time, agricultural output 
prices did not rise so quickly. This was partially the result of the falling demand for food 
during the transition, and partially because the pre-transition subsidies were withdrawn.  
The reduction of the use of inputs as the reason for the initial agricultural production 
decline was studied by Ciaian and Pokrivcak (2007).  They specified that variable inputs 
(e.g., fertiliser and labour) declined more than fixed inputs (e.g., tractors and land). They 
argued that this was caused by the fact that variable inputs are easier to adjust (move), while 
fixed inputs are more specific to agriculture and are immobile in the short-run. Dicke and 
Misala (1993) agreed that some of the above-mentioned factors can cause agricultural decline, 
such as a fall in demand for agricultural products, a decrease in the prices of agricultural 
products and a reduction in agricultural inputs purchases. 
The interdependence of GAO and overall output decline is investigated by Lerman 
(2000), basing this idea on the assumption of the existence of a positive relationship between 
GDP growth and GAO growth. The results of his “CEE vs. FSU” comparison in regard to 
GDP and GAO growth during 1992-1997 show that the CEE countries that had a positive 
GDP growth also experienced the lowest GAO decline, while the FSU countries with negative 
GDP growth had a 5-times higher decline in GAO than CEE countries. 
The pooled regression estimated for the seven countries in question for 1990-2004 also 
supports the hypothesis of the dependence of GDP on GAO (see Table 2.3.1. for the 





Table 2.3.1. Regression results for GAO vs. GDP dependence model. 
Dependent variable: GAO  
















coef. 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.90 1.03 
t value  98.47 87.47 121.26 81.60 145.95 58.27 115.99 
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
No. of countr. 7 R
2
 0.92 
No. of observ. 15 Adj. R
2
 0.92 
Durbin-Watson st. 1.6   
 
An empirical model of the impact of selected political and economic reforms on CEEC 
agricultural output was elaborated by Macours and Swinnen (2000a).
25
  They argued that the 
initial decline in agricultural output was mainly the result of the market liberalization policies 
(reduction of subsidies, price and trade liberalization). According to their research, price 
liberalization and subsidy cuts contributed to almost 50% of output decline. The severe 
drought and transition uncertainty (each of them) explained around 10%   of the   output 
decline. The impact of farm restructuring, privatizations and associated disruptions varied 
among the CEE countries because they depended on initial conditions and the choice of 
reform policies. 
Although an analysis of the existing scholarship provides plenty of explanations 
regarding the reasons for GAO decline, the main (and the most commonly referred to) reasons 
are usually considered the following:  (i) the price liberalization, (ii) changes in subsidization 
policy and (iii) changes in inputs use.   
The next paragraphs of this section will provide a detailed theoretical analysis of the 
influence of price liberalization and changes in subsidization policy on GAO dynamics during 
the period in question, while the empirical testing of the impact of the changes in inputs use 
on GAO dynamic will be done in the separate (last) section of this CEEC chapter.   
The centrally-planned price regulation was one of the key features of the socialist 
economies (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). The market role of the prices was limited and 
relegated to the position of providing accounting information that could be used for 
monitoring and control of enterprises by the central authorities. The liberalization of 
                                                          
25
 The study covers the output of the five main crops (wheat, corn, barley, sugar and oilseeds in eight CEE 
countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) during 1989-
1995. 
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agricultural prices had started at the beginning of the 1990s in all seven countries in question, 
although its scope and starting dates differ throughout the region. For example, in Poland the 
majority of agricultural prices were set free while in Belarus the government kept control over 
the prices for so-called “socially significant” food and agricultural products. The price 
liberalization in Russia officially started in 1992, while in Poland it started in 1990.  
All the market (price) liberalization programs in the CEE countries were implemented 
with the expectation that liberalization would allow the previously distorted agricultural 
prices to align and, thus would lead to an increase in economic efficiency.  
However, at the beginning of transformation period, liberalization negatively affected 
both input and output prices. The financial situation of the former state-owned enterprises in 
the downstream and upstream sectors (i.e., the food and chemical industries) worsened 
because of liberalization (due to the subsidies removal, hyperinflation, interest rates increase 
and so forth). Therefore, following the market (prices) liberalization agenda and sometimes 
using their monopolistic position in the market, the upstream-sector enterprises
26
 increased 





 restricted purchases from agricultural producers and 
attempted to lower the prices offered to farmers by using its monopolistic position in the 
markets. All this led to a significant terms of trade deterioration at the beginning of the 
transformation, which took place in every studied country and was especially drastic in the 
FSU.  (The detailed data are in Appendix 2.4. and the summary is in Figure 2.3) 










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Poland Czech Rep. Hungary
Slovak Rep. Belarus Russia
 
                                                          
26 The term “upstream sector” refers to the input (fertilizers, machinery and etc.) supply enterprises. 
27
 The term “downstream sector” refers to the food processing industry. 
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Moreover, this declining trend for terms of trade continued until the end of the 2000s.  
(except for Belarus) with no significant signs of recovery, contrary to the slow GAO recovery, 
which started  from the mid-1990s.  This fact could be explained by an analysis of the 
changes in the subsidy policies in CEE countries that took place during the transformation 
period.    
During the Communist era, CEEC agriculture was supported by the state through 
different types of subsidies for agricultural producers, inputs’ producers, food processing 
industry and consumers (by keeping food prices artificially low). At the beginning of the 
transformation, agricultural support for all these groups was reduced substantially, which 
caused a significant decrease of GAO.  However, starting from the mid-1990s, due to the 
increasing pressure of the so-called “agricultural lobby” and in response to social pressure, the 
majority of CEEC governments re-introduced price and trade support, and state interventions 
in agriculture. The main difference  between the seven CEE countries in question is that in the 
V4 countries, this re-introduced system of support was a newly constructed one based on the 
principles used by advanced Western-European economies, together with the introduction of 
“hard-budget” constraints, while in the FSU countries, this re-introduced system of support 
was a revitalized former Socialist central-planning system (with just small modifications), 
which coexisted with “soft-budget” constraints for agricultural producers.  
In any case, despite the differences in the institutional basis of the agricultural 
support system, the re-introduction of the system of agricultural support in the mid-
1990s substantially mitigated the negative effects of the terms of trade deterioration 
(price liberalization). The impact of this re-introduction continued from the mid-1990s 
until the end of 2000s, and thus substantially influenced the GAO recovery during this 
period. 
A more detailed country-relevant analysis of the impact of the agricultural support 
policy on GAO dynamics (provided in next paragraphs) yielded some interesting and 
controversial results.  This analysis has been done for the CEE countries in question (except 
Belarus
28
) using WB data for NRA,
29
 OECD data for PSE 
30, 31 
(see Appendix 2.5).and data 
from Table 2.3 for Gross Agricultural Output. 
                                                          
28
 because of the absence  of PSE and NRA estimations for Belarus 
29
 The NRA is the weighted average of the nominal rate of assistance at the product level, where the industry’s 
value share of the each product is used as a weight (Anderson, 2010).  
30
 PSE are the most commonly used measures of support to agriculture, which originally were called “producer 
subsidy equivalents”, but in 1999 , the Agricultural Directorate of OECD, which annually calculated PSEs, 
changed it’s use of the phrase to “producer support estimates” (Liefert and Swinnen, 2002) 
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The comparative analysis of the NRA and GAO dynamics (see Figure 2.4.) surprisingly 
shows that the V4 countries (except Poland) have an NRA rate that is double that of the FSU 
countries with practically the same level of  GAO.  These results indicate that the agricultural 
sectors of the V4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) were heavily dependent 
on the subsidies, which definitely could not be considered a reflection of reform success. 
Figure  2.4. Average NRA and GAO for 1990 -2004 
32




An analysis of agricultural subsidization using PSE data was done due to the possibility 
of comparison of the pre-transition period (1986-1989) and transition period data. To be more 
specific, this analysis was done using the data for PSE from the pre-transition period (1986-
1989), selected years from the final phase of the transition (2000-2003) and the average GAO 
for 1990-2004.  
This analysis allowed us to distinguish the following three groups of countries. In the 
first group were countries that experienced a decline in “percentage PSE” and some increase 
in the “share of the standard PSE commodities”, (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia). The second group was comprised of countries that experienced a “soft decline” 
both in percentage PSE and in the share of standard PSE commodities, (e.g., Poland). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
31
  The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is estimated as “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or 
income”. Percentage PSE (%PSE) is estimated as the “PSE as a share of gross farm receipts (including support)”  
(OECD’s Producer Support Estimate, 2010, p.17)  
32
   WB database.  Available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTTRADE
RESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21812190~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:544849,00.html  
(Accessed:  July 25,  2011)  
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third group was made up of countries with a very sharp and drastic decline both in percentage 
PSE and in the share of standard PSE commodities (e.g.,Russia and Ukraine) (see Table 2.4. )  








average GAO for 
1990-2004 
Czech Republic 72.7 
Share of standard PSE commodities  67.8 73.2  
 Percentage PSE   55.25 23  
Hungary 80.1 
Share of standard PSE commodities  73.2 75.3  
 Percentage PSE   35.5 26  
Poland 83.7 
Share of standard PSE commodities  79.5 56.8  
 Percentage PSE   20.8 13.2  
Russia 71.5 
Share of standard PSE commodities  73.5 8.8  
 Percentage PSE   80.5 12.5  
Slovakia 62.9 
Share of standard PSE commodities  66 75.3  
 Percentage PSE   49.3 21  
Ukraine 65.9 
Share of standard PSE commodities  73.6 -4.8  
 Percentage PSE   77.3 0.3  
 
The analysis of the GAO dynamics in connection with the above-noted results 
concerning agricultural support dynamics have yielded some predictable as well as some 
confusing and contradictory conclusions. The “predictable result” is the suggestion that in the 
pre-reform period, CEEC agriculture was heavily subsidized, and the reduction in the level of 
subsidies could explaine some part of the GAO decline.  
The “confusing and contradictory” part of the story is that the countries from the first 
group (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) with the small decline in percentage PSE and 
increase of the share of standard PSE commodities achieved practically the same level of 
GAO as the countries from the third group (Russia and Ukraine), which had experienced a 
drastic decline in both percentage PSE and share of standard PSE commodities. These 
findings point to the idea that (1) agricultural sectors of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia even after the transformation reforms are still heavily dependent on agricultural 
support measures, something that cannot be considered a reform success; (2) in terms of the 
“comparative GAO dynamics”,
34
 Russia and Ukraine outperform the Czech Republic, 
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  PSE data are from OECD databse. Available at:  www.oecd.org  (Accessed:  July 27,  2011)  
34
 GAO dynamic vs. PSE dynamic 
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Hungary and  Slovakia; (3) the agricultural sectors of Russia and Ukraine are the least 
dependent on agricultural support measures among the CEE countries, which to some extent 
could be considered as a reform success.  
Only the “comparative” (GAO vs. PSE) dynamic analysis for Poland yielded a more-or-
less “conventional picture”. Having practically the same high share of commodities covered 
by PSE as Russia and Ukraine in the pre-transition period, Poland, during the transition period 
smoothly reduced both “the share of PSE commodities” and “percentage PSE”, which 
resulted in only a mild GAO decline. Such reduction of both “the share of PSE commodities” 
and “percentage PSE” followed by a minimal decline of GAO, allows us to conclude that 
Polish agriculture had  really became less dependent on subsidies and found its optimal 
reform path, which could be considered a reform success. 
Finalizing the analysis of the agricultural output dynamic in the selected CEE 
countries, the following conclusions could be made: 
(1) The assessment of the reforms results in “absolute terms” (GAO dynamics measured 
in comparable index numbers) shows that Poland, Hungary and Belarus performed better than 
other countries in question.  
(2) Price liberalization and changes in subsidization policy had a significant impact on 
GAO dynamics. Price liberalization triggered substantial terms of trade deterioration, which 
continued during the whole period in question and was considered to be one of the reasons for 
GAO decline at the beginning of the transformation period (1990-1994, approximately).  
However, the negative impact of imbalanced and not thoughtfully developed price 
liberalization was mitigated by the re-introduction of a system of agricultural support 
(subsidization) starting from the mid-1990s, which continued during 1994-2004 period and 
influenced substantially the GAO recovery starting from the mid-1990s in V4 countries and 
from the 2000s in FSU countries.   
(3) The assessment of the reforms results in “comparative terms”
35
 (comparing the 
GAO dynamics vs. NRA-PSE dynamics and measuring in this way the dependence of the 
agricultural sector on subsidization) shows that the outcome of the market reforms could be 
considered a success for Poland (increase of GAO without a strong dependence on subsidies), 
a partial success for Russia and Ukraine and a failure for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia.  
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 comparing the GAO dynamic vv. NRA-PSE dynamic and measuring in this way the dependence of the 





































2.3. CEEC agricultural productivity during the transformation period. 
This section is assesses whether the reforms succeeded or failed with respect to 
agricultural productivity. From the discussion in the Introduction Chapter and previous 
Section 2.2., it seems that agricultural production (output) improvements cannot be 
considered the sole measure of reform success, and moreover, that agricultural productivity is 
an even more appropriate indicator of reform success.
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With respect to this idea, I will try to answer the question "Could an increase in 
agricultural productivity be considered a reform success?" In order to do this, I plan to 
calculate and analyze partial productivity indicators for the selected inputs (land, labor, 
machinery and fertilizers) in order to determine whether there was an increase in partial 
productivity, and if so, for what kind of inputs it this had been true. 
This section is organized as follows: it starts with an explanation of how the partial 
productivity indexes were estimated; next, the partial productivity dynamics of the above 
inputs will be analyzed; and finally, concluding remarks will be made about the 
appropriateness of considering calculated productivity indexes as indicators of reform success 
(or failiure), providing the background for TFP dynamic calculations.  
Table 1, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 (in Appendix 2.6) provide  the results of 
partial productivity analyses for land, labour, machinery and fertilizers inputs for V4 and FSU 
countries for 1990-2010. The results in Appendix 2.6. are presented in index numbers, which 
allows a cross-country and cross-inputs comparison.  Every Table in Appendix 2.6.  shows (1) 
the dynamic of the selected input productivity for each country; (2) the average speed of 
productivity change for each country during the transformation period (AVG 1990-2004); (3) 
average value of productivity for every year for the two sub-regions V4 (AVG V4) and FSU 
(AVG FSU); and (4) average value of productivity for every year for all seven countries 
(AVG all).  Table 2.5.  in the text summarizes the results of the partial productivity analysis 
only for selected years, just to show the very general tendencies.       
The data for the partial productivity calculation were taken from Fuglie (2012) for all 
the countries (except for the Czech Republic and Slovakia). These data are considered to be of 
very good quality, because Fuglie (2012) did not simply collect the data, but made crucial 
qualitative adjustments for the variables (especially for the capital ones). For example, the 
“Tractors’ data” are aggregated in the "40-CV tractor equivalents" (CV=metric horsepower), 
aggregating the number of 2-wheel tractors, 4-wheel tractors, and combine-harvesters, the 
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 According to Liefert and Swinnenn (2004) and Macours and  Swinnen (1999) opinion. 
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Fertilizer data are the aggregated "N-fertilizer equivalents” and so on. However, the Fuglie 
(2012) data consider the Czech Republic and Slovakia as one unified country for the whole 
period in question (1990-2004), so all the data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia are taken 
from the FAO database
37
, which does not do sufficient qualitative adjustments.   
Table 2.5.  Partial productivity in CEEC (selected years)  
    Hungary Poland Czech R Slovakia Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Land 
productivity 
1990 100 100   100 100 100 
1993 75 92 100 100 95 85 80 
1995 76 83 89 91 76 71 67 
2000 80 84 84 74 71 64 56 
2004 98 95 90 105 91 73 66 
Labor 
productitvity 
1990 100 100   100 100 100 
1993 72 103 100 100 98 80 81 
1995 74 102 95 95 90 68 62 
2000 86 141 105 88 112 70 54 
2004 127 158 126 110 178 99 79 
Machinery 
productivity 
1990 100 100   100 100 100 
1993 40 93 100 100 88 93 72 
1995 41 73 87 101 78 90 65 
2000 33 73 73 96 112 113 78 
2004 39 71 84 116 174 176 80 
Fertilizer 
productivity 
1990 100 100   100 100 100 
1993 124 94 100 100 228 287 284 
1995 105 73 79 82 415 537 366 
2000 95 72 78 60 279 534 560 
2002 90 72 68 62 357 576 524 
 




Partial productivity of the labour
 
is calculated (i) as the ratio of the GAO to the 
number   of agricultural workers and (ii) as the ratio of the GAO to the working hours. For the 
calculation of GAO per worker productivity for all countries (except for the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia) the GAO and the number of the economically active adults in agriculture were 
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 FAO/Production/Production indices/Agriculture (PIN)+ (Total)/Gross Production Index Number (2004-2006 
= 100). Available at: http://faostat.fao.org/site/612/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=612#ancor (Accessed: January 
10, 2014)   
38
Fuglie (2012) calculated the GAO  as FAO gross agricultural output as the sum of the value of production of 
189 crop and livestock commodities, valued at constant, global-average prices from 2004-2006 and measured in 
international 2005 $. 
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taken from Fuglie (2012). 
 
For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the data for agricultural 
population
39
 and GAO were taken from the FAO database. 
 Although the number of workers could be a “very handy proxy”, it is not considered to 
be the best indicator for qualitative improvements (Federico, 2005, p. 59). Thus, the Annual 
Working Unit (AWU) was taken as a proxy of the working hours for the calculation of GAO 
per working hours productivity from the Eurostat database.
40
  However, the analysis was done 
only for the V4 countries for 1995-2010 period, because of limited data availability.   
Partial productivity of the machinery is calculated as the ratio of the GAO to the 
amount of farm machinery measured in items. For all countries (except for the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) the machinery data were calculated as the total stock of farm 
machinery in "40-CV tractor equivalents" (CV=metric horsepower), aggregating the number 
of 2-wheel tractors, 4-wheel tractors, and combine-harvesters. For weights, she assumed 2-
wheel tractors average 12 CV, 4-wheel tractors 40 CV, and combine-harvesters 20 CV. All 
data were taken from the FAO database except 2-wheel tractors, which she compiled herself 
from the national sources. The data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia were the number of 
agricultural tractors in use (without any aggregation).   
Partial productivity of fertilizer is calculated as the ratio of the GAO to fertilizer 
consumption. For all countries (except for the Czech Republic and  Slovakia) the fertilizer  
data were  calculated as the metric tons of N, P2O5, K2O of fertilizer consumption measured 
in "N-fertilizer equivalents," where tons of fertilizer types were aggregated using weights 
based on their relative prices. Fertilizers and their respective weights in the aggregation are N 
(1.000), P2O5 (1.3576), and K2O (0.8532). Weights (relative price per ton of nutrient) were 
derived from IMF annual fertilizer price data from 1995-2012 using Ukraine Urea, U.S. Gulf 
Ports Superphosphate, and Canadian Potash. Data on N, P2O5, and K2O fertilizer 
consumption were from the International Fertilizer Association (IFA) where available, and 
otherwise from FAO.  The data for Czech Republic and Slovakia fertilizers were the 
consumption of NPK in metric tons. 
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 FAO/Resources/Population/Annual Time series/Agricultural population (1000)/  Population - Est. & Proj. 
Avaliable at :   http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=550#ancor   (Accessed:   January 10, 
2014)  
40
AWU (annual work unit), “corresponds to the work performed by one person who is occupied on an 
agricultural holding on a full-time basis. Full-time means the minimum hours required by the relevant national 
provisions governing contracts of employment. If the national provisions do not indicate the number of hours, 
then 1,800 hours are taken to be the minimum annual working hours: equivalent to 225 working days of eight 
hours each”. Eurostat database Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Annual_work_unit_(AWU)  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do;jsessionid=9ea7d07d30d65dc56f91cd7341bc
afae9ad1763c353e.e34MbxeSaxaSc40LbNiMbxeNaNyKe0  (Accessed:  January 5, 2014) 
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An analysis of the partial productivity indicators for the land, labour, machinery and 
fertilizer inputs allows us to come to the following conclusions. 
Land reform was the main issue on the transformation agenda of all transition-economy 
countries. Although each country followed its country-specific land reform path, practically 
all land-reform agendas were concentrated on change of land ownership rights, rather than on 
changes in total agricultural land use. As such, land productivity can be considered the most 
stable, coherent and also the least declined partial productivity indicator, because the steady 
decline of land productivity was experienced by every CEE country.  During the studied 
period (1990-2004), land productivity steadily declined in all 7 countries by almost 20% 
below its pre-transition level, and sub-regional comparison (FSU vs. V4) shows no significant 
differences in the magnitude of decline. This tendency continued for the next 5 years (with the 
exception of Belarus) (see Table 1 in Appendix 2.6) 
A more important indicator of reform effectiveness –labour productivity- was more 
affected by the reforms and shows a more profound magnitude of change (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 2.6.).  In general, the labour productivity decreased on average by 4% during the 
studied period (1990-2004) in all 7 CEE countries in question. However, the cross-country 
and sub-regional comparison (V4 vs. FSU) shows a significant difference in labour 
productivity trends. In the V4 countries (except Hungary), labour productivity steadily 
increased or remained more or less the same as in the pre-transition period, while in the FSU 
countries  (except Belarus)  it steadily declined by 20% on average in Russia and by almost 
30% in Ukraine. These differences in labour productivity dynamics could be explained by the 
differences in the respective reforms’ approaches toward agricultural labour between the V4 
and FSU countries – the former implemented labor-shrinking approaches, while the latter 
promoted “labor-preserving” approaches. Therefore, in V4 countries, agricultural labour 
constantly and significantly decreased, while in the FSU (except Belarus) there were 5-6 year-
long  periods when the agricultural labor index was  the same or even  higher  than in the pre-
transition period.    
The analysis of the long-term trends (1990-2010) reveals signs of convergence among 
the studied countries. In the next 5 years (2005-2010) labour productivity in all seven CEE 
countries started to show a clear upward tendency, and by the end of 2010 it increased by 
46% on average in FSU countries and by almost 30% on average in V4 countries.  
A long-term increase of labour productivity is also observed while taking into 
consideration the quantity of working hours as the base for labour productivity calculations 
(see Table 3 in Appendix 2.6).  The analysis of the labour productivity measured in Annual 
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Work Units (AWU) for 1995-2010 shows an even clearer tendency for labour productivity 
increase during the long-term period than in the GAO per-number-of-workers calculations.
41
 
Such a convergence of labour productivity trends in the long-time period for both types 
of calculations (number of workers and number of working hours) could probably be 
explained by the prevalence of long-term factors that trigger a decrease of agricultural 
employment (like the ageing of the rural population and the constant increase of better income 
opportunities in urban areas compared to rural areas
42
) over the “labour-preserving” policy 
approaches.  
Machinery productivity, like labour productivity, shows clear sub-regional differences 
between the V4 and FSU countries in the studied period (1990-2004), but unlike labour 
productivity, no convergence in the later period (2005-2010) was observed (see Table 4 in 
Appendix 2.6).  In V4 countries (except Slovakia) machinery productivity decreased, while 
in FSU countries (except Belarus) it increased during 1990-2004. This divergence dynamic 
can mainly be attributed to the differences in machinery stock growth rates, which 
significantly increased in V4 and substantially decreased in FSU countries.  Usually, this 
difference is explained by the higher levels of subsidization and better investment capacity of 
the (mainly privately-owned) agricultural sectors of the V4 countries. 
The changes in fertilizer productivity were the most impressive among all the 
analyzed inputs (see Table 5 in Appendix 2.6).   A sub-regional comparison shows the 
profound difference between the two sets of countries – while all FSU countries experienced a 
significant fertilizer productivity increase, Hungary was the only country in the V4 sub-region 
with positive fertilizer productivity growth from 1990-2004. The cross-country differences in 
fertilizer productivity during 1990-2004 were also remarkable - the most impressive records 
among the FSU countries are that of Ukraine and Russia, where fertilizer productivity 
increased more than four times compared to the pre-transition level. Compared to them, the 
record of Belarus, where fertilizer productivity nearly tripled, looks relatively modest.  The 
observed differences in fertilizer productivity between the countries and sub-regions 
continued later on, between 2005-2010. 
The overall analysis of the partial productivity dynamics of land, labour, 
machinery and fertilizer for the seven countries in question shows that some partial 
productivity indexes had increased, while other decreased. However the increase of some 
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 The analysis was done only for the V4 countries for 1995-2010 because of limited data availability. 
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 With the exception of the initial period of transformation,  when agriculture absorbed unemployed labour from 
the other sectors of the economy and allowed the creation of so-called “food security stocks” (or “safety net”) for 
the poorest part of the population. 
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partial productivity indicators cannot be straightforwardly considered as a reform success due 
to the following reasons: 
(1) The increase could simply be caused by the fact that inputs fell even faster than 
GAO, but not because of improvements in inputs’ use.  
 (2) Because the partial productivity calculations do not reflect the fact that in reality 
agricultural production is dependent on the interaction of the several production factors 
(inputs).  
(3) Because the simple partial productivity measures may point to misleading results for 
countries that are characterized by asymmetric changes in inputs, like those in the CEEC and 
FSU (Roselle & Swinnen, 2004).    
Therefore, to evaluate whether the growth of some partial productivity indexes could be 
considered a success or failure of the reform, we must analyze the increase of these particular 
partial productivity indicators not as separate indicators, but in their complex interdependence 
with each other, which implies a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation. 
The Total Factor Productivity is the “aggregate measure that captures the growth in 
productivity of all inputs used in production” (Liefert and Swinnen, 2002, p.23).  If the TFP 
index rose during the transformation period, the increase of partial productivity could be 
considered a reform success, because it was caused by improvements in inputs use.  If the 
TFP indexe fell during the transformation period, the increase of partial productivity could not 
be considered a reform success, because it was caused by the fact that inputs fell even faster 
than the GAO, and also because of the inputs substitution.  
The estimation of the Total Factor Productivity will be done in the next section, together 













Section 2.4. Empirical assessment of the agricultural production and productivity 
dynamics. 
This section provides the rationale for the final conclusions regarding the assessment of 
reform outcomes in terms of agricultural output and productivity.  
For this purpose, the section provides an analysis of the impact of the changes in inputs 
use on the GAO dynamic (referring to Section 2.2) and a calculation of the TFP (referring to 
Section 2.3) by an estimation of the panel regression for the seven countries in question. The 
section starts with a description of the methodology and data; next, the regression results are 
provided and discussed; then, the TFP indexes are calculated and explanations about its 
dynamic are provided; and finally, concluding remarks are made.   
In order to analyze how the selected inputs’ (land, labor and capital) adjustments had 
affected (if affected at all) agricultural output dynamics, several panel regressions were 
estimated using the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function. The estimations 
were “based on the assumption that the common meta-production function” exists and could 
be used for cross-country analysis (Macours and Swinnen, 2000a, p.182).   
The econometric model for the estimations is:  
ln(gao)=α0+β1ln(landit)+ β2ln(laborit)+β3ln(capitalit)+β4ln(TREND it)+ε     
where the dependent variable is the GAO, and the independent variables are the  inputs 
- land, labor and capital. The method used for this estimation is the pooled EGLS -cross-
section SUR (see Appendix 2.7 for EVIEW results). For some of the estimations, the 
TRACTORS, FERTILIZERS and LIVESTOCK variables were used instead of the CAPITAL 
variable.   
The data used for the estimation are the annual observations for seven selected CEE 
countries: Belarus (BY), Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Russia (RU), 
Slovakia (SK) and Ukraine (UKR).  The description of all variables collected for the 
estimation of the pooled regression is provided in Table 2.6. All the data are taken from the 
FAOSTAT database, except for the “LAB_POP” variable, which was calculated using the 
World Bank WDI data.
43
  All variables (except TREND variable) are transformed from index 
numbers (1990 =100%) to log-linear form using the [=+ln …] Excell program function. 
According to the model, several panel regressions were estimated using all the possible 
combinations of inputs’ variables. Further, the accounting statistics, which explain the 
contribution of each input to output change, was calculated for every country in question.  
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  FAO database.  Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  September 12, 2011)  and  WB database: available at:  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  (Accessed: May 8, 2014)   
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Table 2.6. Description of Variables  
Variable  Description 
gao_ FAO series -     Gross PIN (base 1999-2001)- Agriculture (PIN) + (Total) 
land_ Arable land  
lab_ag FAO series -  Agricultural population (1000) “Population - Est. & Proj. 2008” 
lab_ag_ec FAO series -  Total economically active population in Agr (1000) “Population 
- Est. & Proj. 2008” 
lab_pop_ WB (WDI) data Series - Rural population 
trac_ FAO series - Agricultural tractors- In Use (No) 
fert_ FAO series- Total Fertilizers + (Total)- Consumption (tons) 
livest_ Calculated as average stocks for chicken, pigs and cattle from FAO series 
cap_net FAO series  -Net Capital Stock (constant 2005 prices) (USD million) 
 
The detailed list of the regressions which shows a more-or-less acceptable results and 
“accounting” statistics is provided in the Appendix 2.7. and Appendix 2.8. As the 
“acceptable results”, the regressions with the following results were considered:   (i) 
coefficients for LAND, LABOUR and CAPITAL (or TRACTORS, FERTILIZERS  and 
LIVESTOCK)  are less than 1 and have a positive sign; (ii) “Prob.” is less than  <0,2  for all 
the  variables;  (iii) the “Wald Test” probability more than 1;  (iv) the “Durbin-Watson stat.” 
is around 2. A brief summary of these results is in the Table 2.7. 
All these regressions have a good explanatory power (R-squared vary from 0.7 to 0.9) 
and Durbin-Watson stat. is around 2 in the majority of the models, which is satisfactory 
enough.  All coefficients (except C) have a positive sign, which implies a normal production 
function behaviour when the increase of the use of each input (land, labour, capital) leads to 
the increase in output (GAO).    
A more detailed country-relevant analysis of the contribution of each input to the GAO 
dynamics is provided in the Appendix 2.8., which presents the accounting statistics for each 
regression.  The results of this detailed analysis show that in the majority of cases, 
changes in capital use had the most decisive impact on the GAO dynamics. Changes in 
land and labor had a less important impact on GAO.    
In order to evaluate whether the increase in some partial productivity indexes for the 
CEE countries could be considered a success of the reforms, the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) indexes were estimated using the results of the regression (see the conclusion for 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A brief overview of the already-existing TFP estimations (see Appendix 2.9.) shows a 
mixed picture of TFP dynamics for the countries in question, which could reasonably be 
explained by difficulties in the computation, “especially in terms of data requirements” 
(Liefert and Swinnen, 2002, p.24), mixed time-periods, country-scopes and methodologies 
applied to TFP estimations. However, despite the observed difference in TFP values, it is 
possible to generalize that for most of the countries and time-periods the TFP index shows a 
sustainably increasing tendency.  
The results of the TFP calculation based on the regression (Model 1) estimated in this 
section (see Table 2.8.) have also supported this conclusion. The TFP results of the Model 1 
regression were chosen as the sample, because only in this Model all the coefficients for all 
the TFP variables  are  significant at 1% level, while  the  coefficients for some TFP variables  
from Models 2–4  show  less good results.  
Table 2.8.   Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth rates 
  estimated 
coefficient 
TFP growth 





TFP Belarus 0.044 4.4 0.9 
TFP Czech Rep. 0.021 2.1 0.4 
TFP Hungary 0.018 1.8 0.3 
TFP Poland 0.013 1.3 0.2 
TFP Russia 0.025 2.5 0.4 
TFP Slovakia 0.026 2.6 0.5 
TFP Ukraine 0.023 2.3 0.4 
 
All coefficients of the TREND variable are found significant and have a positive sign, 
which indicates a TFP growth in every country in question. However, the rate of TFP growth 
highlights the substantial differences among the countries under study.   
 During the studied period, Belarus attained the highest TFP growth rates (4.4% annual 
growth rate and 0.9% for all the 15 years of the transformation), followed by Slovakia (2.6% 
and 0.5%), Russia (2.5% and 0.4%), Ukraine (2.3% and 0.4%) Czech Republic (2.1% and 
0.4%),  Hungary (1.8% and 0.3%), and finally Poland (1.3% and 0.2%).     
Although a detailed analysis of the TFP growth in Belarus will be provided in the 
subsequent Belarus chapter, the following reasons could be adduced for this remarkable TFP 
growth: 
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 Cumulative TFP (or 15-year period TFP growth) was calculated as {((=+exp(estimated coefficient*15))-1}   
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(i) a more rational use of previously over-used inputs; 
(ii) initially lower (than in the FSU and V4 countries) level of Belarusian agricultural 
development; 
 (iii) changes in institutions – that is, an increase in the share of household plots in total  
agricultural production.  
Regarding TFP dynamics for the whole sample of the seven studied countries, the most 
reasonable explanation of the TFP differences among them probably relates to the “small-
scale vs. large-scale agriculture” aspect, because the results of the TFP calculations to some 
extent correlate with the share of large-scale enterprises in the agricultural sector in the 
countries in question. 
For example, in Belarus, large-scale state-owned farms (former Socialist “kolhoz” and 
“sovhoz”) are still the main agricultural producers due to the slow progress of land reform. 
The same describes the situation in Russia. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
large-scale enterprises (while mainly privately owned) are still dominant in the agricultural 
sector, even after the successful implementation of land reform.  While in Poland, the country 
with the lowest TFP growth rate, the domination of small-scale farms is considered the main 
obstacle to productivity growth by the majority of local, native agricultural economists and 
politicians (an opinion that is not always in line with the views of Western economists) 
Hence, according to the estimated TFP results and finalizing the issue of the 
assessment of reform outcome in terms of agricultural productivity, it is possible to 
conclude that the transformational reform results could be considered a reform success, 














2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
The analysis of the transformational reforms’ progress and agricultural performance of 
the seven Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) for fifteen years leads to the 
following conclusions: 
1. Although each CEE country followed its own specific reform path, in general, the 
agricultural reform process could be considered practically accomplished in the V4 
countries, while in the FSU only moderate progress was reached by some countries (Russia, 
Ukraine), and practically no reform progress was achieved in Belarus. Poland and Belarus 
differ significantly in terms of reform progress: Poland is among the best reformers in the 
CEEC region, while Belarus is the least reformed country, not only among the V4, but also 
among the FSU countries. 
2.2. In terms of agricultural production (output), Poland, Hungary and Belarus 
performed better than other countries in question: all them had low levels of GAO decline 
during the initial period of transformation, which was then followed by a sustainable 
recovery. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that for these countries, the results of the 
transformation in terms of agricultural production could be considered a success.  As the 
main determinants of the changes in GAO dynamics, changes in capital use and in prices and 
subsidization (state support) policies should be considered.  
3. In terms of agricultural productivity, the transformational reform outcome could be 
considered a reform success in all countries in question, due to the increase in TFP and 













CHAPTER 3. Polish agricultural performance during the transformation period. 
This chapter is dedicated to an analysis of Polish agricultural performance during the 
fifteen years of transformation in regard to the “success or failure of reforms” assessment in 
terms of agricultural production and productivity.
45
 It starts with an overview of Polish 
transformational history (Section 1). After that, the Polish agricultural production dynamic 
will be analyzed (Section 2). Then, in Section 3, agricultural productivity improvements will 
be assessed both in terms of partial productivity indexes and the TFP dynamic. And finally, 
the concluding remarks (in Conclusion) will briefly outline the main findings of the research.
 
 
3.1 Poland agricultural transformation history overview. 
This section offers a brief evaluation of the Poland agricultural profile and an overview 
of Polish agricultural transformation history. The section starts with an overview of the 
country’s natural agricultural endowment; next, an analysis of the history of the agricultural 
transformation, including the history of land reform, market liberalization and institutional 
transformation will be provided; and finally, this section will end with concluding remarks.   
Poland is a country located in the center of Europe, with a total area of 312,700 m2 and 
a population of 38.2 million.  It holds the 9th position in Europe and 69th in the world, as 
regards area, and the 8th position in Europe, and the 30th in the world, as regards population 
(Agriculture and food economy in Poland, 2004).               
Prior to 1998, Poland had a “two-tier” administrative division. Its territory was 
organized in 49 voivodships  and 2483 gminas (communes), which  were  the basic units of 
territorial division (Agriculture and food economy in Poland, 2004).   
Since 1998, (according to the July 1998 administrative reform) Poland has had a three-
tier administrative division, which is made up of 16 voivodships (provinces), 314 “poviats” 
(regions) and 2478 “gminas” (communes) (Agriculture and food economy in Poland, 2004).  
Unfortunately, the pre-1998 “voivodships” (regional) borders do not correspond exactly with 
the post-1998 borders, which makes a coherent regional analysis for 1990-2004 period quite 
tricky. Scholars studying these overlapping periods (before and after the 1998 administrative 
reforms) either treat these times periods separately (1990-1998 and 1999-and onward) or try 
to aggregate the pre- and post-1998 “voivodships” into large macro-regions, which anyway 
raises issues about the plausibility of such aggregation and the accuracy of such research 
results.       
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  The study in this Chapter 3 benefited from the research mission at the Natolin European Center supported by 
the Paderewski Grant 
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Polish agriculture has significant potential, although the soil-climatic conditions are 
unfavorable, as compared to most European countries. In 2004, there were 16.3 million ha of 
utilized agricultural land, which constitutes 52.2% of the total area of the country. 
Considering the area of utilized agricultural land, Poland takes a leading position in the 
EU (just after France and Spain, with land area similar to Germany); however, the quality of 
soil is low. According to the geodesic register at the end of 2004, the utilized agricultural area 
(UAA) in Poland was 19,148 00 ha, which ranks the country as third in the UE, following 
France (almost 28 million ha) and Spain (more than 25 million ha). 
A highly variable and unstable climate can also be considered a land productivity 
constraint, because due to unfavorable weather conditions, production of a plant with a high 
heat requirement (wheat, sugar beet, fruit trees and vegetables  grown in open fields) is 
restricted to only a few areas in Poland (Gorz and Kurek, 1998).  So-called average agrarian 
value (which take into account all sets of natural conditions - soil quality, agro-climatic 
conditions, water regime and topography) is estimated at 1.0 for Poland, ranging between 
0.692 for Nowy Sacz vioviodship to 1.29 for Krakow viovodship (Mertens, 2001).
46
  
The quality of agricultural land “is rather poor as evidenced by a relatively “low soil 
quality index of 0.82 on average” (Agriculture and food economy in Poland, 2004, p. 9). The 
soils in Poland are mainly of medium and poor quality – podzol soils (55%) and brown earths 
(20%) dominate in Poland, with limited marshland, muds, limestone soils, and chernozems 
and black earths.  According to qualitative evaluation, very good and good soils (classes I-III) 
amount to 25.6% of the land cover. Medium soils (class IV) account for 39.8%, while poor 
and very poor soils are found over 34% of the country (Gorz and Kurek, 1998).
47
 Lower-
quality soils, accompanied by poor climatic conditions (worse than in West European 
countries) resulted in the fact that “Polish agriculture occupies (in terms of agricultural area 
valorization) one of the last places in Europe” (Agriculture and food economy in Poland, 
2004, p. 9).     
In terms of regional division, the very good soils (classes I-II) are mainly concentrated 
in the southern parts of Poland, while good, medium and poor quality soils are dispersed more 
or less  homogenously  throughout the whole territory (see map in Appendix 3.1). The high 
concentration of very good soils and the high population density in the southern regions of 
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According to the former “voivodships” division.  
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 This farmland classification contains six quality classes each for arable land and grassland, beginning with 
class I (the best soils). These classes correspond to coefficients from 0.15 for class VI to 1.75 for class I, which 
are used to create aggregate quality indices for farms and larger geographic units. The average index value for 
Poland is 0.79 (Mertens, 2001). 
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Poland, compared to the smaller population density and the poorer land quality in the north-
western and western regions (see map in the Appendix 3.1) creates the basis of the so-called 
“north-west” vs. “south” division, with the dominant concentration of small-scale, private 
farms in the “south,” and large-scale (former state) farms in the “north-west”.    
Polish agricultural structure may be characterized by three main features.  First, only 
20% of agricultural land was owned by the state and needed to be privatized during the 
transformation, because approximately 80% of agricultural land was not collectivized in the 
Socialist period (Agricultural situation in the candidate countries, 2002). State land was 
mainly concentrated in the northern and north-western parts of the Poland (detailed maps of 
state and private land share changes are provided later, in the land reform progress 
analysis). Such a division of state vs. private land (large vs. small scale enterprises) could be 
explained by rural population density (more dense in the south and south-east), land fertility 
(the lands in northern Poland are less fertile) and historically-inherited production structures 
(western lands, which formerly belonged to Germany before 1945, had predominately large 
Prussian farms) (see again Appendix 3.1 for land quality and population density maps).  
Second,  significant regional differentiation of farming structure. In the northern and 
western parts of the Poland, tha large-scale agricultural enterprises predominate, while the 
other regions (mainly in the south and south-east) are characterized by small-scale farming. 
The transformational reforms did not significantly alter the average size (around 7.2 ha) of 
individual farms. (Detailed maps of regional farm-size changes are provided later, in the land 
reform progress analysis.) 
Third, the coexistence of market-oriented and peasant (non-market) farming 
(Zawalinska, 2004). Peasant farming, according to Zawalinska (2004, pp.137-138)
 48 
is  
characterized “by (i) family ownership, (ii) reliance on family labor, (iii) priority of own 
consumption, (iv) maximizing income per head of family member, not profit, (v) assuring 
continuation of tradition of family farming, (vi) small-scale production”.  
The Poland “transformation agenda” for agricultural reforms consisted mainly of the 
same basic elements as in other V4 countries, namely (1) land reform; (2) liberalization of 
outputs and inputs markets; and (3) the establishment of a new institutional structure relevant 
to a market economy. In the next paragraphs, an analysis of the Poland transformation history 
within the framework of the above-elements will be provided.  
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A very specific feature of Polish pre-transition agriculture, which differentiates it 
significantly from other V4 countries, was the prevalence of small (usually family-run) 
private farms, but the so-called socialized sector also existed, in the form of state and 
cooperative farms. In 1990, the relative sizes of private and socialized sectors were as below:  
Table 3.1 . Share of private and socialized sectors in Polish agriculture in 1990 (%)
49
   






purchases  tractors 
Private 
farms 76 80 77 73 64 86 
Socialized 
farms 24 20 23 27 36 14 
 
There were 2.1 million private farms with a national average size of 6.3 hectares of 
farmed land: an average of less than 4 hectares in southern Poland, about 6 hectares in central 
Poland and more than 8 hectares in northern Poland. More than half of these farms had less 
than 5 hectares and covered 23% of the agricultural land. Only 6% of private farms had more 
than 15 hectares and cultivated 20% of the agricultural land (Table 3.2). 




Private farms State farms Cooperatives 
1986 1990 1992 1985 1989 1990 1992 1985 1990 1992 
Number of 
farms 
2260 2138 2144 1258 959 1112 1752 2340 2240 2186 
Average 
6 6.3 6.3 2666 3490 2924 1786 297 311 310 
 farm size 
 
The majority of state farms, which occupied 20% of the total agricultural area, were 
concentrated in the northern and western parts of Poland (see map from Appendix 3.2.).  
Around 50% of state farms had more than 1,000 hectares of land. However, many of them 
were divided into smaller production units (100-400 hectares), often located far from central 
administrative headquarters. These farms mainly specialized in grain and selected livestock 
production, and also offered such services as grain storage, food processing and machinery 
repairing facilities (Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the CEEC, 1995).    
Cooperative farms were on average around the 310 ha, but this category of farms was 
a mix of the large-scale and small-scale farms, so this 310 ha average in not a very 
informative characteristic. Approximately half of the cooperative farms were organized on the 
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land allotted to them by the state (Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the CEEC, 1995). 
About 90% of its members were former agricultural workers with no land of their own. Only 
10% of the land of these cooperatives was the former legal property of cooperative members, 
who had been compelled, in the past, to give it up for the cooperative use.  
The other half of the cooperative farms was constituted by specialized cooperatives. 
They were affiliated individual farmers, who remained private owners of their land and 
cultivated it individually, producing only a minority of products collectively.  About the half 
of total receipts of these farms came from processing, services and non-agricultural activities, 
but on average, about one-third of their receipts came from livestock production. Table  3.3. 
provides basic data on the cooperatives’ share in the agricultural production in the pre-
transition period. 














1,912 3,531,500 434,570 59% of marketing of 
agric.  products 
Dairy 323 1,199,400 112,793 95% of milk processed 
Horticultural 
market 
140 372,600 55,519 50% of fruit and 
vegetable 
Agric. product.  
cooperatives 
2,086 177,000 2,700 2,8% of arable land 
Savings and 
credit  




2,006 113,200 154,447 Important share in 
mechanization services 
Total 8,130 7,959,800 791,319   
 
Therefore, the large share of private-owned land during communist period and 
small size of agricultural holdings should be considered as the most distinctive “Poland-
specific” pre-transition characteristic. However, despite the domination of the private 
sector in Polish agriculture, its efficiency was generally lower than in the state sector. The 
quantitative and qualitative analyses done by (Dicke and Misala, 1993) shows that private 
farms were effective only in labor intensive harvesting (sugar-beet, fodder-root crops and 
hay), but were inefficient in livestock and grain production because of a lack of machinery, 
and unfavorable access to credit markets.   
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Thus, when the general privatization process was initiated, private property had already 
prevailed in the agricultural land ownership structure. Importantly, however, that 80% of 
Polish agricultural land was under private ownership before the transformation does not imply 
that 80% of Polish agriculture was privately managed, for two main reasons. First, in the pre-
transition (Socialist) period, Polish agriculture was controlled by the state through strict price 
regulation, because the majority of agricultural procurement and retail prices were fixed by 
the government, rather than by free-market forces. Prices were mainly set on the basis of 
production costs plus a fixed rate of planned profit. The “cheap food” and “income parity”
 52
  
policy (starting in the 1970s) approaches were also taken into consideration while determining 
agricultural prices (Wilkin, 1997)      
 Second, the food processing industry (which purchases agricultural production both 
from the state and private farms) was also monopolized by the state-owned enterprises in the 
majority of sectors. The results of the OECD research (OECD, 1995), which are provided in 
the next paragraph, fully support these theses.   
In the grain sector, the government fixed a price at which local, state-controlled 
cooperatives bought all grains offered by farmers based on orders from the central milling 
industry (PZZ) and feed processors. The production of rapeseed was mainly concentrated in 
state and cooperatives farms, and was processed by 8 major state-owned crushing plants. The 
rapeseed production was dried and cleaned in the warehouses of the central milling industry 
(PZZ) and the state farms. They bought rapeseed on the basis of contract agreements with 
farmers, at a procurement price defined by the government. In the sugar sector, 78 state-
owned sugar factories had a monopoly on sugar production and domestic sales. The state had 
a monopoly for processing and for the foreign trade of potatoes, where the state procurement 
price was fixed for the proceeded and exported production.  Over 95% of all milk produced 
for market purposes by private, cooperative and state farms was purchased by state-controlled 
dairy cooperatives at the procurement price fixed by the state. These cooperatives supplied the 
retail trade and delivered dairy products to foreign trade companies for export. The 
government fixed the procurement and retail prices for the live animal and meat markets.  
The monopoly on the market of poultry products had all enterprises associated in the state 
company “Poldrob”. They purchased at a procurement price 95% of the sales of live poultry 
and 70% of eggs traded. The slaughter houses, having their own small network of suppliers, 
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 Income parity policy – ( i.e. “farmers should receive a similar level of income as workers in the industrial 
sector”) became one of the goals of the Polish agricultural policy from the  late 1970
th
. The goal have been 
“achieved mainly  through the agricultural price support policy” and “in  the 1970s and 1980s an income based 
entirely on agricultural employment reached 80-100 percent of the income outside of agriculture” (Wilkin, 1997)  
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were also integrated in the “Poldrob” company. A free market existed only for fruit and 
vegetable production, which was not covered by the state price fixing system. 
Taking into consideration that private farmer’s production decisions (both in “capitalist” 
and “socialist” economies) depend mainly on the possibility of selling the produced output on  
the offered prices,  Polish agriculture should be considered to be partially “privately –owned”  
(because of large share of private land),  but mainly  “state-controlled”. 
The year 1989 should be considered the starting point of Polish land reform 
(privatization), because it was at this time that the “Solidarity” government formulated the 
Reprivatization (restitution) Law, which raised heated debate. The “discussants” can roughly 
be divided into the two parties.  
One party denied the idea of property restitution, while the other party (supported also 
to a great extent by the Office of President of Poland) demanded that all private property 
seized under Communist rule was to be returned to the original owners or to their rightful 
heirs.
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 The latter view was presented and mainly shared by those who advocated the notion 
of eliminating past wrongs. Quite naturally, among them numbered former owners and their 
families. They prepared their own claims. According to Ministry of Privatization reports, 
about 50 thousand claims for restitution of real estate, and more than 500 claims for re-
privatization of businesses were submitted by  the end of 1991 (Dicke and Misala, 1993). 
After extensive discussion, it was decided that, “any demand for Polish smallholders to give 
up their allotments in favor of the former owners would be politically and socially untenable” 
(especially bearing in mind that the majority of the possible claims would be made in favor of 
the citizens of foreign countries), and the Polish government focused mainly on privatizing 
the 20% of state farms’ land by sale (Csaki and Lerman, 2000, p.9). 
Therefore, land reform was constituted by (i) the process of cooperative farm 
restructuring, and (ii) the process of state farm privatization. 
The process of cooperative restructuring was initiated in January 1990 with the 
adoption of the Law on Cooperatives, which governed the changes in the organization and 
operation of the cooperative movement (Dicke and Misala, 1993). The main objectives of the 
Law were “to liquidate all the cooperative unions, to restore full democratic independence 
through obligatory new elections in all the primary cooperatives, to make possible the 
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 Majority of which were the German, Czech or Former Soviet Union counties citizens as of year 1990, because 
if to oversimplify the issue, the state land was mainly the land, which until 1945 belonged to the former German 
territory (western and north-western part of socialist after WW II Poland), former Czech territory until 1939 
(south and southwest of   after WW II Poland) and former Russian Empire territory (eastern part of WW II 
Poland). 
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splitting of the existing cooperatives into two or more new cooperatives”, and to change the 
legal nature and competence of the Supreme Cooperative Council (Agricultural Situation and 
Prospects in the CEEC, 1998, p.54). This Council became a voluntary association of primary 
cooperatives and the legal representative of the cooperative movement in Poland and abroad. 
The first step in cooperative restructuring was accomplished with the dissolution of 
cooperative unions and the liquidation of their assets. The question of cooperative ownership 
was taken up in the Revalorization Act of 30 August 1991. Under this law, all except the 
housing cooperatives were authorized to revalue members’ shares through transferring not 
more than half of their reserve funds to their share fund. The above-mentioned laws resulted 
in the liquidation of a certain number of cooperatives and the division of many of them into 
smaller units. Only those cooperatives survived that were in good financial standing and were 
able to undergo the necessary restructuring changes (Banski, 2007).  Among those “surviving 
cooperatives,” the majority were organized in the pre-World War II period (Banski, 2010), 
and were mainly situated in the central and the south-western regions in Opolskie, 
Wielkopolskie and Dolnoslazkie “voivodships,” according to Banski (2007).  
The production potential of the cooperatives was diminished by one-third in 1997, 
compared to the pre-transition level in 1988: the number of cooperatives decreased by 20% 
(from 2063 to 1650), its share in total agricultural land use diminished by 34% and its share in 
GAO production (in constant prices) decreased by 36.5% (Wos et al., 1998). However, those 
cooperatives which survived during the transformation period are considered to be 
“improved” and “adjusted to the market economy principles” (Wos et al., 1998, p.40). 
Therefore, according to Wos et al. (1998, p.40) “although the share of the cooperative sector 
in Polish agriculture is small and its expansion is hardly envisaged, but as long as cooperative 
form of production is more preferable than individual farming for the some agricultural 
producers, it has a sense of existence”.   
To facilitate the process of the privatization of state farms, a specific law, the Law on 
Administration of the State Treasury’s Agricultural Real Estate, was adopted in October 1991. 
This law created the Agricultural Property Agency of the State Treasury, and gave to it the 
“property rights of the state’s agricultural real estate and responsibility for the administration, 
restructuring and privatization” of such property (Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the 
CEEC, 1998, p.127). The process of restructuring and the privatization of state farms 
consisted of two stages: the taking over of state farms by the Agency, and their subsequent 
restructuring and privatization. In order to achieve its main task of restructuring and 
privatization, the Agency managed “the state farms or their assets mainly through the sale of 
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their assets” in whole or in part, the leasing out “to private legal entities or individuals in 
exchange for an agreed rent, the transfer of the assets to a shareholding company and the 
establishment of a management or administration contract” (Agricultural Situation and 
Prospects in the CEEC, 1998, p.127).  
An evaluation of the quality and the consequences of the privatization program (both at 
the level of the whole economy and in the agricultural sector in particular) leads to the 
conclusion that privatization was driven mainly by political and ideological considerations, 
rather than efficiency concerns. In 1990, the Polish government declared the introduction of 
the capitalist market system based on private ownership within two or three years, as the main 
objective of its preliminary program. In 1991, the Polish Parliament approved the 
privatization program. The main purposes of the program were (i) the transfer of half the 
state-owned assets into private hands within three years; and (ii) the formation of an 
ownership structure similar to that typically found in Western Europe, within five years. 
Sectoral-relevant efficiency concerns were not taken into consideration.  
Regarding agriculture, the privatization program did not consider the specific features 
of the agricultural sector,
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 which led to quite disappointing results in its privatization, 
especially (i) in terms of privatization methods, (ii) farm-scale changes and (iii) the transfer of 
the land-ownership rights.  
In terms of privatization methods, it was expected that the former big state farms would 
be privatized as large agricultural production units, without dividing them into very small 
plots (the same way that big industrial enterprises were privatized).
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 This would allow to 
avoid the loss of efficiency in the production of some agricultural commodities, where the 
state sector was the main producer, the so-called “rational concentration” and “farmerization” 
approaches (Slay, 1995).   Unfortunately, this expectation did not come to fruition.  The 
former big state farms were mainly split and sold (or rented) as small pieces of land (mainly 
to local, small-scale private farmers) or were not sold at all and remained under the 
supervision of the state Agricultural Property Agency, that is, remained state-owned land (see 
Appendix 3.4.) .   
In terms of farm-size changes, it was expected that the privatization driven by market 
incentives would force small, low-efficiency family farms to merge with larger and more 
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 The agricultural sector was treated the same as all other sectors of the economy (like industry, construction 
etc.)  
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 The majority of industrial enterprises were privatized (sold) as the same unified production units without 
splitting into small units for the purpose of quick sale (privatization), because any industrial enterprise cannot be 
splitted into small units without the loss of production efficiency.  Some of industrial enterprises cannot be 
spitted at all because of production cycle specific.  
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profitable units. Before providing an analysis of the dynamics of farm-size changes, it is 
worthwhile to briefly look at the debate over the existence of the economy of scale in 
agriculture. Although the debate on the (non)existence of the economy of scale in agriculture 
is still an open one (ex. Gorton et al., 2008;  Gardner et al, 2001), with regard to Polish 
agriculture, a substantial share of Western agricultural economists are proponents of the idea 
that large farms are not more efficient than small-scale farms  (ex. van Zyl et al., 1996), while 
local Polish agricultural economists support the notion that small-scale agriculture constitutes 
a serious  impediment to Polish agricultural production and productivity growth (ex. 
Zawalinska, 2004; Czyzewski et al., 2002). Both proponents and opponents of the 
(non)existence of the economy of scale in the Polish agriculture buttress their arguments with 
theoretical and empirical evidence.  
Returning to the dynamics of farm-size changes, it is possible to state that land 
privatization did not cause any significant impact on farm size, because the “average farm size 
increased only from 7.0 ha in 1988 to 7.9 ha in 1996” (Agricultural Situation and Prospects in 
the CEEC, 1998, p.9).  The majority of private farmers preferred to buy (or rent) small pieces 
of land to increase only slightly the average farm size, rather than to risk holding a big 
agricultural estate, which demands large capital investments and more extensive specific 
knowledge and skills for its management (compared to typical, small “peasant-type” average 
Polish farm). Therefore, changes in the average size of private farms’ were not as impressive 
as has been expected, and Polish agriculture is still predominated by small-scale family farms. 
(see Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4. Dynamic of private farm size in 1980- 2005 
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  FARM SIZE  
  1-2 ha 2-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-15 ha 15-20 ha 20-50 ha <50ha Total 
1980 18.7 37 30 10 4.3 0 0 100 
1990 17.7 35.1 29.8 11.3 6.1 0 0 100 
2000 23.8 32.7 23.8 9.8 4.5 4.7 0.7 100 
2005 25.1 33 21.8 9.4 4.3 5.5 0.9 100 
 
 The analysis of the farm-size changes also reveals “the increasing duality” of the Polish 
agricultural system, where only the number of very small, semi-subsistence farms (1-2 ha) 
and the market-oriented big farms (>20ha) increased, while the number of medium-size farms 
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 Table  from Urban et al (2006, p.191), based on the “ data of  Paszkowski S. from AR Poznan and Jozwiak W. 
from IERiGZ” 
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(2-20 ha) constantly decreased during the period in question (Agricultural situation in the 
candidate countries, 2002, p.9). 
No significant changes had occurred in terms of the regional dispersion of small-scale 
vs. large scale farms during the period in question – small-scale farms are still predominant in 
the southern  regions, while large-scale farms are mainly situated in the western and north-
western  regions (see map  from Appendix 3.3.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
An interesting process has also been observed in terms of the transfer of land ownership 
rights. It was expected that the former state land would be privatized fast. However, the share 
of state-owned land did not change significantly during the transformation period. This was so 
because the majority of private, small-scale farmers preferred to lease land, rather than to own 
it, because of the “lack of finance[ing] on the part of buyers”, while “leasing… requires less 
money and is quick to execute” (van Zyl et al., 1996, p.18). 
   
The analysis of the disposition of 
state land taken over by the Agricultural Property Agency (APA) shows that the amount of 
state land which is leased is on average 20 times higher than sold land (see Appendix 3.4.). 
Therefore, although the share of the state-owned land did not change significantly and 
remained around 20%, the share of state-used land declined twice (Table 3.5.). 





owned land used land 
1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999 
Private sector 76 77 79 80 90 92 
Public sector 24 23 21 20 10 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
In terms of the regional distribution of state land, no significant changes had taken 
place. The state land (land in APA disposal) still predominated in the western and north-
western regions in 2004, just as it did in 1990 (see map in Appendix 3.5. for 2004, and 
compare with Appendix 3.2. for 1990).   The main reason for this is that the main demand for 
the land is observed in the southern regions, where the land supply is scarce (even considering 
the availability of former state land in APA disposal), while in the western and north-western 
regions the demand for land is lower and the land supply is higher (due to the high share of 
former state farms) than in the southern regions.   
 Therefore, even after a decade of reform, although some progress in land reform 
had been achieved, state land remains state-owned (though mainly privately run), small-
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 Data for 1990 and 1995 are from Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for Poland (1998); for 1999 from 
Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for Poland (2001)  
 60 
scale farming is still dominant and the regional disparity in terms of the state land vs. 
private land and small-scale vs. large-scale farming has persisted.   
The process and main phases of the liberalization of the outputs and inputs markets 
in Poland did not significantly differ from the “common” CEEC liberalization history, 
previously analyzed in the CEEC chapter. Ratinger et.al (2006) distinguished practically the 
same phases of liberalization for Poland as Anderson and Swinnen (2008) did for the CEEC.  
These researchers recognized the 1989-mid-1991 period as the period of "shock 
therapy" and market liberalization (the “liberalization phase” according to Anderson and 
Swinnen (2008), when the introduction of the “Balcerowicz Plan” (with the withdrawal of 
practically all support to agriculture) started. However this policy resulted in the “bankruptcy 
of most of the state farms and a sharp deterioration on the finance conditions of private farms” 
(Ratinger et.al, 2006, p.18).  
 Therefore, the next liberalization period (between 1991 and 1994), was considered to 
be the period in which a “new system of the agricultural support” (Ratinger et.al, 2006, p.18) 
was established, or according to Anderson and Swinnen (2008), as the period of price and 
income support, which they termed the "fire-brigade policy-making period".   
 That was also the period when three new market-oriented institutions for support and 
control of the agricultural policy were established: the Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernizing Agriculture (ARMA), the Agency for Rural Market (ARM) and the Agency for 
Agricultural Property of the State (AAPS). 
The next, third period (1994-1999) was identified as the “broadening of the scope of the 
agricultural policy” (Ratinger et.al, 2006, p.19) and building of the “framework for preparing 
Polish agriculture for adjustment to CAP” (Ratinger et.al, 2006, p.19.) period. During this 
time, the “Strategy for Poland” (which included issues that pertained to rural areas in general, 
and  not only about agriculture) and “Foundations of socio-economic policy for rural areas, 
agriculture and food economy until 2000” was adopted, which constituted a kind of base for 
the Polish accession to the EU, according to Ratinger et.al (2006). 
Therefore, finalizing the analysis of the history of liberalization of the outputs and 
inputs markets in Poland, it is possible to conclude that “Polish history” did not significantly 
differ from common CEEC history in this respect.  
An integral part of agricultural transformation in Poland (as in the other CEE countries) 
was the deconstruction of the Socialist state central management system and the building of a 
new agricultural institutional framework. These in turn resulted in significant 
modifications in the political and administrative institutional structure, mainly in the 
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transformation (or elimination) of the former ex-Socialist political and administrative 
institutions (e.g., Sejm, Parliament, and Central Planned Office) and the establishment of new 
ones (e.g., Agricultural agencies, foundations, agriculture-oriented political parties and 
unions).  
During the Socialist period, agricultural legislation was prepared by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, then submitted to the Government (which together with the Central Planning 
Office previously formulated the main agricultural policy objectives) and was finally 
forwarded to Sejm for formal adoption.  
Transformational reforms caused the following institutional changes in the Polish 
agricultural policy decision-making and implementation processes. Sejm,  which became a 
part of Polish Parliament in 1991, after the Senat elections  became (not formally) the main 
governmental body responsible for the adoption of general and agriculture related policy 
legislation. The role of the Central Planning Office, which was responsible for agricultural 
policy formulation during the Socialist era (as a part of the Polish general national economy 
plan), was reduced to the monitoring of the economic and trade indicators, because of the 
abolishment of the central planning system. Finally, the Central Planning Office was 
liquidated in 1997, within the framework of administrative reform. 
 From 1991, many tasks pertaining to agricultural policy implementation, which during 
the Socialist period were the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, were  transferred to 
the  newly established agencies - the Agency for the Restructuring  and Modernization of 
Agriculture (ARMA), the Agency for Rural Market (ARM) and the Agency for 
Agricultural Property of the State (AAPS).  
The Agency for the Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture (ARMA) was 
established by the Act of 29 December 1993. Its goal has been “to support structural changes 
in agriculture and in rural areas”. It has been working as a “paying” authority, mainly 
“channeling the preferential credits to the agro-food sector” (OECD, 1995, p.103) 
The Agency for Rural Market (ARM) was established by the Act of 7 June 1990, and 
has been in charge of intervention measures in the Polish market. Its main goal has been 
“stabilizing farm products markets and protecting farm incomes” (OECD, 1995, p.102). The 
agency implements intervention policy through purchases, stocks, sells, imports and exports 
of the agricultural products according to market situation, and it is also responsible for 
maintaining the state’s reserves of the food and agricultural products (OECD, 1995). 
 62 
The Agency for the Agricultural Property of the State (AAPS) (or the Agricultural 
Property Agency
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 (APA)) was established by the Act of 19 October 1991, with the main 
goal of taking over and administrating (restructuring and privatization) of the former state-
owned assets in the agriculture (agricultural state farms and its land). The Agency manages 
this task mainly through the selling, leasing and transferring of former state agricultural 
assets, and by establishing management or administration contracts (OECD, 1995).  (A 
detailed description of the Agency work and its results was provided earlier in this section, 
while discussing the privatization methods of the state farms).   
During the transformation period, some of the tasks of agricultural policy 
implementation (particularly in the field of adjusting the agricultural sector to a market 
economy and the improvement of rural infrastructures) were transferred to newly established 
foundations (Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture, European Fund for 
Development of Polish Rural Areas, Foundation Supporting Rural Areas, Foundation 
for Development of the Polish Agriculture, and etc). These foundations mainly offer 
support for specific investment programmes, training or consulting services. Some of these 
foundations are financed from domestic resources, and others comprise both domestic and 
foreign resources (Karaczun, 2000).  
Since the 1990s, the agriculturally oriented political parties (Polish Peasant Party, 
Peasant Alliance, Polish Peasant Party Solidarity) and agricultural labor unions (the 
Independent Self-governing Labour Union “Solidarnosc” of Individual Farmers, Agricultural 
Labour Union ”Samoobrona”, the National Union of Farmers associated in Agricultural 
Organizations) have started to play an important role in setting the directions of agricultural 
policy. They take initiative on changing or adjusting existing agricultural policy or associated 
trade measures as a part of the numerous Parliamentary Commissions’ work.  
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the transformation process led to a 
strengthening of the role of some institutions (Sejm), a reduction of the importance of others 
(the Central Planned Office) and also resulted in the creation of several new institutions (the 
Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture, the Agricultural Market Agency, 
the Agricultural Property Agency and different foundations).  Overall, the transformation 
process led to a decentralization of the agricultural policy decision-making process (by 
increasing the role of Parliament and political parties’ activities), and it also led to the 
                                                          
58
 In 2003,  the  Agency for the Agricultural Property of the State (AAPS) was transformed into Agricultural 
Property Agency (APA) according to the Law on formation  of the agricultural system from 11.04.2003  
(Ustawa z dnia 11.04.2003 r. o kształtowaniu ustroju rolnego - art. 18 ust. 2   (Dz. U. Nr 64, poz. 592)  
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diversification of channels of agricultural policy implementation (by establishment of several 
agricultural agencies and foundations).  
Finalizing this general description of the Polish agricultural profile and the 
evolution of its agricultural transformation history,  it is possible to distinguish the 
following main features: Poland's soil-climatic conditions are unfavorable to agricultural 
production, compared to most EU countries; the contribution of agriculture to the  total GDP 
significantly decreased during the transformation period; agricultural production
59
 and farm 
structure is  highly regional–specific; the Polish agricultural  transformation process  does not 
significantly differ from the “CEEC history” in terms of market liberalization and institutional 
building, but it differs in terms of land reform, due to specific pre-transition land ownership 
structure; the speed and comprehensiveness of the agricultural reform process allows us to 
consider the Polish  agricultural reform as a kind of “Big-bang” reform, which was mostly 
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3.2. Agricultural production in Poland during the transformation period. 
This section offers a detailed analysis of the GAO dynamics in Poland from 1990-2004. 
The section is organized as follows: it starts with an analysis of the long- and short-term 
trends of GAO production; then, the dynamic of the crops and livestock production with its 
regional diversification is described; after that, the organizational structure of the  agricultural 
production in terms of the ownership and farm size characteristics  is evaluated;  next, the 
overview of the   possible reasons for the initial agricultural production decline is provided; 
and last, concluding remarks finalize the Section. 
The long-term trend of agricultural production shows a cyclic dynamic, and allows us 
to distinguish the following phases in its dynamic: (see Appendix 3.6) 
-stable increase (1961-1975) 
-sharp decline (1975-1980) 
-sharp increase (1980-1986) 
-stabilization (1986-1990) 
-steep decline (1990-1994) 
-stabilization with the slight increase dynamic (1994-2010) 
Comparing the pre-transformation and post-transformation dynamics of the GAO in 
general, it is possible to state that before 1990, the GAO showed a increasing tendency 
(except for the 1975-1980 period), reaching its culmination point  between 1986-1990 (130% 
level compared to base year 1961), next, after 1990 the GAO experienced a steep decline 
(1990-1994), followed by a slow increase that stabilized at the 110% level compared to 1961, 
however never reaching the pre-transition peak of the 1975-1980 period.  
Although the long-term GAO dynamics had ups and downs, the share of agriculture in 
the GDP was constantly on the decrease: the share of agriculture in the Gross output declined 
from 16.4% in 1980 to 10.5% in 1990 and then to 2.9% in 2004. 
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A long-term analysis of the GAO structure (crop and livestock production) shows that 
from 1961-2004 livestock production prevailed, but its share was constantly declining, and 
starting from 2004 livestock and crop production shares had stabilized around 50% each (see 
Appendix 3.7). 
A “short-term” analysis of the agricultural production in Poland during the 
transformation period (1990 – 2004) shows that Poland experienced a steep decline in 
production from 1990 -1994, and after that started a slow recovery.  
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The following are usually considered among the main reasons for this initial GAO 
decline (which was, however, the smallest among all CEE countries in question): price 
distortions (terms of trade deterioration), state support withdrawal and a radical re-orientation 
of agricultural foreign trade. A detailed analysis of these factors will be provided later in this 
section, after the regional and structural GAO analysis. 
The most important agricultural products in Poland are cereals (18%), vegetables 
(7.4%), potatoes (6.9%), fruits (6.3%), milk (13.6%), pork (18.7%) and eggs and poultry 
together  (8.8 %)  in respective  shares of the value of agricultural output in the years 1998 
and 1999 (Agricultural situation in the candidate countries, 2002).  The detailed results of 
the “commodity by commodity” analysis of the agricultural production dynamics in Poland 
are presented in Appendix 3.8., where the production of each commodity in the transition 
period (1990-2004) is compared to its pre-transition level (1983-1989). The results of this 
analysis allow us to state that after an initial decline, the production of some commodities 
increased compared to the pre-transition level (maize, oil seeds, wheat, chicken meat, pig 
meat), but for the majority of agricultural products either decreased compared to the pre-
transition level or experienced cyclical changes.  Regarding the dynamics of the main 
agricultural products, the production of all the main crop products (potatoes, vegetables, fruits 
and cereals (except wheat) decreased.  The production of livestock products shows signs of 
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 The white line on the Graph 3.1. depicts the Polish  GAO, and the black line  depicts the linear trend.   Data 
are from  FAO database  (Gross Production Value (constant 2004-2006 1000 I$) (1000 Int. $) – Agriculture 
(PIN)-Total. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 3, 2013)  
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increase - the production of pork and poultry increased, and egg production, after an initial 
decline started to recover. A serious decline in cattle meat production is attributed to the 
liquidation of former state farms, which specialized in cow breeding (Banski, 2007; Zurek, 
2004), the outbreak of “Mad Cow Disease" (Zurek, 2004) and an increase in demand for 
chicken meat (product substitution). 
In terms of the regional differentiation of the GAO, crop production is mainly 
concentrated in the northern and central parts of Poland (Banski, 2007), but the highest yields 
are achieved in the western regions. According to Zurek (2004, p.14) these yields should be 
attributed “not to the land quality, but to the level of agricultural production”. This 
domination of the western regions in terms of crop yields and crop production did not change 
during the period in question (1990-2004) as we can see from the maps in Appendices 3.9.- 
3.11., where the regional specification of the production of basic cereals, wheat and potatoes 
is provided.   
Livestock (meat) production is mainly concentrated in the central parts of Poland, where 
the “voivodships” with the highest share in total production and production per-1ha are 
situated. Milk production is dispersed more homogenously across the country, with the 
exception of some “voivvodship”- outliers. This production structure did not change 
significantly during the period in question (see maps in Appendices 3.12. - 3.13.)  
Considering the general agricultural performance in terms of marketed output-per-
hectare of farmland, regional disparities generally increased during the transformation period.  
Mertens (2001) found that the ‘performance ratio” of the five best and five poorest 
voievodships for 1985-1989 vs. 1996-1998 years increased to 50% (from  2,9:1 in 1985-89 to 
4:1 in 1996-98).  
 The organizational structure of the GAO production did not change significantly 
during the entire 14-year period, from 1990 to 2004. Private farms are dominant in the GAO 
production, and its share in crop and livestock production increased on average by 10% 
during the period in question (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6. Share of private farms in agricultural production (current prices)
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  1990 1995 2000 2004 
% share of private farms in total GAO 77 89 90 89 
% share of private farms in crop production 78 90 89 89 
% share of private farms in livestock  production 77 88 91 90 
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 Agricultural statistics yearbook for Poland (2001, p.115)  and Agricultural statistics yearbook for Poland 
(2005, p.247).   
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The interdependence of the scale of agricultural production and farm size also did not 
change significantly from 1990 to 2004. Commercial agricultural production is mainly 
concentrated in medium and large farms, while small farms produce mainly for their own 
consumption.  In 1996, around 90% of farms of more than 15ha produced mainly for market 
purposes, while around 70% of small-scale farms (1ha-4ha) reported production for mainly 
private consumption (see Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7.  Farm size and purpose of agricultural production in 1996 
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land size # of farms 
(ths.) 













1-2 ha 460.7 5.5 24.9 44.5 7.4 17.7 100 
2-3 ha 280.8 3.2 16.2 52 16.5 12.1 100 
3-4 ha 211.9 2 10.8 50 29.3 7.9 100 
4-5 ha 173.2 1.4 7.3 42.6 43.4 5.2 100 
5-7 ha 260.1 1 4.6 30.6 60.7 3 100 
7-10 ha 259.6 0.7 2.7 16.4 78.5 1.6 100 
10-15 ha 216.7 0.5 1.9 7.5 89 1 100 
15-20 ha 89.2 0.5 1.4 4 93.3 0.8 100 
20-50 ha 75 0.6 1.5 2.2 94.9 0.8 100 
50-100 ha 5.5 1.4 2.3 1.1 93.8 1.5 100 
>100 ha 2.9 1.9 4.1 1.1 90.5 2.3 100 
Total 2053.7 2.3 10.9 33.1 45.9 7.7 100 
 
The analysis of agricultural market output according to farm size in 1996 also shows 
that farms with more than 7ha size have a main share in market production (see Table 3.8). 





1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5  5-7  7-10  10-15  15-20  20-50  >50  Total 
% share in 
market 
output 
4.3 3.6 4.0 4.3 9.4 14.8 19.7 12.1 16.9 10.9 100 
 
At the beginning of the transformation, the Polish agricultural sector was widely 
recognized among scholars and politicians as one of the “best-prepared” for the introduction 
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 Table from  Borowicz et.al (2001, p.121).   
64
 Agricultural statistics yearbook for Poland  (1998, pp.224-225) and   Agricultural statistics yearbook for 
Poland  (2005, p.247)   
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of free-market principles of transformational reforms due to its mainly private nature.
65
 
Hence, the initial agricultural output decline (although the smallest among analyzed CEE 
countries) was received  with huge disappointment, and several explanations emerged to 
explain this “phenomenon”. These included inherited initial conditions, choice of reform 
policy, low technical efficiency and land fragmentation. The most commonly mentioned 
reasons for this initial decline were price distortions, subsidy policy changes and agricultural 
foreign trade re-adjustment.  
Price distortions and subsidy policy changes were analyzed as possible reasons for 
the  initial decline and then slow increase of agricultural production by Dicke  & Misala  
(1993), Karp  & Stefanou  (1992), Davidova  et al. (2006), Rabinowicz (2003), Zawalińska 
 (2003), Ciaian & Pokrivcak  (2007), Rozelle & Swinnen  (2004). 
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 The liberalization of 
agricultural prices and significant reduction of agricultural subsidization in Poland, which 
started in January 1990 (with the implementation of the Balcerowicz Economic Program), 
freed-up most agricultural and food prices. It was expected that liberalization would permit 
agricultural prices to align, thus leading to an increase in economic efficiency. However, the 
significant terms of trade deterioration induced by price liberalization and subsidy cuts caused 
a rapid decline of agricultural output. The terms of trade deterioration continued its decline 
until the 2000s, but starting from the mid-1990s, its negative impact was mitigated by the re-
introduction of agricultural subsidization (which, however, constitutes the lowest level of 
support among the CEE countries in question) (see Appendix 3.14. with graphs). Therefore, 
starting from the mid-1990s, agricultural output, supported by the re-introduction of 
agricultural subsidization, started to increase gradually.    
The impact of agricultural foreign trade re-adjustment was analyzed by Smith 
(1994), Moutons (1998), Swinnen (2002), Holzmann & Zukowska-Gagelmann (1998), and 
Czyzewski et al. (2001).  This impact can be split into two main factors: (i) an inflow of cheap 
agricultural import from Western countries and (ii) a decline of agricultural export from 
Poland.  
  The favorable conditions for Western imports at the beginning of the transformation 
were created by the very low import tariffs that caused a significant increase in agricultural 
imports (see Appendix 3.15.). The scale of agricultural imports and its impact was so 
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 Polish case is unique among CEEC, because its agricultural sector was never fully collectivized after World 
War II. Private land and “private” labor force  has  accounted for 76% and 80%  share  of  the total land and total  
labor force in 1990 (OECD, 1995)  
66
 Dicke  & Misala  (1993), Davidova  et al. (2006), Rabinowicz (2003), Zawalińska  (2003) studies  refer 
directly to  the Polish agriculture, while Karp  & Stefanou  (1992), Ciaian & Pokrivcak  (2007), Rozelle  & 
Swinnen  (2004) include Poland as a part of the more general CEEC analysis. 
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substantial, that the situation with the meat imports from Germany was perceived as a 
"dumping" and in 1991 cattle and hog imports to Poland were “personally approved by the 
Minister of Agriculture” (Karp and Stefanou, 1991, p.15). This inflow of cheap agricultural 
commodities from the West lowered the output prices for national producers and diminished 
the incentives for production. 
The decline of agricultural export was caused by the CMEA (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) dissolution, because the agricultural products previously directed to 
CMEA countries (especially to the former FSU and East Germany) on non-market rules 
(based on imposed division of labor and recourses among CMEA countries) appeared 
uncompetitive on the recently opened Western markets or went under the Western markets 
imports’ limitation.
67
  Thus, agricultural producers had no incentive to produce agricultural 
commodities that had no chance of being sold, which caused the decline in production of the 
selected “uncompetitive” commodities. The above-mentioned impact of the export de-
composition on output decline was discussed by Karp & Stefanou (1993), Wziatek-Kubiak 
(2000) and Bezemer (2003).  
Hence, the results of the Poland-specific agricultural production analysis provided in 
this section allow us to come to state that the reform results in Poland in terms of output 
68
 
could be considered a success, because despite an initial decline (which was the lowest among 
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 According to Karp and Stefanou (1991, p.15) “the export of meat products declined sharply at the beginning 
of 1991” in Poland “when the EC reduced the 1990 quota by half”.  
68
 It means in “absolute terms” referring only to production dynamic, with no comparison to subsidies level. 
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3.3. Agricultural productivity in Poland during the transformation period. 
With reference to Section 2.3 in Chapter 2, where the outcome of the Polish reforms in 
terms of productivity is already considered a success, this section will provide a detailed 
evaluation of the country’s specific features of productivity dynamics during the 
transformation period. 
This section is organized as follows:  it starts with a specification of the partial 
productivity estimations; then, the dynamic of the partial productivity of land, labor, 
machinery and fertilizer is analyzed; next, an overview of the selected TFP estimations for 
Poland is provided; and finally, concluding remarks regarding the success or failure of the 
reform in terms of agricultural productivity are provided. 
For the purpose of the partial productivity analysis, land, labor, machinery and fertilizer 
productivity indexes for 1990-2010 period were estimated. Land productivity was estimated 
as the ratio of GAO
69
 to total agricultural land.  The labor productivity estimation has two 
specifications: (i) the ratio of the GAO to the number of agricultural workers (economically 
active population in agriculture) and (ii) the ratio of GAO per working hours, where the 
Annual Working Unit (AWU) was taken as a proxy of the working hours.
70
 Machinery 
productivity was calculated as the ratio of the GAO to the amount of the agricultural 
machinery in use (the total stock of farm machinery in "40-CV tractor equivalents" 
(CV=metric horsepower)). Fertilizer productivity was calculated as the ratio of the GAO to 
the fertilizers consumption (the metric tons of N, P2O5, K2O of fertilizer consumption 
measured in "N-fertilizer equivalents," where tons of fertilizer types were aggregated using 
weights based on their relative prices). All the data  (except for AWU) was taken from Fuglie 
(2012)
 
datasets, the quality and reliability of which were discussed previously in Section 2.3.   
In general, the overall analysis of the Polish agricultural productivity (Table 3.9. and 
Appendix 3.16.)  shows that Poland followed the general trend of the CEE countries – partial 
productivity of inputs that fell faster than the GAO decrease to a smaller degree than the 
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 The GAO was calculated  as the FAO gross agricultural output where  the sum of the value of production of 
189 crop and livestock commodities was valued at constant, global-average prices from 2004-2006 and 
measured in international 2005$. 
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 The analysis was done only for 1995-2010 period because of the limited data availability. AWU (annual work 
unit), “corresponds to the work performed by one person who is occupied on an agricultural holding on a full-
time basis. Full-time means the minimum hours required by the relevant national provisions governing contracts 
of employment. If the national provisions do not indicate the number of hours, then 1,800 hours are taken to be 




afae9ad1763c353e.e34MbxeSaxaSc40LbNiMbxeNaNyKe0  (Accessed:  January 5, 2014) 
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partial productivity of the inputs which  fell slower than the GAO.
71
 As a specific Polish 
feature, it is possible to consider the relevant stability of the productivity dynamic, compared 
to other CEE countries - partial productivity indicators did not change by more than 20%.     





























































Changes in  
GAO 100 81 76 82 87 81 79 83 84 78 81 80 
land 100 99 99 98 96 96 89 87 95 84 86 87 
Labor (ec.active 
pop.) 
100 92 84 80 65 57 52 52 72 52 53 48 
Labor (rural 
population) 
 100 100 100 99.8 99.4 99.0 99.4 100 99.7 100.2 101.0 
Labor (AWU)         85 74 67 68 78 68 68 62 
machinery 100 99 111 112 111 111 116 117 109 123 132 133 
fertilizers 100 89 107 112 114 111 110 120 108 135 152 138 
Changes in  
Land 
productivity 








        121 129 139 144 125 135 140 151 
Machinery 
productivity 
100 81 68 73 78 73 68 71 77 63 61 60 
Fertilizers 
productivity 
100 91 71 73 76 72 72 69 80 58 53 58 
 
The next paragraphs of this section will provide a detailed analysis of the partial 
productivity indicators in order to evaluate and explain the specific productivity dynamic 
features in Poland during the transformation period. 
Land productivity in Poland steadily declined during the period in question (1990-
2004) and continued this tendency for the next five years. The dynamic of land productivity 
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 In case of some other CEEC - partial productivity of inputs that fell faster than the GAO had increased, while 
the partial productivity of inputs that fell slower than the GAO had decreased. 
72
 All the data for the Table 3.8 are taken from Appendix 3.16 except for Labor (rural population), which are 
from FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org (Accessed:  March 3, 2014) 
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was dependent on the changes in arable land use, which were to some extent influenced by 
the land reform changes. 
Because of the predominance of small-scale, private farms, the main land-reform 
(privatization) efforts were focused on land that belonged to large-scale state farms. The land-
reform induced decrease in arable land was mainly related to part of this former state 
farmland being taken out of cultivation.   
This happened because nearly one-third of the former state lands belong to the poorest-
quality classes (V and VI), and it would have been economically irrational to continue 
farming on these marginal soils.  However, the issue of the rationality of the use of these 
marginal lands seems rather controversial if one looks further than the simple calculation of a 
costs/benefits ratio. On the one hand, naturally, the above-mentioned benefits/costs ratio will 
be negative on these marginal soils, and these lands surely can not be justifiably exploited in 
terms of the “classical” market economy, where the main task is cost minimization. On the 
other hand, Gorz and Kurek (1998) argue that most of this uncultivated land is situated in 
areas of high unemployment caused by lay-offs of former state farm workers, who have 
received unemployment benefits, which cost almost twice as much money as was previously 
paid in budget allocations to the state farms. Therefore, in terms of social costs, the economic 
rationale of getting out of cultivation of these marginal lands can be considered debatable.  
However, this reform-induced decrease in arable land area was successfully balanced by 
an increase in land intensivity, measured in terms of machinery-and-fertilizers-use ratio per 
arable land, which after a slight initial decline in 1990-1993 started to increase steadily and 
continued this tendency up to 2010, reaching more than a 150% increase compared to the pre-
transition period.  (Table 3.10).  






































































machinery 100 100 100 99 112 114 116 116 130 134 115 146 153 153 
fertilizers 100 71 90 98 108 114 116 116 124 138 114 161 177 159 
 
For the purpose of this research, labor productivity was calculated both in a 
quantitative (GAO per economically active in agriculture population) and qualitative (GAO 
per AWU) way. Both these partial productivity indexes increased during the transformation 
period and had continued its growth, reaching almost a 150% increase compared to the pre-
transition level.    
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The increase of the partial productivity of labor (measured in GAO per economically 
active population ratio) was caused by the high speed of the outflow of the labor force from 
the agricultural sector, which was caused mainly by a decrease in working opportunities in 
rural areas after the land reform (due to the liquidation of the former state agricultural 
enterprises) and an increase of it in urban areas. This tendency became especially evident after 
1995, because until then, agriculture in Poland had played a “shock absorption role” and 
functioned as a “food safety net” during the turbulent initial years of the “Big-Bang” 
transformation. The natural outflow of rural people to urban areas due to better income 
opportunities and quality of life, which  was observed starting from 1946 (Banski, 2006)  also 
played a role.  
However, it is noteworthy that although the economically active population in 
agriculture diminished substantially during the period in question (by about 50% of the 1990s 
level) the rural population in general remained practically the same (see Table 3.8. “Labor 
(rural population)” line) This could be explained by the (i) rural population ageing (increase 
of  the share of senior people in the agricultural population) and (ii) increase of the share of 
agricultural population that works outside the agricultural sector, while living in rural areas. 
The labor productivity increase measured in (GAO per AWU ratio) was also influenced 
by the high speed of the outflow of the labor force from agriculture, because the average 
number of working hours per one person did not change during the transformation period, 
although it fluctuated from maximum 37.1 hours per week in 1994 to 33.2 hours per week in 
1998 (see Table 3.11.and Appendix 3.17).  
Table 3.11. Average number of hours worked per one person
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  1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2005 
Total (all types of employment) 37.1 35.8 33.2 36 34.4 35.1 
Employees  42.2 42.7 41.2 40.1 40.7 39.7 
Employers and own-account 
workers 39.4 37.9 34.4 38.4 36.3 37.9 
Contributing family workers 27.6 28 26.5 28 27.8 26.3 
 
Considering that the average salary in the agricultural sector in Poland (see Appendix 
3.18) steadily increased from 1995-2004, both in terms of its nominal value (measured in 
Polish national currency (zloty) and US$ ) and power purchasing parity (the average salary in 
2004 was 339% higher than in 1995, while the price index for consumer goods and services 
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 Average number of hours worked per one person in the reference week in the main job by employment status 
and selected sections in the 4th quarter of the year.  Data from:  Yearbooks of Agricultural Statistics for Poland  
(various years)  (Section: working conditions) 
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increased by only 104% compared to 1995), the results of the transformational reforms in 
terms of labor productivity could be considered a success. 
Machinery productivity shows a stable downward trend from the very beginning of 
the transformation due to the stable increase in machinery use, which was coincident with a 
stable decline in GAO production. Although overall machinery use in Poland (measured in 
terms of machinery capacity in horsepower) steadily increased during the period in question 
(1990-2004) and continued its growth during the next years, this happened mainly due to the 
positive changes in the narrow stratum of highly adaptable and advanced Polish agricultural 
producers, while in the less-advanced agricultural enterprises, the increase in machinery use 
was hampered by technological and institutional constraints. As the most important of them, 
Ciepelewska and  Mucha-Leszko (1999) mentioned the following: (i) low educational level 
and inefficient system of training and extension services contracted the absorption of the 
technological advances; (ii) technologically unfavorable agrarian structure -  farming tractors 
could not be reasonably used on farms under 10ha, which comprised 90% of Polish farm area; 
(iii) over half of Polish tractors were 10 or more years old  (see Table 3.12.) and were  not 
compatible with the more advanced equipment, and this situation did not change significantly 
during the next decade.   
Table 3.12. Amortization of fixed assets (buildings, machinery, means of transportation) in 
% (current bookkeeping prices)
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 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Private sector 54.7 56.2 58.9 56.9 63.4 63.4 69.7 40.2 71.3 
    -cooperatives 40.6 42.3 48.7 49.9 51 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Public sector 43.7 44.4 46.6 47.5 49.7 49.7 56.5 58.6 59.8 
 
Tractor density (tractors-per-ha ratio) shows a significant regional difference – the 
highest tractor-per-ha ratio is in the southern regions of Poland, while the lowest is in the 
northern and north-east regions. However tractor capacity (measured in horsepower) is higher 
in the northern regions and lower in the southern regions (Banski, 2007). This could be related 
to the two following factors: (i) small-scale family farming, dominant in the southern regions, 
does not require extremely high-capacity tractors, while in the northern and north-east 
regions, with predominantly large-scale farming, the use of high-capacity tractors is more 
reasonable and economically justifiable; (ii) the possession of a tractor has a prestigious 
meaning for the majority of farmers and a lot of tractors were bought on the basis of (low) 
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  Data from Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for Poland  (1998, p.168) and  Agricultural Statistics Yearbook 
for Poland  (2005, p.233) 
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price rather than on the basis of technical characteristics when the state-owned, large-scale 
farm have been  renewed  its machinery park  and got rid of the old, low-capacity and 
outdated agricultural machinery (Banski, 2007). On average, the tractors of medium capacity 
were prevalent in 2002 in Poland (tractors from 25KW to 60 KW), while only 1 out of 100 
farms  had tractors of more than 100KW capacity (Banski, 2007).   
The fertilizer productivity after the initial strong increase shows a clear downward 
trend, which continued during the whole period of observation (1990-2010). The initial strong 
increase in fertilizer productivity should mainly be attributed to a sharp decrease in fertilizer 
consumption because of a significant increase in inputs’ prices and terms of trade 
deterioration at the beginning of the transformation. Due to the “shock” price liberalization, 
the retail prices of inputs, measured in agricultural products, increased twice during the first 
years of the transformation (Appendix 3.19.).   
Besides the overall changes in fertilizer consumption, induced by the transformation 
processes, the fertilizer consumption gap (regional differentiation in fertilizer use) became 
more extended than in the pre-transition period.  According to Mertens (2001), during the first 
half of the 1980s, the difference between “viovodships” with the highest and lowest fertilizer 
consumption levels was 2.5:1, in 1996 it became 3.6:1 and in 1998 it reached the 5.5:1 level – 
which means that the fertilizer consumption gap had increased twice, during the first decade 
of the transformation. However, the author does not provide detailed information regarding 
the geographical positions of the regions with the highest (and lowest) fertilizer consumption 
levels, and whether their fertilizer consumption levels correlate with the small-scale vs. large-
scale production regional division.  
The general analysis of the partial productivity dynamic of all the inputs in question 
(land, labor, machinery and fertilizers) produced a mixed picture and did not lead to 
straightforward assumptions regarding the results of the reforms in terms of productivity.  In 
order to make a final conclusion, the TFP dynamic must be taken into consideration.  
 Unfortunately, the estimation of a plausible (only Poland-relevant) panel regression is 
constrained by insufficient (not consistent) data and changes in administrative division during 
the period in question. The data inconsistency problem is related to a lack of consistent and 
homogenous  GAO data for the whole period in question, because the only GAO data 
available for the whole 1990-2004 period for each region are the “procurement of agricultural 
products”, which are “the quantity and value of agricultural products purchased by economic 
entities conducting procurement of agricultural products directly from producers, compiled on 
the basis of half-year reports presented by this entities” (Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for 
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Poland, 2004, p.312 ). This procurement value does not cover all the GAO produced in 
Poland, but only 70%-80% of it, and therefore should not be considered as a representative 
dependent variable (Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for Poland, 2004 ). The regional division 
problem means that in 1998 the Polish administrative division was reformed (49 
“viovodships” were merged into 16 “voivodships”) and the boundaries of the previous 49 
“voivodships” do not correspond exactly with the newly emerged 16 “voivodships”.  Thus, 
the TFP estimations from the studies when Poland was the part of the multi-countries' panel 
regression will be used for an assessment of the reforms’ results in terms of agricultural 
productivity. 
The analysis of these studies (see Table 3.13) shows that although during the some 
short periods of time within the whole 1990-2004 period (1989-1992 in Swinnen and Vranken 
(2010) study, 1989-1995 in Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) study and 2001-2005 in Fuglie 
(2012) study) the TFP in the long-term run for the whole period in question could be 
considered as a having the stable increasing tendency.  
Table 3.13. Average annual TFP growth (based on overview from Appendix 2.9) 
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Swinnen and Vranken  (2010)  











0.8 -1.7 0.5 3.3 0.9 
Rozelle  and Swinnen (2004)  







  -0.4 -5.1 4.3 







2010   
 0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.0017   
CEEC Chapter regression (Appendix 
2.7)  (dep. variable -GAO)  
1990-
2004 
  0.4 
 
Such an increase of TFP could be attributed to the fact that the technological, 
agricultural and managerial improvements in inputs’ use had a more decisive impact than the 
fall in some inputs use.  This leads to the conclusion that the transformational reforms (in 
terms of productivity) could be considered a success in Poland. 
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  This overview does not include the numerous panel regressions whose estimation was based on Polish farm 
survey data due to its micro-coverage (not the whole of Polish agriculture, but only selected -though very 
representatively- farms) and time-span limits (mainly selected years, but not the whole period in question).  
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3.4. Conclusion 
The analysis of the Polish agricultural performance during the fifteen years of 
transformation allows to come to the following conclusions: 
1. The analysis of the speed and the comprehensiveness of agricultural reforms points 
to Poland as an “advanced reformer”, and the reform process itself could be considered as 
accomplished in terms of market liberalization, institutional building and land ownership 
structure as for year 2004. 
2. In terms of agricultural production and productivity, the transformational reforms 























CHAPTER 4. Belarusian agricultural performance during the transformation 
period. 
This chapter evaluates Belarusian agricultural performance during the fifteen years of 
transformation in regard to the “success or failure of reforms” assessment in terms of 
agricultural production and productivity. The chapter consists of three sections.  Section 4.1. 
is dedicated to a description of Belarus agricultural history, and is divided into four sub-
sections. Section 4.2 provides an analysis of Belarusian agricultural production dynamics. 
After that, in Section 4.3, agricultural productivity will be discussed. Next, in Section 4.4., the 
panel regression for the seven Belarusian regions is estimated in order to analyze the impact 
of the changes in inputs use on the GAO dynamic, and to calculate the TFP indexes. Finally, 
the concluding remarks in Section 4.5 will outline the main findings of the research.  
 
4.1. Overview of Belarusian agricultural transformation history.  
This section consists of the four following sub-sections: Sub-Section  4.1.1 provides an 
overview of the Belarus agricultural profile, and a description of the land reform progress; 
Sub-Section 4.1.2 provides a detailed evaluation of the reasons for the slow land reform 
progress with a special emphasis on the reluctance of Belarusian peasants to become a private 
farmers; Sub-Section 4.1.3 evaluates price- and state-support policies; and Sub-Section 4.1.4 
provides concluding remarks regarding the appropriateness of the gradual  reform approach 
chosen by the Belarusian government.   
 
4.1.1. Overview of land-reform progress in Belarus, 1990-2004 
This sub-section briefly reviews the agricultural reform process in Belarus during the 
transformation period. The sub-section is organized as follows: it starts with an overview of 
the Belarus natural agricultural endowment; then, the role of the agricultural sector in the 
Belarus economy will be analyzed; after that, an outline of the process and results of the land 
reform will be provided; and finally, the concluding remarks will cap off this sub-section.   
The Belarus Republic encompasses 207,595 square kilometers. It has 10.3 million 
inhabitants (80% of whom are Belarusians, with the rest mainly Russians and Ukrainians). 
The majority of the population speaks fluent Russian (Csaki et al., 1994).      
Administratively, Belarus is divided into six regions (“oblast”) with a quite 
homogeneous agricultural structure in terms of the dispersion of agricultural land and 
agricultural labor among them (see map in Appendix 4.1) 
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Agricultural land constitutes around 45% of the total territory of Belarus: 65% of it is 
given over to annual crops, 19% is pasture and 2% are orchards (Csaki et al., 1994).     
In general, the Belarus natural environment is usually considered only of average 
quality for agriculture (Csaki et al., 1994). Further, the Chernobyl explosion has had enduring 
effects on Belarus agricultural resource endowment – “about 261 thousands hectares of 
agricultural land were taken out of cultivation and some restrictions on agricultural cultivation 
were introduced on about 1,5 million ha, about 16% of productive farmland” (Csaki et al., 
1994, p. 6 ).
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The role of the agricultural sector in the Belarusian economy did not change 
substantially during the transformation period, although the share of agriculture in the 
national economy did decline steadily at that time.  
Belarus had been considered one of the most industrialized countries in the USSR – the 
Belarusian share in USSR production was about 8%, while the Belarus population accounted 
for 3% of the total USSR population (Csaki et al., 1994).  
Despite the mainly “industrial orientation” of the Belarus economy, agriculture played a 
significant supplementary role (income earnings, substantial employment, export revenues 
and so forth), although the country had the status of a net importer of food and agriculture 
products in the USSR (Csaki et al., 1994).  In 1992, the agricultural sector constituted 24% of 
the Belarus NMP
77
 (18% of GDP) and employed about 20.7% of the labor force (Csaki et al., 
1994). 
During the transformation period, the role of agriculture continued its natural 
downsizing tendency (Table 4.1).  While in 1990, agriculture employed 18% of the total 
labour force and produced 20% of the GDP, in 1998 its share in the total labor force and GDP 
production declined to 16% and 14%, and in 2004 to 11% and 9% respectively. 
Table 4.1.  Agriculture’s share in the economy 
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 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2004 
Share in GDP 20 22 18 16 14 9 
Share in assets 20 23 17 15 16 -- 
Share in investment 28 18 9 8 7 -- 
Share in employment 18 20 19 17 16 11 
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 Although the Chernobyl reactor is located in Ukraine, 75% of the Cherernobyl  radioactive fallout landed  in 
Belarus  due to the weather conditions (the direction of the prevalent winds) and the Chernobyl proximity to the 
Belarus border  (Csaki et al., 1994) 
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 NMP – Net Material Product was the main macroeconomic indicator used by the USSR and other centrally-
planned economies. GDP calculations are only available from 1992. (Csaki et al.,1994) 
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 Csaki et  al. (1994)   and  Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (various years)  
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  According to the “agrarian index” calculated by Lerman (2007a), Belarus (together 
with Russia and Ukraine) was considered to be the least agrarian among the FSU countries, 
which reflects the correction of the national economic structure and general urbanization 
trends
79
 (Table 4.2.).  According to the WB report, such tendencies could be considered to be 
positive, because they “illustrate[s] the relatively mature nature of the economy” (Cramon-
Taubadel et al., 2009, p.6). 













































































index 33.2 34.8 15.9 40.8 28 49.9 39.2 14 55.1 38.3 45.4 22.7 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of the Belarusian agricultural transformation, which 
significantly distinguishes Belarus from the other CEEC and FSU countries, is the slow speed 
of its transformational reform. For most transitional countries, the transformation agenda 
mainly included land reform, reduction of state (government) subsidies and price (agricultural 
market) liberalization. However, in Belarus, after fifteen years of transformation, the role of 
private agriculture is still marginal, and significant state support together with strict price 
regulation still play an important role in the agricultural sector. This will be discussed in the 
next paragraphs.   
In terms of land tenure, during the Soviet period, Belarus agriculture (as in all FSU 
countries) consisted of a “socialized sector” (centrally controlled, large-scale state farms) and 
a   “private sector” - subsidiary household plots.    
The “socialized sector” consisted of two types of farms – “sovkhoz” (state farms) and 
“kolkhoz” (collective farms). “Kolkhozes” were the “collective farms in which output and 
assets were jointly owned by the members”, while the “sovkhozes” were “the state farms in 
which output and all assets, including land, were owned by the state” (Bondar and Lilje, 
2002, p.4).  Both types of “socialized farms” were organized on the same principles as the 
industrial enterprises, where its members became its workers and received assigned tasks to 
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 This “agrarian index” is expressed in percentages and is calculated as the arithmetic average of  three 
components: share of rural population (in percent of total population),  share of agricultural employment (in 
percent of total employment), and share of agricultural Gross Value Added in the country GDP (Lerman, 2007a, 
p.5)  
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 Source: Lerman (2007a, p.5 )  
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be done from the farm managers (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). The state also made 
investments, set production goals (according to the regional and national centrally elaborated 
production plans), “purchased inputs through planning channels, and remitted profits up 
through the ministerial system”  (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004, p.421).    
The “kolkhozes” and “sovkhozes” were large-scale and well-mechanized enterprises.  
According to Csaki et all.  (2000, p. xix),  “Soviet type” farms “were large in terms of all 
three production factors – land, labor and capital”, compared to the  “farms in the  market 
economies, which tend to be large either in terms of capital or labor, but not both”. The scope 
of its operations very often comprised both upstream and downstream activities, such as agro-
processing (dairy, meat, sugar processing) and the provision of inputs (machinery repair, 
construction services, agrochemical supplies); only a small share of farms was narrowly 
specialized (Csaki et all., 1994). The “socialized” sector  was also responsible for providing a 
comprehensive range of social and municipal services in rural areas, like kindergartens, 
schools, medical and social care, housing, clubs, sport facilities and so on.   
Private agriculture consisted of subsidiary household plots (from 0.1 to 0.5 ha), which 
were cultivated by the members of “kolkhozes” and “sovkhozes” who lived in rural areas, and 
so-called “garden plots”, cultivated by urban residents (Csaki et al., 1994).  During the 1980s, 
household plots (around 1.4 million families, according to Csaki et al., 1994)  occupied 7% of 
total agricultural land and produced  around the 25% of total agricultural output (Table 4.3.)  
 Table 4.3. “Socialized” and “private” agriculture in Belarus (%)
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 1980 1985 1989 1990 
Total agricultural land use 100 100 100 100 
        -household plots  7 7 8 8 
        -state farms 93 93 92 92 
Total agricultural production 100 100 100 100 
       -household plots 34 30 25 25 
       -state farms 67 70 75 75 
The process of land reform in Belarus was initiated between 1989-1990 by the 
Communist Party and Soviet Supreme Council as a vital part of the entire process of 
transformation of the Socialist command economy to a market economy (Sakovitch, 2008a 
and Sakovitch, 2008b). More specifically to land issues, the whole process of land reform in 
Belarus from 1990-2004   could roughly be divided  into two parts: (1) changes  in land 
tenure (land property rights) that affected the “private sector” - subsidiary household plots 
and newly emerged individual private farms, and (2) changes in the legal and 
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organizational status of “socialized sector” farms  (“kolhozes” and “sovhozes”), which is 
often referred to as “farm restructuring” in the international (Western) transformation 
literature (Csaki et.al., 2000; Csaki  and Kray, 2005).  These two land reform streams will be 
analyzed in the next paragraphs. 
Regarding land tenure issues, there were two main waves of land legislation reforms, 
the first of which took place at the beginning of the transformation in the 1990s
 
, and the 
second of which took place in 1996. The first wave started in 1990 with the adoption of a set 
of legislative acts that allowed for the creation of private farms, increased the permitted limit 




The creation of private farms run by private individuals that would be able to make 
“production and marketing decisions independent[ly]” (Csaki et al., 2000, p.15) of the state 
was allowed by the new Land Code adopted in December 11, 1990. Although farm size was 
limited to 50 ha per farm, and the farmland was only used privately but owned by the state,
83
 
this new legislation broke the previous state monopoly on commercial, large-scale agricultural 
production. 
 Household plot size increased from 0.5 ha to 1 ha by a Resolution of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic, adopted in December 11, 1990. This aspect of 
Belarusian land reform is considered by some experts to be its most crucial,   even more 
important than the redistribution of Soviet collective farmland to private farmers (UNDP, 
2006). This point will be discussed in greater detaill later in this section. 
The 1993 Law on Land Ownership officially recognized household plots as private 
property.  
In Belarusian historiography, this period of land reform was referred to as the period of  
“imposed farmerization”
 
(Sakovitch, 2008a, pp. 21-22), which was characterized by the 
following features: (i) dismantling of the state system of the large-scale agricultural 
production based on the “kolhoz”-es and “sovhoz”-es; (ii) forced farmerization of the 
Belarusian villages; (iii) re-orientation of the all Belarusian enterprises to the  market methods 
of the work” (Sakovitch, 2008b).  
During the second wave of land legislation reform, initiated in 1999 by the adoption of 
the new Land Code, individual private farmers were allowed to have up to 100 ha in a lifetime 
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 In total, there were more than 15 land-reform relevant legislative acts adopted during the first wave of land 
reform. I chose only three to discuss on the basis of their importance. 
83
 The land for private farms was allocated only in lifetime inherited possession with no transfer rights. This land 
could not be sold, sub-leased, exchanged, and divided into the sub-plots.  
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inherited possession, and any amount of land to lease. The limit of the household plot 
permitted to be in private possession remained the same (1 ha), but individuals were allowed 
to lease additionally up to 2 ha, so the previously established (in 1990) one-hectare  limit of 
household land size increased to 3 hectares. Although official recognition of private property 
pertaining to land in household plots had taken place in 1993, only a small part of the 
household plots became officially privately owned, some more in lifetime inherited 
possessions, and the major part of land cultivated in household plots remained in state-use 
rights (Csaki et al., 2000).   The WB survey made among the people without land titling 
documents (662 respondents) in 1999, revealed the following reasons for this situation: (i) 
passive approach of the local authorities (do not inform the people about their rights on the 
land) ; (ii) land is not officially valued and titled; (iii) lack of money to pay for the titling 
procedure and document; (iv) sometimes land documents are kept by the corporate farm 
management; (v) other reasons (Csaki et al., 2000). Considering the very small share of 
officially owned private land, the land market in Belarus is poorly developed and the main 
household land transactions are the leasing of land from corporate farms (Csaki et al., 2000).     
Although land reform caused significant legislative change (the break-up of the state 
monopoly on commercial agricultural production, the introduction of private property on 
household plots and an increase in their size) the real economic outcomes were far from 
expected. Reallocation of land from the “socialized” sector (“kolhozy” and “sovhozy”) to the 
“private” sector (household plots and individual farmers) was marginal. The share of privately 
used land of the total agricultural land did not exceed 17% during the period in question 
(Table 4.4.).  Moreover, the main redistribution of state land occurred not in the farmers’ land 
sector, but in the household plots’ sector. The peak of land re-distribution to household plots 
happened in 1992-1993, after the government permission of the two-times increase of allowed 
household plot size, from 0.5 ha to 1ha. During this period, the share of household plots’ land 
increased more than twice, and then stabilized at around a 15% share.  
 The share of private farmers’ land was still marginal, and did not exceed 2% even after 
fifteen years of transformation (see Table 4.4.)  
This land tenure structure (with the prevalence of corporate farm land over private 
farms and household plots) remained the same in every Belarus region for the whole period in 











































































94 87 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 83 83 84 
Private 
farms 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Household 
plots 
6 13 15 15 16 16 16 15 15 16 16 15 15 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Belarus and international scholars maintain that this fact reflects a failure in the 
development of the farmers’ sector, although the explanations of this failure differ. 
International (mainly Western) scholars suggest that the underdeveloped status of the land 
reform (weak and underdeveloped legislation and lack of consistent policy for large, post-
Soviet farms restructuring and privatization) (Csaki and Kray, 2005; Csaki and Nash, 1998) 
and the lack of (or insufficient) support of the Belarusian government for farmers’ sector 
development (Csaki et al., 2000) are the key reasons for this failure. Conversely, Belarusian 
scholars (e.g. Kazakevich,2006; Kornilov,2006; Shpak,2007; Korbut,2009), officials 
(Andrievich, 2007; Belagroprombank, 2011)  and some farmers (Sinevich, 2012) argue that 
Belarusian government provided a sufficient legislative basis and fair enough supportive 
measures for farmers' development (especially at the beginning of the transformation period 
(1991-1994), when it was almost officially declared  that farmers would create “the third and 
most effective sector of the agricultural production, in addition to the state-farms’ and  
subsidiary household plots’ sectors” (Belagroprombank, 2011). Therefore, it is probably 
possible to consider the “the risk-averse behavior and the reluctance of the rural population 
(farm workers, peasants) in starting up the individual farming” (Prognoz, 1999, p.75) as the 
reason for the failure of individual farming.  (These suggestions will be analyzed more 
thoughtfully in the next sub-section of this chapter). 
After the surge of individual farming from 1990-1996, the initial enthusiasm subsided 
substantially, and beginning in 1997, the number of individual farms started to shrink (Table 
4.5.).  Also, the normalization of the food supply and the end of the food shortages (which 
diminished the role of individual farming as a food security net) played a role in the 
diminishing interest in individual farming. 
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Table 4.5.  Average size and number of private individual farms
85
 
  Number of organised 
farms 
Number of liquidated 
farms 
Average size per 
farm (ha) 
1990 17 0 21.2 
1991 84 8 25.4 
1992 757 160 20.6 
1993 2,372 137 19.2 
1994 2,730 283 20.4 
1995 2,954 342 20.6 
1996 3,030 328 20.6 
1997 2,977 451 20.7 
1998 2,668 264 22.7 
1999 2,641 234 25.4 
2000 2,651 344 28.9 
2001 2,525 357 32.8 
2002 2,397 219 38.9 
2003 2,399 257 54.2 
2004 2,493 373 72.1 
2005 2,318 251 73.9 
2006 2,204 203 67.4 
Summing up the outcomes of the land reform process in terms of land tenure (land 
ownership rights), it is possible to conclude that the main developments took place only in the 
private sector (individual private farms and household plots). The “socialized” state sector 
(large-scale “post-Soviet” farms) remained practically unaffected by land tenure reforms, 
because all the land of the former soviet “kolhoozes” and “sovhozes” remained as state 
property even after fifteen years of transformation, and only minor (mainly cosmetic) 
restructuring changes in the legal status of these farms had been achieved, which will be 
discussed later in the next paragraphs. 
In terms of large-scale, “post-Soviet” farm restructuring, it is possible to set forth the 
following three stages. The first stage (1990-1998) is recognized by both Belarus and Western 
scholars as having been “mainly of declarative character” (Miasnikovitch, 2007, p.314) in 
restructuring and “formal change of title” (Miasnikovitch, 2007, p.314) with “little change in 
organizational type” (Csaki et al., 2000, p.19). During this period, only 95 former “kolhozes” 
and “sovhozes” were reorganized into new legal entities (these, however, still remained under 
state control with some minor changes in organizational structure), which constituted less 
than 4% of the total post-Soviet big farms
86
 (Table 4.6.).  
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  Data from  Sakovitch (2008c, p. 153)  
86 Although the World Bank study recognized three  periods in farm restructuring between 1990-1998 (Csaki et 
al., 2000), the small scale of the observed change and insignificant number of restructured farms permits   to 
consider and research this time  period as a coherent one. 
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The second stage (1999-2003) was the most intensive, while involving mainly a formal 
reorganization of post-Soviet farms. It started in 1999 with the adoption of the new Land 
Code,   which did not categorize the “kolhoz” and “sovhoz” as legally recognized forms of 
business organizations (enterprises). However, the actual reorganization started in 2000, after 
the adoption of the Presidential Decree, which stipulated that the “kolhozes” should be 
reorganized into agricultural production cooperatives, and that “sovhozes” should be 
reorganized into state unitary enterprises (Presidential Decree #22, 2000).  
As a result, during the following three years, almost all “kolhozes” and “sochozes” were 
reorganized into new legal entities – large-scale, corporate farms (see Table 4.6.). However, 
the effects of this restructuring were marginal, because the reorganized farms remained under 
state control. Only “the transfer of responsibility for the provision and maintenance of the 
social infrastructure from agricultural enterprises to local authorities” can be considered a 
vital and positive change during this period (Freinkman et al., 2005, p.183).    
Table 4.6. Corporate farm restructuring 
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1985 1,715 917 44      2,676  
1990 1,641 866 45      2,552 3,449 
1991 1,779 733 43      2,555  
1992 1,834 659 39 28     2,560  
1993 1,824 658 30 39     2,551 3,060 
1994 1,806 649 29 69     2,553  
1995 1,803 643 28 69     2,543  
1996 1,802 632 26 63     2,523  
1997 1,774 624 18 84     2,500 3,018 
1998 1,760 621 17 91     2,489  
1999 1,730 617 17 95     2,459  
2000 1,690 612 17 95     2,414 3,824 
2001 1,670 87  663 578 29 32 24 2,420 3,674 
2002 1,519 37  787 603 70 39 75 2,343 3,725 
2003 37 13  2,161 591 1,169 107 294 2,211 3,884 
2004 18 8  1,914 522 1,018 132 242 1,940  
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During the third stage (2003-2004) of the post-Soviet farm reorganization, the legal 
basis of the liquidation of the unprofitable (loss-making) farms was formed.
88
 The set of 
legislative documents,
89
 which allowed the actual legal liquidation of the unprofitable farms 
by its reorganization, sale, merge and leasing, was adopted between 2003-2004. As a result,  
“511 loss-making enterprises were merged  with other entities”, “48 enterprises had been sold 
to private investors and 27 enterprises had also been leased to private farmers” at the end of 
the 2004  (Freinkman et al.,  2005, p.183) , which also caused a visible decrease in the total 
number of large-scale corporate farms (see Table 4.6)   
Nonetheless, the above-described, big “post-Soviet” farm transformations did not cause 
any significant change in either farm management or in farm size. These large corporate farms 
remain under state control, because the state holds a majority share in the farms’ assets  
(Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009), imposes production plans, sets procurement quotas and 
provides financial support. Average farm size did not decrease during the period in question, 
but became even larger, while it had shrunken in other FSU countries.  (Table 4.7).   This fact 
is usually attributed to the “little deep restructuring” (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009, p.16) 
and “little leeway for farms to change size in an attempt to improve efficiency and 
profitability”  (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009, p.17), however with the  notification that 
although there is  no “optimal farm size in Belarus or elsewhere”
 
(Cramon-Taubadel et al., 
2009, p.17), the proper restructuring “would most likely lead on average to smaller farm 
structures in Belarus”
 
(Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009, p.17).
   
Table 4.7. Average size and number of corporate farms in Belarus 
90
  
  1990 1993 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007 
Number of corporate  
farms 2,552 2,551 2,500 2,414 2,400 2,338 2,230 1,617 
Average size of 
corporate farm (ha) 3,449 3,060 3,018 3,824 3,674 3,725 3,884 3,985 
    
There is a two-fold explanation of the slow progress of farm restructuring. While 
Western scholars consider the general unwillingness of state authorities to land reform as the 
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 Before this, farms with zero-profitability and even with long-lasting records of loss-making were not allowed 
to be liquidated and were heavily supported by the state.    
89
 The following Laws and Presidential Decrees were adopted: Zakon RB «O reorganizacii ubytochnyh 
sel'skohozjajstvennyh organizacij» (9.06.2003); Ukaz Prezidenta RB № 138 «O nekotoryh merah po 
finansovomu ozdorovleniju sel'skohozjajstvennyh organizacij i privlechenii investicij v sel'skohozjajstvennoe 
proizvodstvo» (09.03.2004); Ukaz Prezidenta RB № 280 «O porjadke i uslovijah prodazhi juridicheskim licam 
predprijatij kak imushhestvennyh kompleksov ubytochnyh sel'skohozjajstvennyh organizacij» (14.06.2004) 
(Sakovitch, 2008d, p.148)  
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main reason for the slow restructuring, Belarus scholars and state officials identify the 
primary problem in the lack of interest in farm reorganization by all involved “actors”– the 
central government, local (regional) authorities, farm directorate and farm workers (peasants) 
themselves.  A detailed analysis of this situation will be provided in the next sub-section of 
this chapter, dedicated specifically to this issue.  
Finalizing the land reform issue, it is possible to conclude that during the fifteen years 
of transformation nothing of real significance changed in terms of land property rights and 
farm structure.  The main agricultural production entities engaged in agricultural production 
were still the large-scale corporate farms (former “kolhozes” and “sovhozes”), private 
subsidiary household plots and the newly emerged private individual farms. The former 
“kolhozes” and “sovhozes” underwent some formal changes and were transformed into large-
scale corporate farms. They still occupy the major part of agricultural land, and operate as 
they did in Soviet times.
91
 The  household  plots and individual farms, although usually 
considered “private” entities, remain closely linked to the structure of the corporate “mother” 
farm, on which they depend heavily (especially the  household plots) for inputs and support 
services
92
 and still occupy a  comparably small share of agricultural land in Belarus. 
In general, international scholars assess the land reform progress as slow and inadequate 
(Csaki and Kray, 2005; Freinkman, 2005). From the point of view of Belarusian scholars, 
however, the introduction of legislation that allowed the creation of individual (not state-
owned) farms, that recognized private land in household plot possession and that broke the 
previous socialist state monopoly on commercial, large-scale agricultural production was a 
significant “step forward” when taking into account the seventy-years legacy of state-
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 Workers at the corporate farms do the work assigned by farm managers, both workers and managers are 
salary-paid and state pension-covered employees, the production targets are (mainly) set by the state authorities, 
with accordance to the state annual production plan.     
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 All rural households use the production resources of corporate farms (although to different extents) without a 




































4.1.2. Belarus land reform constraints, or why Belarus peasants do not want to be 
the private farmers. 
This sub-section describes a specific set of reasons for the slow progress of land reform, 
that is, the reluctance  to reforms of the all “actors” involved in this process – state authorities 
(central government and  local  authorities), farm directorate and farm workers (peasants) 
itself. The sub-section is organized in a following way: it starts with a brief analysis of the 
state authorities' position regarding the reformation process; then, the reasons of the large 
corporate farms directorate (former “kolkhoz”-es and “sovchoz”-es) reluctance to reformation 
are provided; and finally, a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the Belarusian peasants 
unwillingness to be independent private farmers is provided and supported by the empirical 
evidence.     
The poor progress of individual private farming development and generally slow 
progress of land reform in Belarus can be explained by a set of strongly interrelated political, 
economic and social factors.  
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, Western scholars consider a general 
unwillingness of the state authorities (central government and local authorities) to land reform 
as the main retarding force in the restructuring (Csaki et al., 2000; Csaki and Nash, 1998; 
Csaki and Kray, 2005), while Belarusian scholars and state officials maintain that the primary 
problem has been a lack of interest in large, corporate farm reorganization (land privatization) 
by all involved “players” (Prognoz, 1999).    
Western and (some) Belarusian scholars concur that the central government and local 
authorities were reluctant to participate in land reform (Csaki and Zuschlag,2004; Prognoz, 
1999; Sakovitch, 2008e). As the basic and the most obvious explanation for this 
unwillingness, a concern for the diminishing of the sphere of their command-administrative 
influence is suggested. Also the so-called “catastrophic results” of the initial period of reform 
(especially in terms of food supply) could be the reason for state authorities' reluctance to 
participate in radical reformation. A more thoughtful analysis of this opinion is provided in 
the next paragraphs, with a detailed description of the initial period of reform (1990-1995), its 
poor results and an explanation as to why it led to a reluctance of state authorities to forge 
ahead with radical reformation. 
Actually, Belarus was among the first countries to start the land reform process in the 
post-Soviet area. The different pieces of legislation that broke the state monopoly on 
commercial, large-scale agricultural production also allowed for the creation of individual 
(not state-owned) farms, and recognized the private status of land in household plots were 
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passed in 1990-1991 (while in Russia and Ukraine this process started a few years later). 
From 1990-1991, it was almost officially declared that independent farmers will create “the 
third and the most effective sector of the agricultural production, in addition to the state-
farms’ and subsidiary household plots’ sectors” (Belagroprombank, 2011).  
Therefore, in 1990-1994, the process of the large farm (“kolhozes” and “sovhozes”) 
dismantling, forced “farmerization” and reorganization of input supply channels along free-
market principles had begun.  However, all the above-mentioned led to catastrophic results 
(instead of the agricultural prosperity promised by the reform proponents) and was considered 
a failure in 1995-1996, because although numerous private farms emerged, they still played a 
marginal role in agricultural production, while the production of large, state farms 
plummeted, leading to a serious disruption in food supply for the majority of the Belarus 
population.  
  To be more precise, the disruption in the food supply led to severe food shortages (the 
so-called period of the “empty shelves in the food stores”) and the introduction of food 
stamps. According to the food stamps system, each person in Belarus was able to buy a 
limited quantity of food and other consumer products during a one-month period. The range 
of food products that were covered by the food stamps system was substantial and included 
the majority of Belarusian staple products: all cereal products (buckwheat, manna-croup, 
oatmeal, pasta products, peeled barley, rice, pearl-barley and so on), oil, row meat and 
processed meat products, fish products, salt, sugar, tea and so forth.. Although this system 
guaranteed adequate food for all, the 2-7 hour queues in food shops and substantial delays in 
salary payments (from 1-7 months) made the whole process extraordinarily time-consuming 
and effortful. 
Although “grey markets” for the deficit food and other consumer products existed 
during this period, the incredibly high prices for the products which were sold on it and the 
extremely low salaries (or sometimes payment-in-kind or a 1-7 month salary payment delay) 
made it practically impossible to satisfy food demand for the majority of the Belarusian 
population.  In this situation, the household plots of rural residents and garden plots of urban 
residents became a survival food safety net, together with the food stamps system provided by 
the Belarusian government. The main reasons for these severe food shortages were: (i) an 
abrupt GAO decline; (ii) the strong dependence of the food supply on other USSR republics, 
because in the pre-transition period Belarus was a net food importer (Csaki et al., 1994); (iii) 
the serious disruptions in the food processing plant work, which led to a situation in which 
already-produced harvests were not processed and manufactured for retail consumption.   
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 In 1996, this critical situation had officially been termed by the Belarus government as 
“a crisis that could lead to difficulties in food supply for the population”   (Resolution, 1996), 
and starting from this moment the process of radical land reform (as well as the majority of 
the other reforms) was put on hold. Since then, only minor, mainly formal changes were 
introduced into the farm structure and land tenure system.
93
  The main emphasis was put on 
the preservation and development of large-scale, “post-Soviet” farms (although slightly 
reformed), as a response to the failure of the initial stage of market reformation in Belarus, 
which resulted in a “crisis situation” in Belarus agriculture, especially in terms of food supply 
security. The slogan “Farmers will not feed the country” was widely used by the proponents 
of the large-scale, “post-Soviet” farms during the discussions about the possible ways of 
furthering agricultural developments.  
   Therefore, regarding Western and Belarusian scholars' opinions about the general 
unwillingness  of state authorities  to participate in the  reforms, as the main reason for the 
slow land reform (privatization) process, it is possible to conclude that this “unwillingness” of 
state authorities mainly refers to the second period of transformation (starting from 1995-
1996), because at the beginning of the transformation Belarus state authorities “expressed a 
commitment to transforming agriculture…by encouraging the development of a market-
based, predominantly privately-owned, and  largely owner-managed agricultural production 
system”   (Csaki et al., 1994, p.i)  and were among the first in the FSU area to start the 
considerably radical reformation. But the extremely poor results of the initial period of 
reforms (1990-1994) raised concerns about the path of radical reform, and after 1995-1996 a 
gradual reformation approach (accompanied by slow land reform progress) was considered to 
be the proper path.  
As the main reasons for the poor results of the initial period of reform it is possible to 
consider (i) the little understanding  of economic reform implementation in general and of 
agricultural reform implementation in particular by  the newly formed  Belarus government, 
and  (ii) the lack of the consistent consultancy support from the IMF, WB, OECD, FAO and 
other international organizations, compared to the intensive consultancy support provided by 
these international organizations for the V4 countries. 
As the most common (and well-explained) reasons regarding the   farm directorate 
unwillingness to reform the following are considered:  (i) the the fear of farm directorate of 
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 Maybe with the exception of the increase of the limits of the land allowed to be held in lifetime inherited 
possession from 50 ha to 100ha, and any amount of land in lease for farmers and additional 2ha of leased land to 
household plots (Belarus Land Code, 1999)    
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the loss of fertile agricultural land due to its transfer to the newly emerged private farmes (e.g. 
Belagroprombank, 2011); (ii) the “understanding of how conflict and difficult this task is” 
(e.g. Prognoz, 1999, pp. 79-80).  
Nevertheless, the most important and surprising part of the “general unwillingness to 
reform” puzzle is the indubitable reluctance of the rural population (farm workers) to start 
independent private farming (i.e., produce agricultural output for mainly commercial purposes 
on commercial scale). The vast majority of the rural population prefers to combine the 
salaried work on large, corporate farms with work on small, household plots for subsistence 
agricultural production.  
This notion of a general unwillingness to introduce private property on land and engage 
in independent farming is also supported by some (limited) empirical evidence provided by 
survey results from the beginning and middle of the transformation period. 
   For example, according to a survey conducted by the Sociological Institute of the 
Belarus National Academy (hereinafter “Belarus survey”), in 1992 around 40% of survey 
respondents were in favor of preserving state property on land, 27% supported the idea of 
transferring land into lifetime possessions with a right of inheritance, and only 27.8% were 
proponents of the introduction of private property on land. Most interestingly, in 1993 only 
14.6% of the surveyed rural residents supported the idea of private property on land. In the 
next year (1994) this share became even smaller – only 12.8 % of the surveyed rural residents. 
Also, the share of people who wished to begin independent farming diminished during the 
survey period in question: in 1992 -7.5% of respondents claimed an intention to start 
independent farming, while in 1994 this share diminished to only 2% of respondents.
94
 
This attitude would not change significantly during the next years. According to the 
results of a survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999 
95
 (hereinafter in this section “WB 
survey”) only 20% of farm workers were in favor of allowing buy-and-sell transactions of 
land. Moreover, only 6% of respondents stated their intention to start private farming, while 
90% of respondents reported no intention to start private farming (Csaki et al., 2000).     
In 2000, according to officially reported data, there were 44 officially registered refusals 
of agricultural enterprises restructuring, with officially formulated statements for this such as 
the “uncertainty in the rightness” of the privatization/reformation and “the willingness to 
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 The survey results were taken from the Sakovitch PhD resume (1998, pp.11-12), which provided no 
information regarding the scope of the survey (number of people, regional, professional and other stratifications).  
Access to the full PhD thesis text was denied.   
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 The survey included the 855 respondents (among them 744 farm employees, 30 private farmers and 81 farm 
managers) randomly and proportionally dispersed among the all six Belarus regions (Csaki et al.,2000)    
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preserve state property” as the main reasons for the refusal of the enterprises’ reformation 
(Miasnikovitch, 2007, p.314).  
Many explanations were offered to the question “why Belarusian peasants are not 
interested in farm restructuring and starting to independently private farm". The most 
common ones are:   
  -long historical legacy of state–run agricultural production, which resulted in an 
erosion of individual farming habits due to the natural generation change  (Sakovitch, 1998);  
 - high start-up costs  (Prognoz, 1999) and problems with credit access;  
 -lack of proper institutions and agricultural support services (Csaki and Zuschlag, 
2004);  
  -poor quality of the land redistributed to individual farmers (Dzun and Tereszczuk, 
2009)   and reluctance of the big state farms directorate to give land to individual farmers   
(Belagroprombank, 2011); 
- insufficient technical (machinery) equipment (Dzun and  Tereszczuk, 2009)  and its 
maladjustment to small-scale individual farming (Belagroprombank, 2011).   
 Taking into consideration the range of explanations, and generalizing the debate on this 
issue, the following conclusions could be made: 
(1) International (mainly Western) scholars (e.g. Csaki and Nash, 1998; Csaki et al., 
2000; Csaki and Kray, 2005) suggest that a lack of proper institutions (underdeveloped 
legislation, poor access to land, financial capital and inputs, insufficient support from the 
Belarus government for farmers’ sector development) are the key reasons for the 
unwillingness to engage in private farming.    
(2) Belarusian scholars, officials and some farmers (e.g. Kornilov, 2006; Shpak, 2007; 
Korbut ,2009; Andrievich, 2007; Belagroprombank, 2011; Sinevich, 2012)  argue that the 
Belarus government provided a sufficient legislative basis and fair enough supportive 
measures for farmers' development, but the  risk-averse behavior and a reluctance on the part 
of the rural population (farm workers, peasants) to start individual farming
 
are the reasons for 
the failure of individual farming (Prognoz, 1999). Some Belarusian scholars also mention 
human capital quality issues and the legacy of state-run agricultural production as possible 
reasons for the unwillingness to start private farming (Lihachev, 2001; Sakovich, 1999). 
 (3) None of these explanations are supported by strong empirical evidence.    
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to conclude that the majority of  
international scholars and especially Western politicians  argue that Belarusian peasants did 
want to engage in independent farming, but could not do so because of the obstacles laid by 
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the government, while the Belarusian scholars, officials and some farmers contend that risk-
averse behavior and reluctance are the main reasons for the unwillingness to start individual 
farming, while not denying  institutional and legislative  problems. 





, human capital quality, risk-averse behavior, and general 
reluctance) in order to attempt to answer the question whether Belarusian peasants 
really do not want to have land in private property and start individual farming, or 
whether they did intend to engage in individual farming but were prevented from doing 
so by institutional hardships. 
In terms of institutional capacity relevant to private farming development, 
international and Belarusian scholars agree that it is not well-designed and does create 
obstacles for people in individual private farming (e.g. Csaki and Kray, 2005; Garmel', 2010; 
Gilevskaja, 2011). However the language used seems to implicitly suggest the difference 
regarding the extent of the hardship provided by this underdeveloped institution capacity.The 
bulk of the international scholars maintain that institutional underdevelopment created 
practically unbearable hardship, while Belarusian scholars state that although several, and 
sometimes severe obstacles do exist, they are not insurmountable. For example, over 2000 
individual farms have remained and successfully continued its work out of the pool of 6000 
individual farms, which were created during 1990-2010 (Belagroprombank, 2011). This 33% 
“survival rate” shows that although the institutional environment for individual farming is not 
particularly friendly, it is not unbearably hostile and that ways to start and continue individual 
farming in Belarus exist. Also, this not very high, but substantial-enough 33% “survival rate” 
raises the question why some individual farmers were able to survive, while others failed. 
Answers to this question might be found in an analysis of the human capital quality, which 
will be done in the next paragraphs. 
It is obvious that not every rural resident (and not every farm worker) is able to become 
a farmer – relevant education, experience, specific skills and appropriate age are the apparent 
prerequisites to start individual farming. In terms of educational attainments, and especially 
their role in the successful survival of the individual farm, the results of the two surveys 
(“Belarus survey” and “WB survey”) are very revealing. According to the “Belarus survey” 
conducted at the beginning of the transformation in 1993, only 30% of surveyed farmers had a 
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  “institutions” –i.e. “a set of formal or informal rules to determine the initial ownership of the goods and 
factors (property rights) and to regulate the exchanges (contracts, markets, and other forms of distribution)”   
Federico (2005, p.117)  
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bachelor degree (and 27% had a technical college degree
97
), while in 1999 (according to the 
“WB survey”), the share of the people with a bachelor degree among the surveyed farmers 
almost doubled (60% of respondents had a bachelor degree) and number of people with a 
technical college degree among the surveyed farmers  increased by 10% (36% of respondents)  
(Csaki et al., 2000). 
The results of these surveys bring us to the following conclusions: (1) proper education 
is an important prerequisite for the starting-up of individual farming; (2) keeping in mind the 
considerably  small share of appropriately educated people among the rural residents,  the 
natural pool of candidates for starting-up individual farming is  not very extensive; (3) at the 
beginning of the transformation 1990-1993 (the so-called period of the “imposed 
farmerization”  (Sakovitch, 2008a, pp. 21-22; Lihachev, 2001, p.24), an appropriate education 
was not considered to be the paramount prerequisite for successful conducting of individual 
farming, but 7-10 years later, after gaining real-life experience of individual farming, its 
importance became more evident.    
The survey results are also supported by official Belarusian statistics. As for the year 
2005, 31% of the heads of the individual farms held a bachelor degree, 44% held a technical 
college degree, and only 23% held only a high school diploma – out of the whole pool of 
2326 heads of individual farms in Belarus (Sakovitch, 2008c).   
While proper education was not considered to be an important prerequisite at the 
beginning of the transformation, and some people were brave enough to start individual 
farming with insufficient educational attainment, an acquaintance with specific skills and the 
experience was considered a fundamental precondition from the very beginning of the 
transformation. The “Belarus survey” in 1993 reveals that the majority of independent 
farmers at that time were former state farm directors, chef executives, chief specialists (chief 
agronomists, chief vets, chief accountants and etc.) and the other highly skilled 
professionals.
98
  Nothing changed in the next 7-10 years, according to the “WB survey” of 
1999:  60% of respondents come to individual farming from high managerial, chief specialist 
and highly skilled professional jobs in large, corporate (former state) farms (Csaki et al.,  
2000).  Keeping in mind the obviously   small   ratio of former state farm management to all-
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 A Bachelor degree in Belarus required 5 years of study at the University, and a technical college degree 
required two years of study at a specific vocational college. Data for educational background are from Sakovitch 
(1998)   
98
 Data for the skills and experience background are from Sakovitch (1998)  
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state farm workers, the natural pool of candidates for start-up individual farming became even 
smaller than in cases of proper educational attainment (Csaki et al., 2000) 
99
  
Last but not least, prerequisite for a successful start-up of individual farming is age. 
According to both surveys, the majority of independent farmers were under (or around) the 
age of 40.  According to the “Belarus survey,” the average age of the independent farmer was 
40 years in 1993  (15% of the respondents were under 30 years old, 45% respondents were 
under the 40 years old and 29% were 41-50 years old).   According to the “WB survey”, the 
average age of the independent farmer in 1999 was 41. Considering the generally increasing 
tendency of the rural population ageing (which started long before the 1990s) the natural pool 
of candidates for start-up individual farming seems not very extensive, and is continuously 
shrinking.  
Therefore, an analysis of the main human capital characteristics such as education, 
specified skills, experience and age leads to the conclusion that although the rural population 
(and farm workers) constitute a substantial part of the Belarus population (and Belarus labor 
force), a large part of it was not able or was not sufficiently prepared for starting and 
successfully managing an individual farm. Hence, the natural pool of candidates for starting 
up individual farming is quite limited. 
The so-called “risk-averse behavior” of the Belarusian rural residents is one of the 
constraints upon which both international (Csaki et al., 2000) and Belarusian scholars 
(Prognoz, 1999, p.75; Lihachev, 2001; Sakovich, 1999) concurred. The range of the suggested 
reasons for such behavior runs from a passive approach to life (as an inherited part of the 
Belarusian traditional rural mentality) to the long historical legacy of state-run agricultural 
production, which eroded individual farming habits. However, a more diligent probing of 
rural mentalities reveals that the conception of “risk-averse behavior” was mainly based on a 
concern for the possible loss of social services and benefits provided by large, corporate 
(former state) farms to farm workers.. Considering the range and scale of these social benefits 
and services (see Table 4.2.1. based on WB survey) this explanation seems very plausible.   
The importance of this concern is also supported by the fact that 50% of the spouses of 
independent farmers (mainly wives) keep their jobs at large, corporate farms as “insurance 
against the risk in the uncertain business of independent farming”, according to the WB 
survey (Csaki et al., 2000, p.29).    
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 A university education (bachelor's degree) and a technical college education are either free of charge or are 
affordable in price, while the number of opportunities to get managerial skills and experience is scarce (limited 
to already existed large corporate farms) and is more difficult to obtain.  
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Hence, an analysis of the main constraints of independent private farming development 
(institutional capacity, human capital quality and risk-averse behavior) shows that all of them 
do really exist. However, there is little research (especially quantitative) have been done on 
the extent of the influence of each constraint on the decision regarding whether to start or not 
to start the independent farming.   
 
Table 4.2.1.  Social benefits and social services provided by large corporate (former 









-wage premium compensations for inflation 79 46 
-pension premiums 17 7 
-free/subsidised vacation 74 22 
-subsidesed food products 49 19 
-children allowances to families 44 13 
-support for school services 48 19 
-stipends to students 26 6 
-medical care 21 4 
Social services   
-housing construction and repair 58 5 
-heating fuel 23 6 
-subsidesed utility services 33 5 
-use of enterprise housing 53 11 
-transportation 86 62 
-help with fieldwork on household plots 91 NA 
-burial services 89 NA 
 
The only attempt to measure quantitatively the share of each constraint was the WB 
survey questionnaire. Within the framework of this questionnaire, 439 farm workers were 
asked whether they had plans to become private farmers. Only 6% indicated that they “have 
plans to establish an independent private farm” (Csaki et al., 2000, p.48).  Considering that 
this 6% expressed only the “intention” but had not undertaken any real action, the actual share 
of farm workers who would probably start independent farming seems even less than 6%. 
Around 92% of respondents (403 persons) stated that they had no intention of becoming 
private farmers. These 403 persons were asked to state their reasons why they “do not plan to 
become private farmers” (Csaki et al., 2000, p.48). The results of this questionnaire are 
summarized in Table 4.2.2.    
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 Source:  Csaki et al. (2000, p.90)  
 100 
Table 4.2.2. Why employees of large corporate farms do not plan to become private 
farmers (% of respondents)
 101
 
Institutional constraints  
Non-supportive environment  
uncertain legal situation 4 
land related issues (lack of good land for private farms, prohibition to buy 
and sell) 1 
social considerations (negative attitude in the village, reluctance of other 
family members) 2 
Resources’ considerations  
insufficient capital 20 
difficult to find inputs 6 
Human capital quality issues  
Personal considerations  
too old and unhealthy 14 
inadequate personal qualifications (not enough economic and legal 
knowledge) 1 
Risk-averse behavior  
Attitudes to risk  
don't want to  change my life style 24 
don't want to risk uncertainty 20 
Income considerations  
better income in farm enterprise 5 
don't want to lose social benefits 3 
Total 100 
 
The results of this questionnaire show that the institutional constraints such as uncertain 
legal situations, land-related issues and difficulties in inputs’ supply are of marginal 
importance, although insufficient capital (lack of financial resources) plays an important role.  
The  quality of  human capital seems to play a role, though not a leading one – the majority of 
respondents were more concerned about their age and health as the main obstacles for the 
private farming, rather than educational and experience attainments. This to some extent 
correlates with empirical evidence pertaining to changes in the educational background of 
independent farmers. The share of people in individual farming who held a bachelor's degree 
doubled in a 7-10 year period, which means that the majority of start-up farmers had not taken 
into account the importance of proper education before they actually started in the private 
farming business.  
These answers leave some room for interpretive speculations, because although the 
unwillingness “to risk uncertainty” and “to change lifestyle” plays a crucial role in the 
reluctance to start independent farming (44% share), it is not clear whether it because of the 
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  Source: Csaki et al. (2000, p.48) 
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risk of the loss of the social benefits and services provided by large corporate farms (8% 
share). It is quite possible that the respondents of this questionnaire did not want to announce 
openly and straightforwardly how important for them are the social benefits and services 
provided by the large corporate farm. Considering that the provision of social benefits and 
services is generally dependent (at least in an implicit way) on the farm directorate good-will, 
it could have been possible that the survey respondents did not wish to reveal this tool for 
leverage.  
The general conclusion of the team of international scholars that conducted this WB 
questionnaire is that “the prospects for the growth in private farming appear to be bleak” 
(Csaki et al., 2000, p.48). 
   
 
Finalizing the analysis of Belarusian peasants’ attitudes toward independent farming, it 
is possible to conclude that although substantial institutional obstacles do exist and hamper 
the individual private farming development, the poor quality of human capital and risk-averse 
behavior also play significant roles in the obvious reluctance of Belarusian peasants to engage 























































4.1.3. Overview of state support and price policy developments in Belarus in 1990-
2004 
A detailed analysis of the state support dynamics during the period in question is 
impeded by a lack of relevant data (see the discussion in the Introduction Chapter). The 
general impression of both Belarusian and Western scholars about the dynamics of state 
support is that during the initial period of transformation (1990-1995), state support had been 
cut abruptly and drastically, and then, after the 1996, started to increase, finally achieving its 
highest levels during the 2003-2004 period, and continuing this growth onwards 
(Miasnikovitch, 2007; Sakovitch, 2008d; Csaki et al., 2000; Freinkman et al., 2005).   
A decrease of state support to agriculture during the initial period of reform (1990-
1995) is usually attributed to the “crises situation in Belarus agriculture” (Sakovitch, 2008a), 
which endangered the country's “food sovereignty”.   Thus, in 1996 the increase of the state 
support to agriculture was considered to be a possible way out  of this “crisis”, and in 1996 
the largest (non-budget) source of agricultural funding –the National Fund for Support of 
Agricultural Producers, Food and Agricultural science – was created  (Freinkman et al.,2005), 
along with an increase of regular budget spending to agriculture.   
Starting from that period, the system of state support (subsidization) began to intensify 
and expand. In general, the subsidization of agriculture in Belarus was provided in different 
direct and indirect ways, 
102
 and may be classified into the following groups, according to the 
World Bank report and Belarusian Institute of Privatization and Management study: (i) state 
supply of inputs (state purchase and distribution of key inputs and compensation for some 
inputs purchases by farms, preferential prices for fuel, subsidized leasing for machinery, 
industry  tariffs (lower than normal) for the electricity and heat)); (ii)  investment support 
(budget loans and guarantees for budget loans, direct budget investments, interest rate 
subsidies, debt write-offs and so on); (iii) preferential tax treatment; (iv) non-monetary 
transfers from other sectors (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009;  Babicki et al., 2003).    
The main sources of state support were (and still are) (i) the national budget (budget 
state expenditures called “Expenditures for agriculture” at the annual Laws on Budget of 
Belarus Republic), (ii) the local budgets, (iii) National Fund for Support of Agricultural 
Producers, Food and Agricultural Science and (iv) the Local Fund for Support of Agricultural 
Producers, Food and Agricultural science.  
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 According to official sources, around 30 different subsidization schemes are applied for agricultural support 
(Babicki et al., 2003)  
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The main beneficiaries of state support are the large, corporate farms (as the principal 
agents of the existing institutional framework), although some direct and indirect support for 
private, individual farms
103
 and subsidiary household plots
104
 is also provided.  
The above-mentioned increase of state support resulted in the stabilization of 
agricultural sector performance (in 1996-2000), and was used as a justification for further, 
more profound increases of state support to agriculture in the subsequent years (2000-2004)  
The limited numerical data from the Table 4.8 show the increase of state support share 
in GAO, per ha and per worker.
105
   








































Support as a share of GAO (%) 8 26 25 25 24 37.1 33.8 
Budget support as a share of GDP     4 3.8 3 4.3 4 
Budget support per worker (in constant 2000 
US$) 
    653 771 827 1,425 1,728 
Budget support per hectare (in constant 2000 
US$) 
    44 49 49 78 94 
 
A comparative analysis of agricultural support in the FSU, CEEC and EU shows that 
although the amount of budget support per ha in Belarus has been increasing steadily and was 
higher than in the selected FSU countries (Russia, Ukraine), it was still smaller than in some 
CEE countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) and significantly smaller compared to 
the EU-15 and EU-27 (Table 4.9) 
Although the budget support per ha in Belarus was smaller than in the CEEC and EU, it 
comprised the highest share of GDP (Table 4.10). The effectiveness of state support use, 
calculated as the ratio of agricultural value added share in GDP per state support share in 
GDP to agricultural value added share in GDP seems to be the lowest among the studied CEE 
countries (Table 4.10.).  However, the results of this calculation are highly biased by the fact 
that a significant amount of agricultural support goes through non-budget channels.   
                                                          
103 The annually adopted Laws of Belarus budget include a separate line for expenses headed,  “State support for   
private, individual farms”   
104   For example,  the state subsidies “leak from the large corporate farms to household plots”  because the 
household plots sometimes officially receive for free (or substantially lower than the market price) some inputs 
(fuel, fertilizers, feed for animals ) from the corporate farms, use for free the machinery and “appropriate for 
their use  some  ready-to-be-sold products”  from the corporate farms. (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009, pp. 6-7)  
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  The twice- higher increase of the support per ha and per worker compared to the share in GAO could be 
attributed to the decline in land and labor during this period.   
106
  Data for ‘Support as a share of GAO’ are from Sakovitch (2008c, p.143). All the other data are from   
Freinkman et al.  (2005, p.197)  
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Belarus 47 51 51 84 103 127 
Russia 11 13 14 16 16 18 
Ukraine  11 16 20 21 36 46 
Hungary       203     
Czech Republic       159     
Slovak Republic       135     
Poland       37     
EU-15 381 402 421 520 583 585 
EU-27 270 287 302 374 472 479 
Switzerland 1,369 1,513 1,639 1,982 2,028 2,005 
USA 189 193 183 195 219 234 
Canada  52 52 60 74 76 91 
New Zealand 7 6 7 9 11 14 
 









































































Budget support for 
agriculture  (% of 
GDP)  
4,3 0,95 1,65 1,44 0,81 1,03 0,33 0,68 0,95 0,73 0,22 
Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP) 
10,2 6,3 12,1 4,3 2,7 4,5 4,4 1,9 1 1,2 6,2 
Agricultural value 
added per budget 
support 
2,4 6,6 7,3 3 3,3 4,4 13,3 2,8 1,1 1,6 28,2 
 
   
The relatively high share of budget support to agriculture (measured as a % of GDP)   is 
typically used by Western experts as a ground for the claim that state support for agriculture is 
provided at the cost of the other sectors of the economy, where it could be more efficiently 
                                                          
107  Data for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, EU-15, EU-27, Switzerland, USA, Canada  and New Zealand are from 
Cramon-Taubadel et al. (2009). Data for Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Poland are from 
Freinkman et al. (2005)  
108  Data for budget support for agriculture as the share of GDP are from Freinkman et al. (2005). Data for the 
share of the agricultural value added  in GDP are from WB database. Available at  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators / (Accessed: May 4, 2014) 
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used (Freinkman et al.,2005). However, these scholars do not identify these presumably more 
appropriate sectors of the Belarusian economy, not to mention supporting these claims 
through economically grounded calculations. 
Concluding the state support issue, it is possible to make the following generalizations 
about its dynamics and comparative characteristics: (i) state support in Belarus (measured in 
absolute terms – total spending in national currency or USD) went through the following three 
stages: sharp decrease (1990-1995), slight increase and recovery (1996-2000), steep surge  
(2001-2004);  (ii) although the percentage share of  state support  in GDP is higher in Belarus 
than in some CEE countries and EU, the level of per-ha support in Belarus is still 
substantially lower than in the above-mentioned  CEEC and EU. 
Price policy is considered one of the most important components of the agrarian policy 
in Belarus (Babicki et al., 2004). It was mainly executed through the strict price regulation 
provided by the Belarus government.   
 A brief analysis of Belarus price regulation history allows us to determine two main 
phases in price regulation.   
(1) 1990-1995 – price liberalization (or price deregulation) period. However, it is 
important to mention that this period is considered the “price liberalization period” mainly by 
Belarusian officials (e.g., Garkun, 1997) and some scholars (Miasnikovitch, 2007; Parshin, 
2003; Dadalko, 1997), but not Western scholars (Csaki et al., 1994).    
Actually, in 1990-1994 the following changes  took place in the former USSR 
centralized price determination system: (i) wholesale prices were liberalized; (ii) consumer 
prices were not supported by budget subsidies (except for milk and bread); (iii)  fruit, 
vegetable,  wool,  poultry and sheep meat prices were fully liberalized; (iv) prices for all other 
agricultural and food products (like grain, sugar beet, flax,  rapeseed, milk, beef and pork 
meat), although it had been announced as liberal and free, in reality were regulated  by the 
introduction of  procurement prices (quotas) and “recommended” or “indicative” prices   
(Csaki et al.,1994, p. iv; Miasnikovitch, 2007, p.309).  
The above-noted changes in a previously totally regulated price system permitted 
Belarus officials to claim agricultural prices as liberalized (Csaki et al.,1994), while their 
Western counterparts argued that prices “are not free or liberalized in the Western sense, 
where “price liberalization” generally means that prices are allowed to be formed by 
competitive forces”  (Csaki et al.,1994, p. iv).   
(2) 1996-2004 – return of the state regulation. Starting from 1996, in conjunction with 
the “State program of the agricultural reformation” (adopted in August 6, 1996) and The 
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Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Belarus Republic (adopted in May 3, 1996), the 
Belarusian government started to pay closer attention to price issues, and began to increase its 
influence in this sphere.
109
 This resulted in the adoption in 1999 of the Law “On Price 
Regulation,” which implicitly favored the state regulation of prices, although allowing the co-
existence of regulated and free prices. According to a World Bank assessment, this law (and 
other legislative documents adopted on the basis of this law) had agricultural prices in Belarus 
“generally set at a level that allows agricultural enterprises to generate “normal” profits” and 
“performing a social function” (Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2009, p. 24).  
The extent to which agricultural prices in Belarus were over-regulated (i.e., were kept 
artificially low) according to Western standards during the 1997-2004 period, compared to 
other countries in the CEEC region, could be derived from the World Bank  annual 
calculation of the “Price  and market liberalization index”
 110
 (Table 4.11.), previously 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1) 
Table. 4.11. Price and market liberalization index for CEE countries 
111
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Czech Rep. 9 9 9 8 9 9 9 - 
Hungary  9 9 8 8 9 9 9 - 
Slovak Rep. 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 - 
Poland 9 8 7 8 8 8 9 - 
Russia 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Ukraine 7 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 
Belarus 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
 
 During the whole transformation period studied in this research (1990-2004), the prices 
in the Belarus economy were regulated by the state in many ways, such as: (i) establishing 
fixed prices; (ii) setting prices ceilings; (iii) setting compulsory trade mark-ups; (iv) setting 
maximum rates of return; (v) determining price-calculation procedures; (vi) establishing 
procurement quotas on agricultural products; (vii) declaring prices levels and so on. Specific 
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 Both of these documents pay special attention to the agricultural terms of trade deterioration and the crucial 
necessity of its mitigation.  
110
 The analysis is based on the Csaki   and Zuschlag  (2004, p.15) calculations of the “Agricultural Reform 
Index”,  (for details see CEEC Chapter  Section 2.1) which includes the “price  and market liberalization”  index 
as its composite element, where “1-2” index means the  “direct state control of prices and markets”; “5-6” means 
“mainly liberalized markets constrained by the absence of competition and some remaining controls on trade 
policy”; “7-8” means that all command economic  “type interventions are removed,  market and trade policies 
are in compliance with WTO, however, domestic markets are not fully developed”;  “9-10”  refers to  
“competitive markets with market conforming trade and agricultural policies”, and no more than modest 
protection.  
111
  Data from Csaki and Zuschlag (2004)  
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to food (agricultural) production, the so-called “list of socially important products”, the prices 
of which should be maintained at “reasonable” levels was introduced in 1999. The main aim 
(and the main result) of these price regulations was the keeping of agricultural output prices 
artificially low in order to make food products affordable for everyone. This price policy of 
the Belarusian government was supported by the Belarusian public opinion, which according 
to Western experts, could be explained by a lack of “clear grasp of the welfare effects of price 
controls” by the Belarus public, the same “as in many other transition economies” (Csaki 
et.al., 2000, p.9). 
 At first glance, the price regulation aimed at keeping agricultural output prices 
artificially low resulted in consequences that were extremely unfavorable for the agricultural 
producers. First of all, it caused a substantial terms of trade deterioration, with the most abrupt 
decline in 1990-1994 (see Figure 4.1). Second, it resulted in a substantial decline in price 
parity for agricultural products, measured in so-called “natural prices”
 112
 (see Table 4.12). 
The “natural prices” (or “real prices”) measurement is a specific way of measurement that is 
commonly used for the description of the transition economies, where the substantial rate of 
inflation (like 1 milliard times for inputs and 381 million times for output in Belarus from 
1990 to 2004 see Appendix 4.3.)  makes the calculation of the commonly used  price 
dynamics useless.  
In Belarus, during the period in question, the increase of prices for inputs ranged from 
up to 3 times (grain/fertilizers(N) or  milk/tractors ratio) to  up to 50 times (meat/diesel ratio), 
while in developed Western countries
113
 this “natural prices” ratio either remained the same 
(fertilizers/milk  ratio) or increased by an incomparably smaller extent (fertilizers/grain  ratio 
and diesel/ grain, milk, meat ratios) than  in Belarus, and for some inputs even decreased  
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 The “natural prices” (or “real prices”) measurement is a calculation, when the price (cost) of agricultural input 
(fertilizer, diesel, tractor) is measured not in monetary (money) units, but in physical quantities of agricultural 
output (e.g., how many tons of agricultural output (grain, meat, milk measured in tons) should be sold in order to 
buy one ton of fertilizer (or one ton of diesel, or one tractor).   
113
  The choice of countries and inputs/outputs was mainly determined by the data availability in the  Eurostat 
database 
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Figure 4.1. Agricultural terms of trade deterioration 
114
 











































Prices expressed in tons of 
grain milk meat 
1991 2004 
2004/ 
1991 1991 2004 
2004/ 
1991 1991 2004 
2004/ 
1991 
Tractor MTZ-82 26 114 4.4 18 54 3.0 2 12 6.0 
Combine KSK-
100A 81 544 6.7 56 261 4.7 7 59 8.4 
Fertilisers-K (t) 0.128 1.361 10.6 0.089 0.654 7.3 0.011 0.148 13.5 
Fertilisers-N (t) 0.201 0.628 3.1 0.14 0.301 2.2 0.017 0.07 4.1 
Fertilisers-P (t) 0.607 2.771 4.6 0.422 1.331 3.2 0.051 0.302 5.9 
Petrol (t) 0.343 5.357 15.6 0.239 2.573 10.8 0.029 0.584 20.1 
Diesel (t) 0.259 4.758 18.4 0.083 2.285 27.5 0.01 0.519 51.9 
 
However, all the above-discussed negative effects of keeping agricultural output prices 
artificially low 
116
 were balanced by significant state support directed at agricultural 
producers.  This policy was called “pushing the gas and brake pedal at the same time”.
117
   
Although the net effect of such a policy was considered to be “a priori unclear”, the “overall 
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  Data from Ceny v Belarusi (2006, pp.182-185)  
115
  Data from Sakovitch (2008c, p.147)  
116
 The process of keeping agricultural output prices low is considered to be a kind of  “implicit taxation” of the 
agricultural producers (Cramon-Taubadel et al ,2009, p. 69;  Freinkman et al., 2005,  p.190)   
117
 Belarus government “steps on the gas”  via subsidies and „applies the brakes” via price regulation. (Babicki et 
al., 2004, p.9) 
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perception of the agricultural producers was that the taxes
118




Finalizing the price regulation issue, it is possible to conclude that some attempts 
toward agricultural prices liberalization were made at the beginning of the transformation 
period, which however were hampered from 1996. Price limitations were the main instrument 
of price regulation. This resulted in a terms of trade deterioration, which was mitigated by 
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 The definition of “taxes” here   includes direct taxes such as land, labour and profit taxes, and indirect taxes 
such as procurement quotas and price limitations. 
119
 Results of the survey made by the World Bank in 2000 among the managers of the corporate (state) farms and 
independent private farmers. (Csaki et al., 2000) 
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4.1.4. Conclusion for Section 4.1.  
Finalizing the general description of the Belarus agricultural profile and 
agricultural reforms path, it is possible to outline its main features as follows: The 
Belarusian natural agricultural environment is only of average quality for agriculture;  the role 
of agriculture in the national economy continued its natural downward trend during the 
transition period; the major features of the former Socialist (command) economy, like the 
prevalence of large corporate farms (former state-farms ) over the private agriculture, the state 
support and price regulation were   preserved in Belarus, although some attempts at its  
reformation were made. 
The main justification for the slow pace of land reforms and remaining practically intact 
(or only a little bit modified) the old Soviet system of state subsidies and price regulations is 
that the “gradual” reformation approach and strict government regulation of agricultural 
sector allows (i) the achievement of food sovereignty (food security) on a country-wide level 
and (ii) the maintainence of social stability. 
“Food sovereignty” as defined in the “National program for increasing agribusiness 
efficiency for the period of 2000-2005”,  means  that the “critical level” of domestic 
production should cover no less than 80% of the consumption of nine main products – grains, 
meat, eggs, sugar, vegetable oil, fruits, vegaatables and potatoes - in order to  ensure an 
adequate food supply (the “optimistic level” of domestic production means the domestic 
demand is fully covered by the domestic production, and agriculture is export-oriented).   
The calculations based on this conception (Table 4.12.1.) show that although Belarus 
has achieved the minimally required “critical level” of food sovereignty, the desired 
“optimistic level” of domestic production is still to be achieved. 
This food sovereignty (food security) conception at that time was (and still is) the 
cornerstone of Belarusian agricultural policy. Numerous Belarusian studies are dedicated to 
the development of different aspects of this conception (i.e.  Il’ina, 1999; Gusakov and Il’ina, 
2004; Il’ina and Batova, 2009). Further, numerous product-specific studies have emphasized 
the importance of the increase in production of selected food products; for example, potatoes 











































































































Grain  1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.9 
Potatoes 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.8 1.4 0.9 
Vegetables 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.8 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.1 
Sugar beets 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.7 2.0 1.4 2.5 1.7 
Meat 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.0 
Milk 1.7 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.4 0.9 
Eggs 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.8 1.2 
 
However, this conception is to some extent questioned by Babicki et al. (2004), who 
maintain that Belarus is food-secure on the country-level (i.e., the level of Belarus GAO 
production is sufficient), but there are some issues on the household and individual levels 
(e.g., low income levels that do not allow individuals to buy sufficient amounts of food 
products). According to Babicki et al. (2004), it would be better to provide “targeted aid to a 
vulnerable population” rather than apply direct price regulation for the whole economy 
(Babicki et al., 2004, p.1).  
In a nutshell, the notion of food sovereignty suggests that in order to secure enough 
food products at affordable prices for everyone it is necessary to increase GAO production 
and introduce agricultural reforms (land reform, price regulation and state support system 
reforms) very gradually and cautiously. While Babicki et al. (2004), argue that instead of 
expending financial resources through state support for producing enough affordable food for 
everyone, it would be better to reduce substantially this spending, allow food prices to rise to 
a free-market level, and then re-channel the financial resources released from state support for 
agriculture to provide targeted financial help to low-income people, who would not be able to 
buy food at the high, “free-market” prices.  
The “social stability” concern means that reforms should be provided in a way that 
avoids unemployment and income decreases in rural areas, and that ensures universal access 
                                                          
120 The food sovereignty (food security) indexes were calculated as a ratio of actual production to the required 
level of production (critical or optimistic) according to data from the Conception (2004).   
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to food through “reasonable” food prices (i.e., even the poorest people should be able to buy 
sufficient amounts of food products). 
 Although “food sovereignty” is considered to be a traditional goal of closed command 
economies in the view of Western economists (Csaki et.al., 2000) and “social stability” issues 
could be solved through the creation of new workplaces outside of agriculture and the 
establishment of special employment programs and direct assistance for the poor, the Belarus 
“very cautious” approach to reform seems to have brought good results. The agricultural 
production decline was not as drastic as in the other FSU countries, the food supply for the 
population was protected and the disruption of the production system was halted.
121
 Would 
these positive effects became only short-term achievements of the trade-off between the speed 
of reform and sectoral stability, or has it become the characteristic Belarusian way of systemic 
transformation, which seems at this moment to be very slow and financially costly (in long-
term run), but reasonable and appropriate in terms of social stability? This question remains.   
The question remains open as well because, while both radical and gradual reform 
approaches have their respective proponents and opponents, a detailed and comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis for any of these approaches has not been calculated yet. The majority of 
the “pro” and “contra” arguments are based on the experiences of other countries (sometimes 
not very relevant to the Belarus case), or are limited to specific agricultural sub-sectors (but 
the not the whole of Belarusian agriculture), which leaves a lot of room for speculation and 
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 Actually, these positive effects became the basis for the continuation and reinforcement of the policies 





































4.2. Agricultural production in Belarus during the transformation period  
This section is dedicated to an analysis of the Belarusian GAO dynamics during the 
transformation period. It is organized in the following way: a brief description of Belarusian 
output dynamic in pre-transition period opens the section; then, a detailed description and 
analysis of output decline in Belarus during the  transformation is  provided, comprising the 
long- and short- term output dynamic analysis and sectoral (crop-livestock), organizational 
(private–socialized) and regional output differentiations; after that, several pooled regression 
models are estimated for analysis of how the changes in selected inputs affected the 
agricultural output dynamic; and last, the final concluding remarks for the whole “output 
section” are made.  
Belarus agricultural production in the pre-transition period may be characterized by its 
comparable significance in the total USSR agricultural production,
122
 steady growth in both 
crop and livestock sectors and the prevalence of the livestock sector over the crop sector in 
the agricultural production structure.   
The livestock sector accounted for about 60% share in Belarusian agriculture by the 
end of the 1980s. The mainstay of the livestock sector was dairy production, while beef 
production had a complementary role. Pork production was also an important livestock sub-
sector (due to the food consumption preferences of the Belarusian population), but poultry 
was the fastest-growing sub-sector, which accounted for about 14% of meat consumption 
(Csaki et al., 1994).  
An analysis of the production dynamics shows a continuous growth of livestock 
production from the 1970’s until the beginning of the 1990s (Table 4.13.).   
Table 4. 13. Livestock production (1970 =100%)
123
  
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 
Milk (1000 ton) 100 116 116 128 142 112 
Meat (1000 live weight) 100 126 131 166 176 127 
Eggs (millions)  100 158 182 201 219 210 
 
Livestock productivity also achieved an impressive increase between 1970 and 1990. 
During this period, the quantity of milk-per-cow increased 47% , the number of eggs-per-hen 
increased 25% and beef productivity also increased, indicating efficiency gains  (beef 
                                                          
122
 Belarus, with only 1.7% of total FSU land, accounted  for  6% of meat, 7% of milk and 4% of eggs  in total 
FSU agricultural production, although it has been a net importer of food and agricultural products (Csaki et al., 
1994)  
123
 Data from Sakovitch. (2008c)  
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production increased more rapidly than cattle numbers due to more rapid weight gains and 
younger slaughter age) (Csaki et al., 1994). 
 
     
The prevalence of livestock production over crop production may be explained not only 
by the specificity of the natural resource endowment (which favors livestock over crop 
production), but also due to the centrally allocated unlimited imports of grain and the high 
priority of livestock sector development during the Soviet period. This prioritization of 
livestock sector development was reflected by generous subsidies to both livestock producers 
and consumers, and by the construction of large-scale livestock farms with high 
concentrations of animals, and substantial requirements for feed, energy, and transportation 
(Csaki et al., 1994).   
Crop production in the pre-transition period played a mainly complementary role, 
accounting for about 40%-45% of the GAO since 1975. Around 80% of crop land was used 
for the production of fodder crops and feed grains
124
 (Table 4.14). Although the principal 
activity of the crop sector was the production of forage and feed for livestock, Belarus has 
accounted for the 27% of the FSU flax production and 15% of potato production, which 
shared around 3% and 13% of total crop area accordingly. Other important non-grain crops 
were sugar beets, vegetables and oilseeds
 
(Csaki et al., 1994).  




1970 1980 1990 
area % of total area % of total area % of total 
Grain crops 2,503.3 41.4 3,139.2 49.8 2,645.2 43.2 
Fodder crops 2,223.5 36.8 2,038.3 32.3 2,553.6 41.7 
Potatoes 956.3 15.8 786.6 12.5 638.3 10.4 
Vegetables 48.6 0.8 53.8 0.9 40.9 0.7 
Flax 261.1 4.3 234.3 3.7 149.2 2.4 
Sugar beets 48.9 0.8 51.7 0.8 46.2 0.8 
Other 3.4 0.1 4.2 0.1 52.8 0.9 
Total cropped area 6,047.1 100 6,308.1 100 6,126.2 100 
 
The analysis of the crop production dynamics shows that in the pre-transition period (10 
pre-transition years) the production of all major crop products increased (Table 4.15). The 
most substantial increase was in grain production - from 4.1 mln. tons in 1980 to a 7.3 mln. 
tons in 1989. Impressive results were also achieved for sugar beets and flax production with 
127.6% and 120.8% average growth, respectively. The increase in potato and vegetable 
production was modest, but significant enough to be noticeable.  
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 However, these grains were mainly used for the animals’ feed, and necessary food grain requirements were 
met by imports. 
125
 Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (various years)   
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Table  4.15.   Production of the major crops 
126
 
 1980 1985 1989 
average growth 
rate 
Grain 4,108 5,790 7,384 134.2 
Potatoes 9,333 10,553 11,097 109.1 
Vegetables  733 828 894 110.5 
Sugar beets  1,122 1,568 1,810 127.6 
Flax 61 85 87 120.8 
 
The evaluation of the long-term trend (1965 - 2010) of total agricultural production 
leads to the distinguishing of the following phases in its dynamics (see Figure 4.2.): (1) 
constant growth (aprx. 1965 – 1990); (2) step decline (1990- 1999); (3) steady recovery 
(1999-2003); (4) rapid growth (2003 -2010).  This dynamic could provide the basis for the 
conclusion that the Soviet agricultural system “worked at full speed” not only until the 
beginning of the “Perestrojka” process  in USSR in 1986, but even for a half decade longer 
(until 1990), showing no evidence of collapse in terms of production volumes.    






The “short-term” analysis of the agricultural production in Belarus during the 
transformation period (1990 – 2004) shows that Belarus experienced a steep decline in 
production, just as the other FSU countries (Russia and Ukraine) did until the end of the 









 and then started to show signs of recovery. This initial GAO decline was then 
followed by a slow recovery that could be attributed to the disruptive consequences of the 
initial reforms (lack of clear reformation policy resulted in a general deregulation of the 
economy, state support withdrawal, terms of trade deterioration, which influenced the inputs 
supply, and so on), which then were mitigated by an increase in state support and the 
introduction of a more restrictive agricultural policy. A detailed empirical analysis of the 
impact of land, labor, machinery and fertilizers on GAO dynamics will be provided later, 
using the regression analysis in the sub-sequent section of this chapter.  
The “sectoral analysis” of the Belarusian agricultural production during the 
transformation period shows two significant structural changes: (i) a shift from livestock to 
crop production and, (ii) an increase in the share of the “individual sector” in overall 
agricultural production.    
During the period in question, Belarusian agriculture transformed from being livestock-
based to being crop-oriented (Figure 4.3.).  The share of crops in total agricultural production 
increased almost twice (from 37% in 1990 up to 60.7% in 2003), while the livestock share 
contracted from 63% in 1990 to 39.3% in 2003.  











1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003
crop production livestock production
 
 
The main reasons for this re-specialization were (i) the unfavorable for livestock 
production shift in prices, and (ii) the dismantling of the former inter-USSR trade 
connections. 
The unfavorable for livestock production shift in prices means that during the 
transformation period, the sale prices for crops generally increased more than production 
                                                          
128 Data from Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (2004)   
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costs, while the prices of livestock inputs increased beyond the livestock sales prices, which 
made crop production more profitable than livestock production.  
The negative impact of the dismantling of former inter-USSR trade connections on 
livestock production reflects the fact that during the Socialist period, Belarus was a livestock-
oriented republic within the Soviet Union, and cheap animal-feed delivery (mainly from 
Russia and Kazakhstan) was organized on a centrally-planned basis.  After the collapse of the 
USSR, the trade connections established during the USSR period were disrupted, and 
livestock production in Belarus consequently became unprofitable and thus declined.  
However, this decrease of livestock production did not significantly jeopardize Belarus 
food security in terms of livestock consumption, because during the Socialist era, a substantial 
part of livestock products was produced not for internal Belarus consumption, but for delivery 
to the other USSR republics. For example, in the “late 1980’s about 30% of dairy products” 
produced in Belarus “were delivered to Russia” (Csaki et al., 1994, p.8) 
“Individual”  agricultural production (household plots and private farmers)  
registered impressive gains during the transformation period, rising twice, from 23.7% share 
in total agricultural production in 1990 to 39.9% in 2004, while the corporate (state) farm 
production contracted from 76.3% in 1990 to 60.1% in 2004 (Table 4.17.). 
The increase of the share of the individual sector in agricultural production was mainly 
the result of the reallocation of land from state farms (“kohoz” and “sovhoz”) to household 
plots. Agricultural land used by household plots more than doubled
 
during the short period 
between 1990 and 1995,
129




  started to appear as the result of the realization of the land 
reform programs.  However, after the initial increase, land redistribution stagnated, and the 
structure of land use has remained unchanged since 1995, with almost 85% share of corporate 
(state) farms and 15% share of household plots (the private farms still accounted for less than 
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 Mainly due to the government permission of two-times increase of the allowed size of household plot land 
from officially allowed in USSR 0.5 ha to 1 ha. This aspect of the Belarus land reform is considered by some 
experts as the most important aspect of the land reform in Belarus, even more important than the redistribution of 
the Soviet collective and state farms land to the private farmers (UNDP, 2006).  
130
 Around 2600 private farms with an average land size of 20 hectares were organized from 1990 to 1994. 
131
 In Russia, the share of private farms in agricultural land use was about 6%; in Ukraine, about 8%. (UNDP, 
2006) 
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Table 4.17. Individual versus state agricultural production
132
   
  1990 1995 2000 2004 
land use structure 
corporate farms 93.5 83.5 83.8 83.6 
household  plots 6.4 15.8 15.3 14.5 
private farmers 0 0.7 0.9 1.9 
BELARUS TOTAL Land 100 100 100 100 
 
GAO production structure 
corporate farms 76.3 51.6 61.2 60.1 
household  plots 23.5 48.0 38.2 38.8 
private farmers 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.1 
BELARUS TOTAL GAO 100 100 100 100 
 
The analysis of the regional diversification of the agricultural output production shows 
that the share of each region in total agricultural production remained fairly stable during the 
transformation period (Table 4.18 and the map in the Appendix 4.10.).   
The Minsk region has the highest share in total Belarus agricultural production (23%), 
and the Mogilev region the lowest (12.5%). While the difference between the regions with the 
highest and lowest share is more than two times, the difference between the regions from the 
second (Brest region), third (Grodno region), fourth (Vitebsk region) and fifth (Gomel region) 
positions in rating is very small and almost insignificant.  The share of each region in the total 
agricultural production is to some extent correlated with the regions’ share in the total 
Belarusian agricultural labor force. The “most agricultural” in terms of the share in 
agricultural output regions like the Minsk, Grodno and Brest regions also have the highest 
shares in the total agricultural labor force.   
The analysis of the regional agricultural output growth rates resulted in practically the 
same picture as the analysis of the regions’ share in output (Table 4.19). The “main 
agricultural producers” (Minsk, Grodno and Brest regions) had the highest output growth 
rates during the studied period – 74.7%, 78.5% and 70.3% respectively. The only exception 
was one of the least productive Belarus regions –the Vitebsk region, which while  having one 
of the smallest shares in agricultural production (# 4 according regions' rating) had achieved 
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 Data from: Babicki et al. (2003) and Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (various years)   
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Mogilev region 13.0 12.5 13.1 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.1 11.8 11.5 6 13.9 
Minsk region 23.1 23.7 22.7 23.6 23.8 24.2 24.4 24.1 23.7 1 19.3 
Grodno region 16.6 17.7 17.2 18.6 17.2 16.9 17.3 17.4 17.7 3 19.9 
Gomel region 15.4 14.4 13.6 12.7 13.9 14.7 14.2 14.6 15.3 5 13.1 
Vitebsk region 13.6 14.6 15.7 14.2 15.0 14.8 14.0 14.9 14.3 4 14.4 
Brest region 18.3 17.2 17.8 18.5 17.5 16.8 18.0 17.1 17.5 2 18.8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
 























































Mogilev region 100 73 72 64 67 68 69 74 5 
Minsk region 100 74 70 64 76 78 78 83 3 
Grodno region 100 79 79 74 77 79 78 83 1 
Gomel region 100 67 63 56 63 63 65 69 6 
Vitebsk region 100 79 79 69 74 74 75 78 2 
Brest region 100 70 69 65 68 70 72 77 4 
Average for 
Belarus 100 74 72 65 71 72 73 77   
 
Finalizing the analysis of the regional diversification of agricultural output production 
during the transformation period, it is possible to come to the following conclusions: 
(1) There were three regions in Belarus that could be considered to be the “leaders” in 
terms of agricultural production - Minsk region, Grodno region and Brest region, and three 
regions that could be considered to be the “laggers” - Gomel region, Vitebsk region and 
Mogilev region.      
2) This (agriculture-relevant) regional differentiation can be considered relatively 
strong:  the ratio of the share in total Belarus agricultural output of the “least agricultural” 
Mogilev region and the “most agricultural” Minsk region is approximately 1:1.9. 
                                                          
133
 Data from Regions of Belarus Republic (2004) and  Regions of Belarus Republic (2005).    
134
 Percentage share of each region in total Belarus agricultural labor force for  2001.   
135
 Data from  Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (2003)  and Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics 
Yearbook (2003)   
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3) The best-performing (in terms of agricultural output) regions were in the western part 
of the Belarus, while the worst-performing were in the eastern part of the country. This East-
West agricultural division can mainly be attributed to the better soil and climatic conditions in 
the western parts of Belarus.
136
    
4) During the transformation period, the share of each region in Belarusian agricultural 
output production remained fairly stable. The regions with the highest shares in total 
agricultural output also showed the highest output growth rates (with the only exception for 
the Vitebsk region).   
Finalizing the analysis of the agricultural output dynamic during transformation period, 
in Belarus, it is possible to make the following conclusions: 
(1) The dynamics of agricultural production in the Belarus pre-transition period is 
characterized by a steady output growth and the prevalence of the livestock sector over the 
crop sector. 
(2) During the transformation period, the agricultural output production experienced a 
steep decline (although the lowest among the studied FSU and some V4 countries), which 
was then followed by a slow but steady recovery.  However, unfavorable changes transformed 
the   livestock-based Belarusian agriculture into one that was crop-oriented. 
(3) The regional structure of agricultural output production did not change during the 
transformation period: the share of each region in total Belarus agricultural production 
remained stable. Therefore, the results of the detailed region-specific analysis of the 
agricultural production allow us to conclude that in “absolute terms,”
137
 the transformational 
reforms’ outcome could be considered a modest success, due to a slow but steady output 
recovery. 
 The possibility of making a more comprehensive output analysis in “comparative 
terms”
138
   is constrained by the absence of Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) estimations 
for Belarus, and also by the partial and unclear data and estimations of the official Belarus 
statistics, regarding state support to agriculture.
139
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 However, some researchers attribute it to the fact that western regions of Belarus (Grodno, Brest and some 
parts of Minsk region) experienced just 40 years of a Soviet-type socialist economy, while the eastern Belarus 
regions experienced 70 years of it.   
137 referring only to output dynamic (see conclusion of the “CEEC output Section”) 
138
 comparing the output dynamic to changes in agricultural subsidies (see conclusion of the “CEEC output 
section”) 
139
 Only the budget state expenditures under the headings: „Expenditures for agriculture” and „Fund for 
supporting producers of agricultural products” are the “visible portion of subsidies”. “Many other support 
payments do not show up in the state budget” like: credits and below-market interest rates, write-offs of credits, 
preferential tax treatment, preferential prices for inputs, non-monetary transfers from other sectors (Babicki et 
al., 2003, p.4) 
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A detailed empirical analysis of the impact of land, labor, machinery and fertilizers on 
the GAO dynamics will be done applying the regression analysis in the subsequent Section 




































































4.3. Agricultural productivity in Belarus during the transformation period 
This section tackles the productivity dynamics in Belarus during the transformation 
period. It starts with a description of the main characteristics of the productivity dynamic; 
next, the factors that influenced land, labor, machinery and fertilizer productivity are 
discussed; after that, the concluding remarks finalize the section. 
Overall, Belarusian agricultural productivity dynamics followed the general trend of the 
CEE and FSU countries, where the partial productivity of the inputs that fell faster than the 
GAO had increased, while the partial productivity of the inputs that fell slower than the GAO 
had decreased. (Table 4.21- productivity dynamic summary and Appendix 4.11 - detailed 
calculations)   
 An analysis of overall land productivity calculated as a GAO/land ratio
140
 shows that 
land productivity steadily declined until 1999, and after that started to increase slowly, which 
resulted in an average decrease of land productivity by almost 20% during the period in 
question (1990-2004). However, the upward tendency continued for the next five years, and 
starting from 2007, land productivity reached its pre-transition level and continued its growth. 
The changes in land productivity can mainly be attributed to the different speed of changes 
for the GAO and land use rather than improvements in land use, because the amount of land 
under cultivation was stable (even with some minor increases) until 2000, but after that, 
started to decline steadily, contrary to the GAO, which steady declined up until 1999 and then 
began to increase gradually.   
Although an analysis of overall land productivity yielded expectable results, the 
analysis of the sectoral (crop-livestock) and organizational (private–socialized) patterns of 
land productivity provided a more complex picture, and showed surprisingly low 
achievements of individual  (private) farmers, who had been expected to be the “leaders” of 
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 GAO  is the  FAO gross agricultural output, which was calculated as  the sum of the value of production of 
189 crop and livestock commodities, valued at constant, global-average prices from 2004-2006 and measuring in 
international 2005$. Land is the total agricultural land. 
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  Change of   
GAO 100 95 90 77 80 73 71 74 84 80 88 99 





100 95 99 86 77 71 63 50 47 75 46 47 
labour-2 (average 
salary US $) 
100   7 27 39 34 31 42 58 30     
machinery  100 100 118 99 87 73 64 51 48 81 46 44 
fertilizers  100 81 52 19 27 29 25 22 34 36 45 60 
Change of the productivity of 
land productivity 100 95 90 76 78 72 71 81 91 81 96 108 
labor productiv.-1 100 99 91 90 103 103 112 149 178 111 192 210 
labor productiv.-2 100   1,241 283 204 212 228 176 146 373     
machinery 
productivity 
100 95 77 78 91 99 112 145 174 105 190 227 
fertilizers 
productivity 
100 116 175 415 296 254 279 340 247 280 195 165 
 
The analysis of crop yields (calculated as the ratio of the selected crops per arable land) 
in regard to different farms types (Appendix 4.12 and Appendix 4.13) shows a mixed 
picture.  Corporate farms and household plots had the highest average crop productivity. 
Corporate farms achieved the highest productivity for vegetables and forage beets (first places 
in the “productivity rating”) and slightly smaller productivity for grains and potatoes (second 
places in “productivity rating”). Contrarily, household plots had the highest productivity for 
grains and potatoes (first places in “productivity rating”) and a slightly smaller productivity 
(compared to corporate farms) for vegetables and forage beets. Individual farms had the 
lowest productivity for all types of studied crops during the transformation period.  
The analysis of crop yield dynamics (Appendix 4.12 and Appendix 4.13) during the 
transition period shows that in general, all main crop yields (analyzed in this research) 
declined in all types of farms.  The average annual decline for fodder beets was about 62.6% 
(maximum decline), for vegetables – 78.5%, for grains – 83.7% and for potatoes – 93.4%. 
However, the  analysis of the crop production dynamics with respect to different types of 
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 Data for calculations are from Fuglie (2012).  Data for average salary in Belarusian agriculture are from the 
Belarusian Agricultural Statistics Yearbook (various years).   Re-calculation from the Belarusian national 
currency (“rouble”) to US $ was done according to the official exchange rates. 
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farms reveals that  corporate farms had the lowest productivity growth rates compared to the 
individual sector
142
 - (third places in “productivity rating” for all the studied crops). 
Household plots achieved the best productivity growth results for (labor-consuming) 
vegetables and potatoes production (first places in the rating), while individual farms had the 
best results for (capital-consuming
143
) grain and forage beets productivity growth.  
In general, the analysis of crop productivity during the transformation period shows that 
crop productivity fell in all types of farms (although to different extents), and there was no 
clear evidence of a significant advantage of “individualized agriculture” over “socialized” 
agriculture. Individual farms had the lowest productivity, but the highest productivity growth 
rates, while corporate farms had the lowest productivity growth rates, but the highest 
productivity itself. (To oversimplify the issue, the corporate farms had already achieved the 
highest possible limits of their productivity, and thus had “less room” for increase in growth 
rates).   
While discussing the issue of crop productivity, it is necessary to mention that 
according to the experts, crop productivity potential in Belarus has not yet been exploited to 
the full (Csaki et al., 2000).  For example for grain production, the gap between the yields 
achieved at scientific research stations (4.5 t/ha) and the yields gained by farms (around 2.5 
t/ha) reached almost 50% (Csaki et al., 1994).  The main constraints of crop productivity 
growth are usually considered low-quality seeds, insufficient application of fertilizers, 
herbicides and insecticides, outdated machinery and some special climate features (like 
moisture stress)  (Csaki et al.,2000).   
The analysis of the land productivity in terms of livestock production
144
  (Appendix 
4.14. and Appendix 4.15) shows that it declined for the majority of studied livestock 
products, with a very slight exception for milk production. The slow speed of livestock 
production decline can be attributed to the fact 1995 was taken as the base year for the 
comparison; this was when the main decline in animal herds and livestock production had 
already taken place.
145
 An analysis of livestock growth rates in regard to farm types shows 
that individual farmers had the highest growth rates for milk production, but the lowest rates 
for animal production, which can be explained by its milk production orientation. Household 
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 household plots plus  individual farms 
143
 “Capital” here means the machinery and the agricultural equipment use.  
144
 Livestock productivity was calculated as the ration of the selected livestock products per ha of the agricultural 
land. 
145
 The year 1995 was deliberately taken as the base year, because the “year 1990” (which is usually taken for 
the comparison) could be considered as “bumper year” and thus, the all calculations which could be done, would 
be extremely biased downwards.   
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plots had higher growth rates compared to corporate farms in animal production, but lower in 
egg and milk production.  
While an analysis of crop productivity does not produce any clear picture in regard to 
productivity differentiation according to farm type, the results of the livestock productivity 
analysis shows the visible over-performance of household plots over corporate farms and 
individual farmers.  Household plots achieved not only the highest productivity for meat, milk 
and egg production, but also the difference between the household plot productivity and its 
“corporate and individual farms” rivals was remarkably huge.  Household plots’  productivity 
was four times higher for eggs production,  three times higher  for milk production and almost 
two times higher for meat production, compared to the productivity achieved by corporate 
farms. The gap between household plots’ and individual farms’ productivity was even more 
remarkable -  it was eight time higher for eggs production, seven times higher for milk 
production and two times higher for meat production. Although the difference between the 
corporate and individual farms' productivity was not as remarkable as for the household plots 
vs. “corporate-individual farming”, the corporate farms achieved substantially higher 
productivity (two times higher) for milk and egg production compared to individual farmers, 
while the difference in meat productivity was only slight. The above results allow us to come 
to the conclusion that the best livestock productivity (with a huge gap) was achieved by 
household plots, while the lowest productivity performance is mainly attributable to 
individual farmers.  
Summarizing all the results obtained for land productivity (in terms of the GAO, crop 
and livestock production-per-land), one may conclude that overall GAO/land productivity, as 
well as crop and livestock productivity, declined during the period in question (1990-2004).  
Any significant difference was observed in regard to the “individualized
” 
vs. “socialized” 
sector for “crop-related” land productivity, while “livestock-related” land productivity shows 
a significant advantage of household plots over corporate and individual farms.   Surprisingly, 
individual farms had the worst productivity results for crop/land and livestock/land 
productivity measured in natural volumes (except for the highest growth rates for crop 
productivity).
146
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 Surprisingly, because at the beginning of the transformation, it was expected that the newly emerged 
individual farms will be able to achieve the best results (compare to the corporate farms and household plots) 
and become the locomotives of the agricultural sector progressive development.    
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The labor productivity (calculated as GAO per agricultural workers ratio
147
) during the 
transformation increased on average at an 11% rate, which, however, was mainly caused by 
the fact that the GAO declined slower than agricultural labor, but not because of the labor 
adjustment process. The significant decrease in agricultural labor (the economically active 
adults in agriculture) could be explained by two main factors: (i) rural population ageing and 
(ii) increasing attractiveness of urban life compared to rural dwelling (better jobs, better 
salaries, and better living conditions).  The latter factor was not effectively hampered by 
either governmental policy, oriented to the subsidization of agriculture as a kind of a job 
creation scheme, or by the decline of working opportunities in urban areas, which makes work 
in agriculture (and settlement in rural areas) more attractive due to the possibility of the 
creation of “food security stocks”.
148
 
Although the number of economically active adults in agriculture could be a “very 
handy proxy” for the labor productivity calculations, it might not be a good marker for 
qualitative improvements (Federico, 2005, p.59). Therefore, for the purpose of a more 
thoughtful assessment, labor productivity was also calculated as the GAO per-average-salary 
ratio.
149
 This GAO per-salary-productivity index shows an even more substantial increase 
than the GAO per-worker-productivity index. However this GAO per-salary index should be 
interpreted very cautiously, because this average salary index was significantly biased due to 
(i) the huge inflation rate, which reached the millions’ times increase for inputs and milliard 
times increase for output
150
 – (see Appendix 4.3); (ii) the widespread practice and sometimes 
the prevalence of payment-in-kind (especially in 1990-1996), rather than salary payments in 
money units. 
The machinery productivity measured as the ratio of GAO per total stock of farm 
machinery in "40-CV tractor equivalents" decreased slightly until 1997, but from 1998 started 
its recovery and continued its remarkable  growth until 2010 - reaching the 227% increase 
compared to the 1990 level. Considering that the actual number of tractors (measured in 
items, without considering horsepower capacity) constantly decreased during 1990-2010, this 
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 “Labor workers” is number of the economically active adults in agriculture. Data for GAO and “labor 
workers” are from Fuglie (2012) 
148
 In fact, agriculture in Belarus had played its role as the “food security net” during the initial period of 
transition (when the GAO decline was the most profound and the food shortages in the urban areas were 
substantial), but after the improvements in the food supply and the general economy revitalization its role as the 
“security net” diminished substantially.     
149
 Calculation of the GAO/working hour is impossibly due to the scarcity of the data regarding the working 
hours in agriculture. 
150 Even the  calculation of the average salary in US dollars  in order to mitigate inflation effects does  not help a 
lot due to currency exchange rate biases and the existence of several exchanges rates (official and “black 
market”) during that period of time.  
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machinery productivity growth could be considered a substantial qualitative improvement and 
thus, a transformational reform success.  
Fertilizer productivity was calculated as the ratio of the GAO per-metric tons of 
fertilizer consumption (measured in "N-fertilizer equivalents"), where the tons of different 
kinds of fertilizer were aggregated using weights based on their relative prices. This partial 
productivity index shows the most impressive growth among all the studied productivity 
indexes from 1990-2004, which could probably be considered a reform success. The signs of 
the slow decrease of fertilizer productivity, which started to appear from 2002 could possible 
reflect the fact that the speed of GAO recovery was slower than the speed of fertilizer-use 
increase.  
An overall analysis of the partial productivity dynamics of land, labor, machinery 
and fertilizers shows that only land productivity decreased during the period in question, 
while other partial productivity indexes increased (though to different extents). Such a 
dynamic could be considered a success of the reform, as well as simply a reflection of the 
differences in the speed of the decline/increase of GAO and the input in question (i.e. land, 
labor, machinery and fertilizers). Therefore, to evaluate whether the growth of some partial 
productivity indexes can be considered a success or failure of reforms, it is necessary 
calculate the Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The estimation of the Total Factor Productivity 
will be done in the next Section 4.4., together with a concluding assessment regarding the 















Section 4.4. Empirical assessment of the agricultural production and productivity 
dynamics. 
This section provides the rationale for the final conclusions regarding the assessment of 
the reform outcomes in terms of agricultural output and productivity in Belarus.   
For this purpose, the section analyzes the impact of the changes in inputs use on GAO 
dynamics (referring to Section 4.2) and the calculation of the TFP (referring to Section 4.3) 
by an estimation of the panel regression for the seven Belarusian regions. The section starts 
with a description of the methodology and data; next, the regression results are provided and 
discussed; then, the TFP indexes are calculated and explanations about its dynamic are 
offered; concluding remarks will finalize the section.   
In order to analyze how (and if) the selected inputs’ (land, labor and capital) 
adjustments affected agricultural output dynamics, a panel regression was estimated using the 
Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function.   
The econometric model for the estimation is:  
ln(GAOit) = α0 +β1ln (LAND_TOTit )+ β2ln (LAB it) +β3ln(CAP it) +ε 
where GAO  is the total value of Gross Agricultural Output,   aggregated using the 
constant prices (base year: 1990) for the three types of agricultural producers (corporate 
farms, household plots, individual farmers), LAND_TOT  is the agricultural land  used by the  
three  types of agricultural producers (corporate farms, household plots, farmers),  LAB is the 
number of the  working hours, CAP  is  the average of the  machinery in use (tractors and 
combines), fertilizer consumption and livestock inventories (cows, pigs and poultry), and 
TREND is a  proxy for TFP.  
The data used for the model are the observations for the years 1990-2004.
151
 Although 
the above-presented variables are mainly of a quantitative rather than qualitative character, 
and also not all of them are available for the whole period in question (the data coverage for 
1991-1995 is extremely scarce) - they are the only data available, and the panel regressions 
results based on them allows us to make plausible conclusions. 
The geographical coverage for this pooled regression includes all six Belarusian 
regions: Mogilev region (_mog), Minsk region (_min), Grodno region (_gr), Gomel region 
(_gom), Vitebsk region (_vit) and Brest region (_br).  
All variables (except TREND variable) are transformed from index numbers (1990 
=100%) to log-linear form using the [=+ln …] Excell program function. 
                                                          
151
 Data are from   Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (various years)   
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The detailed results of the pooled regression estimations (coefficients in EView format 
and growth accounting statistics Tables) are presented in the Appendix 4.17. and  
summarized in Table 4.22 
Table 4. 22.   Belarus pooled regression results  
Dependent variable: GAO (Gross Agricultural Output) 
  coef. t value 
Land 0.20* 5.04 
Labor 0.29* 11.75 
Capital 0.49* 14.73 
TFP_Brest 0.01* 6.88 
TFP_Gomel 0.01* 5.94 
TFP_Grodno 0.02* 8.24 
TFP_Minsk 0.01* 6.86 
TFP_Mogilev 0.02* 10.36 
TFP_Vitebsk 0.03* 11.86 
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix (cross-section SUR) 
No. of regions  6 







Durbin-Watson st. 2.03 
Wald Test 0.3 
* indicate significance at the 1% level (prob. <0.01) 
 
Table 4.22.  presents the  results of the model where the CAP variable is estimated 
without any time-lag (while in previous CEEC regression in Section 2.4. the CAP variable 
was estimated with a minus one-year lag).  This was done because the results for the models 
in which the CAP variable was estimated with time-lags are not as good as when the 
estimation was done without any time-lag.  However, this does not imply a discontinuity in 
results, because this approach is consistent with the estimation of the Western countries' 
pooled regression model in the next Chapter 5, where the best results were also obtained for 
the model without any time-lags. 
The regression has a good explanatory power (R-squared is around 1) and the Durbin-
Watson stat.  is about 2, which  is satisfactory enough. The Wald Test result is “0.3”.  All the 
coefficients are highly significant (p<0.01) and have a positive sign, which implies the normal 
production function behaviour when the increase of the use of each input (land, labour, 
capital) leads to an increase in output (GAO).  According to the regression results, the capital 
has the most significant impact on GAO: a 1% increase in capital use raises the GAO by 
almost 0.5%.  The next important input is labor, which causes a 0.3% of GAO increase for 
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each 1% of land-use increase. The land input has the lowest impact on the GAO dynamics: 
the 1% increase of labor use would provide only 0.2% of GAO increase. 
A more detailed regionally relevant analysis of the contribution of each input to the 
GAO dynamics is provided in Table 4.23. This table summarizes the results of the GAO 
accounting calculations from Appendix 4.17 






Contribution to total change of the 
∑ GAO 
land labor capital TFP 
LAND LAB CAP TREND 
Mogilev  -0.02 0.18 -0.95 1.83 -1.71 -0.65 
Minsk  -0.01 0.12 -1.19 2.02 -2.13 -1.18 
Grodno  -0.01 0.13 0.54 1.19 -1.75 0.11 
Gomel -0.03 0.08 0.43 0.92 -0.68 0.75 
Vitebsk -0.02 0.21 -1.02 1.58 -1.77 -0.99 
Brest -0.02 0.08 0.40 1.72 -1.21 0.99 
 
The growth accounting statistics is acceptable (the sum of the percentage contribution to 
the total GAO change is around “1”) for the five Belarusian regions from the model sample.  
According to the growth accounting statistics for the regions with acceptable results, the 
capital variable made the highest contribution to output change among the all inputs, and 
sometimes made an even higher contribution than the TFP variable.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the obtained regression results suggest that the 
changes in capital use had the most decisive impact on the GAO dynamics in Belarus. 
The changes in land and labor had a less important impact on the GAO. These results 
are consistent with the findings of the previously estimated Cobb-Douglass production 
function for the seven CEEC countries (including Belarus) in the CEEC Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4.), where the changes in capital use were found to be the most influential 
factor of the GAO dynamics. 
In order to evaluate whether the increase in some partial productivity indexes in Belarus 
could be considered a success of the reform, the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) should be 





Table 4.24. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth rates  
  
estimated coefficient 
for TREND variable 
TFP growth 
annual TFP growth 
cumulative  TFP growth 
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TFP_Brest 0.019 1.9 0.3 
TFP_Gomel 0.018 1.8 0.3 
TFP_Grodno 0.022 2.2 0.4 
TFP_Minsk 0.020 2.0 0.3 
TFP_Mogilev 0.030 3.0 0.6 
TFP_Viitebsk 0.031 3.1 0.6 
 
Coefficients of the TREND (TFP) variable are found significant and have a positive 
sign for all six Belarus regions. The annual TFP growth among them vary between 1.8% to 
3.1%, which is consistent with the results of the CEE countries' regressions (Section 2.4), 
where the annual TFP growth for Belarus varied from 3.3% to  2.3% depending on the model. 
Therefore, considering the positive (and significantly high) TFP growth in Belarus, it is 
possible to assess as a “success” the transformational reforms’ result in terms of 
productivity. 
The incredibly high rate of the TFP increase in Belarus can be explained by the 
following reasons: 
(i) more rational and economical use of previously  (during the Socialist era) over-used 
inputs, less wastage of inputs;  
(ii) initially lower (less favorable) level of Belarusian agricultural development. Among 
the FSU countries in question (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine), Belarus is usually considered 
the country with the least favorable conditions for agricultural production (in terms of climate 
and soil characteristics) and Federico (2005) and Galonopoulos et al. (2008) imply that the 
”backward” countries (Federico,2005, p.211) or countries with “lower initial levels of 
productivity” (Galonopoulos et al.,2008, p.10) show higher growth rates, or, to generalize, the 
“initially poorer regions grow faster than initially more wealthy regions” (Bivand and 
Brunstad, 2002, p.i). Macours and Swinnen (2000a) also found that GAO growth was higher 
for countries with lower levels of pre-reform development and with lower pre-reform 
distortions; 
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 Cumulative TFP (or 15 years period TFP growth) was calculated as {((=+exp(estimated coefficient*15))-1} 
in Excell (MS)  
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 (iii) the increase of the share of household plots in total agricultural production 
(changes in institutions).  During the transformation period, the most remarkable institutional 
changes occurred in the household plots production sector – having only a small share of the 
agricultural land, the household plots’ production reached almost 50% of total GAO for some 
years (see Table 4.25).   
Table 4.25. Share of the households’ plots in Total GAO and Total agricultural land
153
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total GAO 100 100 100 100 
household plots GAO 23.5 48.0 38.2 37.6 
Total agricultural land 100 100 100 100 
household plots land 6.4 15.8 15.3 14.5 
 
Therefore, according to the estimated TFP results and finalizing the issue of the 
assessment of the reforms outcome in terms of agricultural productivity, it is possible to 
state that the transformational reforms’ results in Belarus could be considered a reform 
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The analysis of the Belarus agricultural performance during the fifteen years of 
transformation leads to the following conclusions in regard to the “success or failure of 
reforms” in terms of the transformational processes, agricultural production and productivity. 
1. The main features of the centrally-planned (command) economy were mainly 
preserved in Belarus, although some attempts were made to reform the former Socialist  
agricultural system. In general, the transformational reform dynamics could be considered as 
a process of soft and mild adaptation from the former centrally-planned economy to the free-
market environment, which emerged after the dissolution of the USSR. 
2. In terms of agricultural production (in “absolute terms”
154
), the transformational 
reforms’ outcome may be considered a modest success, due to slow but steady output 
recovery.  A change in capital use was the most influential factor in the GAO dynamics. 
3. In terms of agricultural productivity, the reform outcome in Belarus may be 
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 referring only to output dynamic (see conclusion of the “CEEC output section”) 
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CHAPTER 5. Polish and Belarusian agricultural performance, from a centrally-planned 
to market oriented economy: the determinants of reform success.   
The analysis of the transformational processes in Polish and Belarusian agricultural 
systems provided in the previous chapters allows us to make the following comparative 
conclusions regarding the transformational approaches and results.  
In terms of the chosen transformational policies, Poland and Belarus chose different 
reform approaches and followed divergent reform paths. Poland chose a liberal-market 
reform approach and followed the speedy “Big-Bang” transformational path, while Belarus 
took the so-called “socially-oriented” (“socially-friendly”) reform approach and followed a 
slow and very gradual reform path.  
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to describe the Polish agricultural 
transformation as a fast and straight reformation of the centrally-planned economy to the 
market-oriented economy, while the Belarusian agricultural transformation could be marked 
as the very slow and mild adaptation of the centrally-planned economy to the hostile free-
market environment, which rapidly emerged after the dissolution of the USSR.  
However (and surprisingly), despite the different transformational policies,  the results 
of the transformations, measured in terms of agricultural production (output) and 
productivity could be generally considered a “success” for the both Poland and Belarus, 
although some differences in the dynamics and magnitude of production and productivity 
changes were observed. 
The agricultural production (output) clearly followed the same upward direction 
(after an initial decline) in Poland and Belarus, which leads to the conclusion that the 
transformational results a “success” for both countries.
155
  The only differences observed 
pertained to the speed and the magnitude of the production dynamics.  
In terms of agricultural productivity, the transformational results could also be 
generally considered a “success” for Poland and Belarus, because both countries experienced 
a modest TFP increase, despite the fall of the partial productivity of some of the inputs. Both 
Poland and Belarus followed the same (declining) trend for land and labor partial 
productivity, but different trends for machinery and fertilizer partial productivity. 
In light of the above-noted conclusions, the following questions should be raised: 
(1) How did it happen that Poland and Belarus, having so different transformational 
approaches and following so different transformational paths, achieved similarly successful 
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 although the agricultural production (output) had not yet reached the pre-transformation level of agricultural 
production in both Poland and Belarus, as for year 2004.  
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results in terms of agricultural production and productivity? What were the driving forces 
behind such a controversial effect? 
(2) Which were the determinants and reasons for the differences in the dynamics and 
magnitude of agricultural production and productivity?  
A possible explanation could be provided by the following hypotheses, which will be 
verified within the next two sections of this chapter.  
Hypothesis 1.  “Poland and Belarus achieved similarly successful results of the 
agricultural transformation in terms of production and productivity because both countries 
followed the developmental path of advanced Western countries - a shift from land- and 
labor-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture”. Or if to reformulate it in the 
transformational history framework, “the capital endowment has the more decisive impact 
on the reforms’ success (or failure) than the reforms’ profoundness”.     
Hypothesis 2. “The observed differences in the dynamics and magnitude of production 
and productivity changes could be explained by the differences in the “institutions” in a 
broadly defined sense,
156
 or to be more specific, to the transition economies discourse, the 
differences in the reform paths and initial conditions (Swinnen, 2006). 
The next Section 5.1. of this chapter  provides verification of Hypothesis #1  
(explaining the  “similarities” of the  transformational results), while Section 5.2.  provides 
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 “institutions” –i.e. “a set of formal or informal rules to determine the initial ownership of the goods and 
factors (property rights) and to regulate the exchanges (contracts, markets, and other forms of distribution)”   
(Federico, 2005, p.117)  
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5.1. Explanation of the similarities in agricultural production and productivity 
dynamics. 
This section explains the “similarities” of the transformational results within the 
framework of the previously formulated hypothesis that “Poland and Belarus achieved 
similarly successful results in agricultural transformation in terms of production and 
productivity, because both countries followed the developmental path of advanced 
Western countries: a shift from land- and labor-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive 
agriculture”.   
The section is organized as follows: first, it establishes that advanced Western countries 
experienced a shift from land- and labor-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture 
from 1960 to 2004, and that Poland and Belarus also took this path; then, in order to verify 
whether the increase in capital use had a decisive impact on agricultural production, a pooled 
regression for the selected advanced Western countries was run; next, a brief explanation of 
the impact of capital intensivity (and increase in capital use) on productivity (TFP) increase 
will be provided; and finally, concluding remarks will finalize the section.  
An analysis of the land dynamics shows that agricultural land decreased in practically 
all advanced Western countries from 1961 to 2004.
157
   Further, agricultural labor (measured 
in terms of agricultural population) decreased in this period. These declining tendencies for 
the both land and labor began in the 1960s and continued through the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s.  The dynamics of land and labor changes in CEE countries (and Poland and Belarus as 
part of it) followed the path taken by advanced Western countries (see Appendix 5.2 for land 
and Appendix 5.3 for labor).   
However, the picture for tractor and fertilizer dynamics appears to be more 
complicated. 
At first glance, a simple quantitative analysis of the tractors in use in advanced 
Western countries compared to the CEEC (Poland and Belarus) shows no clear common path. 
In the advanced Western countries, the number of tractors in use grew until the 1990s, and 
then started to decline. In Poland, the number of tractors in use constantly increased since the 
1960s, while in Belarus it grew until the 1990s and then started to decrease (see Appendix 
5.4).   
However, the picture becomes more interesting when one considers the ratio of 
tractors- per-land-use (see Appendix 5.5.). A comparison of advanced Western and CEE 
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 except for arable land in  France, Ireland and Netherlands.   
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countries  shows the huge gap between these two sets of countries, and Poland was the only 
country from the CEEC that was able to overcome it and come close to the average Western 
“standard” for tractors-per-land-use (as for year 2003).  Or in other words, Poland was the 
only CEE country that was able to achieve the “average Western countries” tractors-per-land 
ratio.  
The same tendency applies for the fertilizer consumption. A simple analysis of 
fertilizer consumption trends shows no clear commonalities between the advanced Western 
and CEE countries (see Appendix 5.6.), while fertilizer-per-land-consumption reveals a 
substantial gap between these two sets of countries (see Appendix 5.7.) Further, Belarus and 
Poland  were the only CEE countries that came close to the   average Western “standard” for 
fertilizer-per-land- consumption (as for year 2002). Or in other words, Belarus and Poland 
were the only CEE countries that were able to achieve the “average Western countries” 
fertilizer-per-land ratio.  
Thus, a brief descriptive analysis of land, labor and capital changes leads to the 
following conclusions:  
(i) Western countries experienced a shift from land- and labor-intensive agriculture to 
capital-intensive agriculture from 1961 to 2004;   (ii) Both Poland and Belarus followed this 
path (a shift from land and labor-intensive to capital-intensive agriculture), although with a 
10-15 years delay, and were the most successful among the other CEE countries in terms of 
capital use: Poland was leader among the CEEC for tractors-per-land-use, and Belarus for 
fertilizer-per-land-consumption.
158 
   
The next issue in verifying Hypothesis #1 is to evaluate whether the capital intensivity 
(increase in capital use) could be considered an important factor in the agricultural production 
(output)   increase, or in other words, could the shift from land- and labor-intensive 
agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture be the reason for the agricultural production 
increase.  
The crucial importance of capital improvements for the agricultural production increase 
for the CEE countries from 1990 to 2004   has already been empirically established in 
previous Chapters 2-4, where the results of the pooled regression for the seven CEE 
countries and also the Poland- and Belarus-specific regressions had proven that an increase of 
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 However, the driving forces behind these leaderships are different.   Poland was the leader in tractor use due 
to a constant increase in the number of tractors per land which had started long before the  pre-1990s period and 
proceeded during the transformation period (1990-2004);  Belarus was the leader in fertilizers-per-land-
consumption due to the pre-1990s excessive fertilizer consumption ,and had actually experienced a decline in 
fertilizer-per-land-consumption from 1990-2004. Thus, the Belarus leadership was mainly based on the 
exploitation of its  the pre-1990s potential.    
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capital use was one the most important factors (or at least had a very significant impact) for 
agricultural production increase.   
In order to verify whether the changes in capital use (increase or decrease) had the same 
importance for the agricultural production dynamics in the advanced Western countries, a 
pooled regression for the selected 12 advanced Western countries was estimated.  This pooled 
regression was estimated according to the following model:  
 
ln(GGAOit) = α0 +β1ln (LAND_ARit )+ β2ln (LAB_RUR it) +β3ln(CAP it) +ε      
 
where GGAO is Gross Production Index Number (2004-2006 = 100),  LAND_AR is 
arable land, LAB_RUR is rural population, CAP is the average of the tractors in use and  
fertilizers consumption, TREND is a  proxy for TFP.  
The regression sample was comprised of the twelve most advanced Western countries: 
Denmark (_DEN), Finland ( _FIN), France (_FRAN), Germany (_GER), Ireland (_IRL), 
Italy (_ITAL), Netherlands (_NETH), Portugal (_PORT), Spain  (_SPA), Sweden (_SWD), 
Switzerland  (_SWZ), United Kingdom  (_UK). 
The data used for the model are the observations for the 1990-2004 years period from 
the FAO database. All variables used for the regression estimations were calculated as the 
index (percentage) numbers normalized around the year 1990 (1990=100%) and then 
transformed into a log-linear form using the EXCELL formula [=lg] 
The detailed results of the pooled regression estimations (coefficients and growth 
accounting statistics Tables in EView format) are presented in Appendix 5.8. and Appendix 
5.9. and summarized in Table 5.1  and Table 5.2. 
The regression has good explanatory power (R-squared is around 1) and the Durbin-
Watson stat. is about 2, which is satisfactory enough. The Wald Test result is above “0,1”.  
All coefficients (except for Trend for Sweden) are highly significant (p<0.01) and have a 
positive sign, which implies the normal production function behaviour when the increase of 
the use of each input (land, labour, capital) leads to the increase in output (GAO). According 
to the regression results, the capital has the most significant impact on GAO in all Western 
countries in question: a 1% increase in capital use raises the GAO by almost 0,6%.  The next 
important input is labor, which causes the 0.4% of GAO increase for each 1% of labor 
increase. The land input has the lowest impact on the GAO dynamic: the 1% increase of the 
land use would provide only the 0.1% of GAO increase.  
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Table 5.1. Regression results 
Variable  Coefficient t-value  
C -0,519 -1.146 
Land 0,127* 5.833 
Labor 0.404* 4.874 
Capital 0.580* 24.385 
TFP for Denmark 0.033* 32.227 
TFP for Finland 0.017* 8.832 
TFP for France 0.019* 15.236 
TFP for Germany 0.010* 6.683 
TFP for Ireland 0.011* 9.769 
TFP for Italy 0.006* 7.822 
TFP for Netherlands 0.024* 10.310 
TFP for Portugal 0.017* 7.851 
TFP for Spain 0.010* 4.407 
TFP for Sweden 0.003** 2.148 
TFP for Switzerland 0.003* 3.541 
TFP for UK 0.006* 4.798 
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix (cross-section SUR) 
No. of regions  12 







Durbin-Watson st. 2.16 
Wald Test 0.1 
* indicate significance at the 1% level (prob. <0.01); ** indicate significance at 5% level 
(0.01<prob. <0.05);  -0.519 - insignificant variable (more that 20% significance) 
The more detailed country-relevant analysis of the contribution of each input to the 
GAO dynamic is provided in Table 5.2. This Table 5.2. summarizes the results of the GAO 
accounting calculations from Appendix 5.8 and presents the “Column D” (contribution to 
output change / % of total change) from the country-relevant Tables from Appendix 5.8 The 
growth accounting statistics is acceptable (the sum of the percentage contribution to the total 









Table 5.2.   Contribution of each input to GAO change as the % of total change 












Denmark 0.0095 -0.14 0.07 -2.41 3.48 1.00 
Finland -0.0004 1.42 11.95 36.12 -44.87 4.62 
France 0.0059 0.05 -0.71 -1.64 3.37 1.07 
Germany 0.0003 0.46 5.22 -61.34 36.98 -18.68 
Ireland 0.0069 0.21 0.18 -0.78 1.62 1.23 
Italy 0.0019 -0.35 -0.24 -0.72 3.67 2.37 
Netherlands -0.0020 -0.24 5.16 8.16 -12.61 0.46 
Portugal 0.0072 -0.65 -0.54 0.47 2.42 1.69 
Spain 0.0254 -0.08 0.01 0.47 0.41 0.82 
Sweden 0.0035 -0.13 -0.24 -1.49 0.91 -0.96 
Switzerland -0.0071 -0.02 -0.40 2.05 -0.56 1.07 
UK -0.0054 0.26 -0.04 0.94 -1.30 -0.14 
 
According to the growth accounting statistics for the countries with acceptable results 
(Denmark, France, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), the capital variable had the 
highest contribution to output change among the all inputs, and sometimes had an even higher 
contribution  than the TFP variable (for Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). Thus, although the 
regression results do not look excellent, they generally provide significant evidence that 
changes in capital use have an essential impact on the agricultural production dynamics for 
advanced Western countries.  
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the results of the  regressions made for the 
several set of countries  (twelve advanced  Western countries, seven CEE countries, and  
Belarusian  region-specific regressions)  verify the hypothesis that capital intensivity 
(increase in capital use) could be considered one of the most influential  factors in the  
agricultural production increase, or in other words, that the shift from land- and labor-
intensive agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture could be considered the reason for 
the  agricultural production increase.  
The successful results in terms of agricultural productivity (TFP) for Poland and 
Belarus could mainly be attributed to improvements in capital use (an increase in capital 
intensivity), like the agricultural production “success”. The following three main types of 
capital improvements can be identified for both Poland and Belarus for the 1990-2004 period: 
1. More rational and sparing use of previously (during Socialist times) overused inputs 
due to the introduction of hard budget constraints.  
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2. Capital use (tractors-per-land and fertilizers-per-land ratio) increased, and  came 
close to the level of the advanced Western countries (in the case of Poland) or at least did not 
decrease substantially and  remained  close to the level of the advanced  Western countries (in 
the case of Belarus) 
3. Adoption of more efficient Western agricultural technologies and use of more 
productive Western agricultural machines, fertilizers and other inputs, which became possible 
due to a liberalization of trade relations. 
Therefore, finalizing this section's exploration of the “similarities” between the 
transformational results for Poland and Belarus it is possible to make the following 
statements: 
1. Advanced Western countries experienced a shift from land- and labor-intensive 
agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture. Poland and Belarus followed this path, and were 
the most successful in this, compared to the other CEE countries.  Increase in capital use (and 
capital intensivity) was one of the most significant factors in the agricultural production and 
productivity increase for the advanced Western countries and CEEC. Thus, the hypothesis 
that “Poland and Belarus achieved similarly successful results for the agricultural 
transformation in terms of production and productivity, because both countries followed the 
developmental path of advanced Western countries (a shift from land- and labor-intensive 
agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture)” may be considered to be true.   
2. Although both Poland and Belarus achieved the similarly successful results for 
agricultural production and productivity, despite the differences in the transformational 
policies, the Polish “advanced” transformation policy seems more sustainable from a long-
term perspective than the Belarusian, because it induced a steady  increase of capital  use 
(capital intensivity), while the Belarusian “slow and incomplete” transformational policy only 
allowed capital use (the capital intensivity) not to drop drastically (as in other FSU countries) 









5.2. Explanation of the differences in the agricultural production and productivity 
dynamic. 
This section is dedicated to an analysis of the “differences” in the transformational 
results within the framework of the previously formulated hypothesis that “The observed 
differences in the dynamics and magnitude of the production and productivity changes could 
be explained by the differences in the “institutions” in a broadly defined sense, 
159
 or if to be 
more specific to the transition economies discourse, the differences in the reforms’ paths and 
initial conditions (Swinnen, 2006). 
The section is organized in the following way: first, a brief summary of the observed 
“differences” in agricultural production and productivity is provided; then, the framework 
within which the analysis will be done is outlined; after that, the set of differences in 
agricultural production will be analyzed; next, the differences in the agricultural productivity 
(tractor and fertilizer productivity) will be explained; and finally, concluding remarks will 
finalize the Section.  
The analysis of the Polish and Belarusian agricultural transformation results revealed 
the following differences in the agricultural production and productivity: a difference in the 
speed and the magnitude of the production (output) dynamic, differences in sectoral 
performance (crop/livestock ratio and share of the individual sector in output 
production), regional disparities in output production and differences in machinery and 
fertilizer productivity.  
The analysis of the reasons and driving forces behind these “differences” provided in 
the subsequent paragraphs will be organized around the explanations of how the “differences 
in the reforms’ paths and initial conditions” (Swinnen, 2006 conception), or in other words 
“the difference in the (1) ownership of the goods and factors and in (2) the regulation of its’ 
exchange” (Federico, 2005 conception) caused the observed differences in agricultural 
production and productivity.  
The analysis of the agricultural production dynamics shows that although both countries 
followed the same path in terms of the agricultural output trend (a sharp decline in 
agricultural production at the beginning of the transformation period followed by visible signs 
of production recovery) there are some clear differences in the speed and magnitude of the 
production dynamics. These differences could mainly be attributed to the different reform 
                                                          
159
 “institutions” –i.e. “a set of formal or informal rules to determine the initial ownership of the goods and 
factors (property rights) and to regulate the exchanges (contracts, markets, and other forms of distribution)”   
(Federico, 2005,p.117 )  
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path followed by each country. Poland, as the country with the “Bing Bang” reform policy 
approach, reached the “bottom line” of agricultural production earlier than Belarus, and 
consequently started to recover earlier. Also, the magnitude of the decline was lower in 
Poland.  Belarus, which took a more gradual reform path, reached its “bottom line” five years 
later than Poland, and its magnitude decline was 13% higher than in Poland. These findings 
are in line with Macours and Swinnen (2000a) findings that fast “Big Bang” reformers 
reached the bottom line of the decline and recover faster than gradual reformers, which could 
suggest the idea that “fast reformation” provided better  and more efficient “institutions”  for 
the regulation of the exchange of goods and factors, which catalyzed the  faster and more 
profound growth of agricultural production.  
The “sectoral analysis” of Polish and Belarus agricultural production shows that 
Belarus experienced more profound changes than Poland during the transformation period in 
terms of (i) crop/livestock ratio, and (i) individual vs. state agricultural production.  
During the studied period, Belarus transformed from a livestock-oriented to crop-
oriented production, while the Polish livestock/crop ratio remained practically unchanged 
(approximately 50% for crop production and 50% for livestock production, according to 
Lukas and Mládek (2006). That happened because during the Socialist period, Belarus was a 
livestock-oriented republic within the Soviet Union, where livestock production was mainly 
concentrated in large-scale, state agricultural farms. Animal feed delivery was organized on a 
centrally-planned basis and was primarily based on Russian- and Kazakhstan-delivered 
animal feed.  After the collapse of the USSR, the connections established during the USSR 
period were quite disrupted, and livestock production in Belarus became unprofitable without 
stable and cheap animal feed delivery from FSU republics, and thus, declined. 
 In Poland, where the agriculture was organized largely around private, small-scale 
farms on a mainly self-sufficient basis, the dismantling of the centrally-planned system and 
the destruction of the inter-state economic relations established during the Socialist era (e.g., 
CMEA agreements) had no significantly destructive impact.
160
  Thus, this “sectoral 
difference” should mainly be attributed to the different initial conditions, (i.e., length of time 
under the centrally-planned system and therefore the strength of the interdependence between 
the socialist countries), which affected the “institutional mechanism” of the “exchange of the 
factors and goods.” 
                                                          
160
 It is necessary to keep in mind that in Poland, the climate and soil conditions are more favorable for 
agricultural production than in Belarus; hence, Poland is more self-sufficient in terms of agricultural production.  
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 Moreover, the share of the individual sector in agricultural production increased 
substantially in Belarus but remained practically unchanged in Poland, which could also be 
attributed to the difference in initial conditions. In Poland, with the mainly pre-dominant 
private agriculture during Socialist times, there was no huge demand for an increase in 
privately-owned (or privately-run) agricultural land. However in Belarus, with the dominance 
of large-scale, state-run farms during the Socialist period, the government permission of the 
two-times increase of the allowed size of the household plot (from 0.5 to 1 ha) caused a 
significant increase in both privately-owned subsidiary households’ land and the share of 
private agricultural production. Thus, this “sectoral difference” in the share of the “individual 
sector” should also be attributed to the difference in initial conditions, which caused 
differences in the “institutional mechanism” of ownership rights.  
The analysis of the regional structure of the agricultural production shows that the 
“regional gap” (the difference between the more and less agriculturally developed regions) 
was more profound in Poland than in Belarus, and during the transformation period, this gap 
became even wider, which could be attributed mainly to the differences in the countries’ 
reform path, which affected the “institutional” mechanism of the exchange (distribution) of 
“goods and factors”.  In Belarus, the main approach of the gradual agricultural (industrial, 
transportation and any other type of) policy still tended to be somewhat egalitarian in 
character, or more precisely, the main aim of every policy was to moderate regional 
disparities and “catch-up” the “lagger’” regions to “leader” regions at (sometimes) any 
price.
161
  While in Poland, with its liberal market-oriented reform approach, the prevailing 
attitude (also not clearly pronounced) is that “widening regional disparities in Poland are an 
unavoidable consequence of the process of transformation and economic growth” (Lobatch, 
2003, p.9)    
The analysis of the capital (machinery and fertilizers) productivity
162
 shows a 
profound difference between Poland and Belarus, not only in the speed and magnitude of the 
changes, but also in the directionality of the changes (see Appendix 5.10 and Appendix 
5.11). In Belarus, machinery productivity at first dropped and then began to increase, while in 
Poland it had a clear downward trend during the studied period.  
The fertilizers productivity, initially, experienced a huge increase and then sharply 
decreased, reaching its nadir for both Poland and Belarus in 1997. After that, fertilizers 
                                                          
161
 This  is not explicitly  pronounced in the  Belarusian  official documents,   but could be derived from the 
formulated in these documents main goals of the development and the methods of its achievement   
162
 measured in items (tractors in use and tons of fertilizers consumptions), but not in horsepower for tractors and 
pure nutrient values for fertilizers  
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productivity steadily decreased in Poland and steadily increased in Belarus.  The magnitude of 
the fertilizer dynamic change was also remarkable. The average “index of change” for 
fertilizer productivity was about 99.7% in Poland and 175.9% in Belarus. 
This difference in tractor and fertilizer productivity between Poland and Belarus 
could be explained by the differences in tractor and fertilizer use. Although the tractor and 
fertilizer dynamic had its “ups and downs” in both Poland and Belarus, the resulting trends for 
Poland show a stable increase of tractor and fertilizer use, and a steady decrease for Belarus 
(see Appendix 5.12). Such a difference resulted from the differences in the “institutional 
mechanism” of “exchange of the factors and goods” – the liberal free-market environment in 
Poland permits the accumulation of more financial resources and has a more efficient 
mechanism of tractor and fertilizer supply than the under-reformed economy in Belarus. 
Finalizing this section's exploration of the “differences” in transformational results for 
Poland and Belarus in terms of agricultural output and productivity, it is possible to conclude 
that these differences were caused by the different reform paths and different initial conditions 
(or in other words, the “differences in institutions”). Hence, the hypothesis formulated at the 




















CHAPTER 6. General discussion and conclusion 
This chapter provides the final conclusions for all the thesis findings. It includes a 
synthesis of the research and suggestions for further work.    
6.1. Synthesis of the research 
This section provides the synthesis of the research results obtained in Chapters 2-5. 
The analysis of the agricultural performance of the V4 countries and three FSU countries 
(Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) shows that besides the noticeable differences and profound 
gaps in the agricultural performance of the seven above-noted countries, Poland and Belarus 
could be considered to be the “best-performers” in their regions in terms of agricultural 
production and productivity.  
Despite the different transformational policies (“Big-Bang” reforms for Poland and 
gradual reform path for Belarus), the results of the transformations, measured in terms of 
agricultural production  and productivity could be generally considered “successful” for 
both Poland and Belarus, although some differences in the dynamics and magnitude of the 
production and productivity changes have been observed. 
These similarly successful results might be explained by the fact that both countries 
followed the developmental path of advanced Western countries – a shift from land- and 
labor- intensive agriculture to capital-intensive agriculture, while the differences in the speed 

















6.2. Suggestions for the further research  
In this section, the prospects for further research are briefly discussed. 
This PhD study has a several limitations regarding its geographical coverage, time-
frame and research methodology. Hence, much room is left for possible further extension 
of the given study scope within the “success or failure of reforms” assessment framework.   
While the geographical scope of the study is limited only to the two “transitional” 
countries (Belarus and Poland), it would be  possible to extend the countries’ coverage to 
other “transitional countries” from Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) and 
European FSU countres (Russia, Ukraine and Moldova).  This broader framework would lead 
to more precise generalizations, and would enrich the historical puzzle of regional 
transformations.  It would also be interesting to extend the  countries ’ coverage to countries 
from the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Central Asia region (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Transcaucasia region (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia), Balkan region (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia) and East Asia 
region (China, Vietnam, Laos).
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  This kind of extension of the countries’ coverage would 
expand the understanding of the transformational commonalities and differences (or 
convergence and divergence) between the Eastern Europe vs. former USSR (or Europe vs. 
Asia) and therefore would enrich the regional perspective.  
Methodologically, this PhD work is limited to two measures of economic 
performance (production and productivity) and six variables (Gross Agricultural Output, 
land, labor, machinery, fertilizers and livestock). Thus, the use of other measures of economic 
performance (e.g., export-import trade improvements, consumption of agricultural products, 
agricultural farms’ profitability, market services’ improvements) and additional variables 
relevant to the above measures might contribute to solving the puzzle of the “success or 
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Price and market liberalisation 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Czech Rep. 9 9 9 8 9 9 9   
Hungary 9 9 8 8 9 9 9   
Slovak Rep. 7 7 7 8 8 9 9   
Poland 9 8 7 8 8 8 9   
Russia  7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Ukraine 7 6 6 6 7 6 6 5 6 
Belarus 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
 Land reform 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Czech Rep. 8 8 8 9 9 9 9   
Hungary 9 9 9 9 9 9 10   
Slovak Rep. 7 8 8 8 8 8 9   
Poland 8 8 8 9 8 9 9   
Russia  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 
Ukraine 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 
Belarus 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 Agro-processing 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Czech Rep. 8 9 9 10 10 10 10   
Hungary 9 10 10 10 10 10 10   
Slovak Rep. 8 8 8 9 9 10 10   
Poland 7 8 9 9 9 10 10   
Russia  7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 
Ukraine 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 
Belarus 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 
 








                                                          
1
 Data for 2004-2005  are from  Csaki  et. al. (2006) Data for 1998-2003 are from Csaki  and Zuschlag (2004). Data 




Continuation of  APPENDIX 2.1.  
 
 Rural finance 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Czech Rep. 8 9 9 9 9 9 9   
Hungary 8 9 9 9 9 9 9   
Slovak Rep. 8 8 8 8 8 9 9   
Poland 6 7 7 7 7 7 8   
Russia  6 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 
Ukraine 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 8 7 
Belarus 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
          
 Institutional Change 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Czech Rep. 8 8 8 9 9 10 10   
Hungary 8 8 8 9 9 9 9   
Slovak Rep. 7 7 7 7 8 8 9   
Poland 8 8 8 8 8 8 8   
Russia  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 
Ukraine 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 



























Figure 1. Agricultural production indexes for the developed, CEE,  FSU,  and East Asian  










Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain ,Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China United Kingdom, United States 
FSU Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine. 
CEEC  Albania, Bulgaria, Czechslovakia,  Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia. 
East Asia China, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar 
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1
 The GAO data for Hungary, Poland, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are from Fuglie (2012). The GAO data for Czech 
Republic and Slovakia  for 1993-2010  are from FAO. The GAO data for Czech Republic and Slovakia  for 1990-
1993  are from National Statistical Datasets.  Available at:  http://faostat.fao.org   and     
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/international-agricultural-productivity/documentation-and-methods.aspx     
(Accesses: December 20, 2013)).   For GDP (GDP in constant LCU) data  are from WB database. Available at:   






APPENDIX 2.3. 1.   Regression results for GAO vs. GDP dependence model. 
 
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample: 1990 2004   
Included observations: 15   
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 105  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     _BY--GDP_BY 0.978759 0.009939 98.47417 0.0000 
_CZ--GDP_CZ 0.927251 0.010600 87.47831 0.0000 
_HU--GDP_HU 0.956083 0.007884 121.2679 0.0000 
_PL--GDP_PL 0.918408 0.011254 81.60743 0.0000 
_RU--GDP_RU 0.993894 0.006810 145.9535 0.0000 
_SK--GDP_SK 0.900914 0.015460 58.27511 0.0000 
_UKR--GDP_UKR 1.035406 0.008926 115.9982 0.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.926143     Mean dependent var -4.339778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.921621     S.D. dependent var 40.95229 
S.E. of regression 1.031686     Sum squared resid 104.3089 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.604429    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared -0.061968     Mean dependent var 4.285254 
Sum squared resid 3.707451     Durbin-Watson stat 0.209666 
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APPENDIX 2.7.  CEE countries pooled regression estimation 
Model 1.   
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2004   
Included observations: 11 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 77  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.638324 1.045074 -1.567663 0.1217 
LAND? 0.273554 0.163604 1.672049 0.0992 
LAB_AG_EC? 0.385354 0.152852 2.521088 0.0141 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0.643044 0.117840 5.456931 0.0000 
_BY--TREND_BY 0.044123 0.007477 5.900802 0.0000 
_CZ--TREND_CZ 0.021465 0.004385 4.894946 0.0000 
_HU--TREND_HU 0.017893 0.006882 2.599941 0.0115 
_PL--TREND_PL 0.013196 0.004665 2.828925 0.0062 
_RU--TREND_RU 0.024544 0.006032 4.068773 0.0001 
_SK--TREND_SK 0.025796 0.004980 5.180246 0.0000 
_UKR--TREND_UKR 0.022870 0.006567 3.482771 0.0009 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.716055     Mean dependent var 103.4687 
Adjusted R-squared 0.673033     S.D. dependent var 91.78674 
S.E. of regression 1.072217     Sum squared resid 75.87683 
F-statistic 16.64397     Durbin-Watson stat 1.773572 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.466292     Mean dependent var 4.383828 
Sum squared resid 0.364128     Durbin-Watson stat 1.269122 
     
 
Wald Test:   
Pool: POOL01   
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic  1.352417  66  0.1809 
F-statistic  1.829031 (1, 66)  0.1809 
Chi-square  1.829031  1  0.1762 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4)  0.301953  0.223269 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 




continuation of APPENDIX 2.7. 
Model 2  
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2003   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 70  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.415891 1.527950 -1.581132 0.1194 
LAND? 0.338196 0.147000 2.300653 0.0251 
LAB_AG? 0.466773 0.288567 1.617557 0.1113 
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 0.046353 4.637383 0.0000 
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 0.020189 5.848732 0.0000 
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 0.038173 9.097812 0.0000 
_BY--TREND_BY 0.040718 0.011138 3.655937 0.0006 
_CZ--TREND_CZ 0.019266 0.007651 2.518004 0.0146 
_HU--TREND_HU 0.016469 0.011339 1.452479 0.1519 
_PL--TREND_PL 0.013132 0.008176 1.606157 0.1138 
_RU--TREND_RU 0.041068 0.009060 4.532700 0.0000 
_SK--TREND_SK 0.020215 0.006886 2.935631 0.0048 
_UKR--TREND_UKR 0.039769 0.010792 3.684989 0.0005 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.905781     Mean dependent var 96.16730 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885946     S.D. dependent var 87.11571 
S.E. of regression 1.068193     Sum squared resid 65.03901 
F-statistic 45.66471     Durbin-Watson stat 1.977659 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.681325     Mean dependent var 4.377228 
Sum squared resid 0.197760     Durbin-Watson stat 1.411706 
     
     Wald Test:   
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic  1.484144  57  0.1433 
F-statistic  2.202684 (1, 57)  0.1433 
Chi-square  2.202684  1  0.1378 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)+C(5)+C(6)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5) + 
C(6)  0.485294  0.326986 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
to be continued on the next page… 
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continuation of APPENDIX 2.7. 
Model 3   
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2003   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 70     
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.936959 2.483030 -1.585547 0.1184 
LAND? 0.527094 0.189024 2.788502 0.0072 
LAB_POP? 0.607175 0.444627 1.365583 0.1774 
TRAC? 0.182418 0.063751 2.861426 0.0059 
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 0.022569 4.525947 0.0000 
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 0.045408 8.820678 0.0000 
_BY--TREND_BY 0.033986 0.008967 3.789969 0.0004 
_CZ--TREND_CZ 0.008516 0.003857 2.207736 0.0313 
_HU--TREND_HU 0.004316 0.005649 0.764078 0.4480 
_PL--TREND_PL 0.003769 0.003928 0.959595 0.3413 
_RU--TREND_RU 0.032596 0.008084 4.032212 0.0002 
_SK--TREND_SK 0.012046 0.004652 2.589217 0.0122 
_UKR--TREND_UKR 0.029031 0.007874 3.687096 0.0005 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.868284     Mean dependent var 72.02343 
Adjusted R-squared 0.840555     S.D. dependent var 60.29208 
S.E. of regression 1.067951     Sum squared resid 65.00958 
F-statistic 31.31254     Durbin-Watson stat 2.098712 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.678466     Mean dependent var 4.377228 
Sum squared resid 0.199534     Durbin-Watson stat 1.656515 
     
     
Wald Test:   
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic  1.526927  57  0.1323 
F-statistic  2.331507 (1, 57)  0.1323 
Chi-square  2.331507  1  0.1268 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)+C(5)+C(6)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5) + 
C(6)  0.819367  0.536611 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
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continuation of APPENDIX 2.7. 
Model 4   
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2003   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 70  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.055100 2.314941 -1.319732 0.1922 
LAND? 0.363098 0.144633 2.510480 0.0149 
LAB_POP? 0.564304 0.410543 1.374530 0.1747 
TRAC?(-1) 0.202192 0.044888 4.504392 0.0000 
FERT?(-1) 0.111073 0.020102 5.525387 0.0000 
LIVEST?(-1) 0.390089 0.036759 10.61215 0.0000 
_BY--TREND_BY 0.031413 0.007350 4.273669 0.0001 
_CZ--TREND_CZ 0.006684 0.003102 2.155157 0.0354 
_HU--TREND_HU 0.000967 0.005104 0.189511 0.8504 
_PL--TREND_PL 0.001444 0.003211 0.449662 0.6547 
_RU--TREND_RU 0.030457 0.005699 5.344228 0.0000 
_SK--TREND_SK 0.009686 0.003281 2.952367 0.0046 
_UKR--TREND_UKR 0.028149 0.006321 4.453101 0.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.902105     Mean dependent var 97.87573 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881495     S.D. dependent var 102.2720 
S.E. of regression 1.067386     Sum squared resid 64.94079 
F-statistic 43.77123     Durbin-Watson stat 1.973938 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.681319     Mean dependent var 4.377228 
Sum squared resid 0.197764     Durbin-Watson stat 1.426884 
     
 
Wald Test:   
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic  1.259329  57  0.2130 
F-statistic  1.585909 (1, 57)  0.2130 
Chi-square  1.585909  1  0.2079 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)+C(5)+C(6)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5) + C(6)  0.630755  0.500866 
    
    





APPENDIX 2.8.  Accounts for GAO change  
 





Contribution to total change of the 
∑ 
GAO 
land labor capital TFP 
   (trend) 
Belarus   -0.01 0.19 1.35 2.48 -3.36 0.66 
Czech Rep.  -0.01 0.08 1.07 0.28 -1.96 -0.54 
Hungary  -0.01 0.171 1.737 0.163 -1.97 0.10 
Poland  -0.01 0.226 0.955 0.071 -1.23 0.02 
Russia  -0.02 0.08 0.54 1.52 -1.31 0.84 
Slovak 
Rep.  
-0.02 0.14 0.33 0.85 -1.12 0.19 
Ukraine  -0.02 0.03 0.69 1.09 -0.92 0.89 
accounting statistics is acceptable for 4 countries (∑ GAO is around 1 ), in 3 out of it the  
capital has the most significant contribution 
 
 
























Belarus   
-0.01 




-0.01 0.10 1.36 -0.24 -0.11 1.64 -1.76 0.98 
1.29 
Hungary  -0.01 0.21 1.87 -0.90 -0.33 1.40 -1.81 0.44 0.17 
Poland  -0.01 0.28 1.07 -0.23 -0.21 0.07 -1.22 -0.25 -0.38 
Russia  -0.02 0.10 0.74 0.82 0.63 1.28 -2.20 1.38 2.74 
Slovak 
Rep.  
-0.02 0.17 0.54 0.34 -0.10 0.34 -0.88 0.41 
0.58 
Ukraine  -0.02 0.04 0.75 0.28 0.70 1.01 -1.60 1.16 1.98 
accounting statistics is acceptable for 4 countries (∑ GAO is around 1) , in 3 out of it the  
capital has the most significant contribution 
 








continuation of APPENDIX 2.8. 
 



















Belarus   -0.01 0.37 0.74 1.07 0.06 1.27 -2.59 0.92 2.40 
Czech Rep. -0.01 0.15 -0.19 -0.17 -0.10 1.89 -0.78 0.80 1.62 
Hungary  -0.01 0.33 0.09 -0.74 -0.29 1.61 -0.47 0.53 0.59 
Poland  -0.01 0.44 0.04 -0.19 -0.18 0.08 -0.35 -0.17 -0.30 
Russia  -0.02 0.16 0.05 0.71 0.55 1.48 -1.74 1.20 2.74 
Slovak 
Rep.  
-0.02 0.26 -0.05 0.27 -0.09 0.39 -0.53 0.26 
0.57 
Ukraine  -0.02 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.60 1.16 -1.17 1.09 1.98 
accounting statistics is acceptable for 5 countries (∑ GAO is around 1) , 
 in 5 out of it,  the  capital has the most significant contribution 
 
 





Contribution to total change of the 
∑GAO ∑capital land labor capital TFP 




Belarus   -0.01 0.26 0.68 1.19 0.07 1.24 -2.39 1.05 2.50 
Czech 
Rep. 
-0.01 0.10 -0.18 -0.23 -0.11 1.84 -0.61 0.82 
1.51 
Hungary  -0.01 0.23 0.08 -0.85 -0.31 1.57 -0.11 0.62 0.41 
Poland  -0.01 0.30 0.04 -0.22 -0.20 0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.35 
Russia  -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.77 0.59 1.44 -1.63 1.33 2.81 
Slovak 
Rep.  
-0.02 0.18 -0.05 0.32 -0.09 0.38 -0.42 0.32 
0.61 
Ukraine  -0.02 0.04 0.20 0.26 0.66 1.13 -1.14 1.16 2.05 
accounting statistics is acceptable for 5 countries  ( ∑GAO is around 1) , in 5 out of it the  
capital has the most significant contribution 
 




continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Accounting statistics for Model 1 
Model 1   estimated 
coefficient  
   contribution to output change  
change in variable  absolute   % of total change  
  A B  C (A*B)   D  
LAND? 0,273554 -0,009285 0,00 0,19 
LAB_AG_EC? 0,385354 -0,04605 -0,02 1,35 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0,643044 -0,050566 -0,03 2,48 
trend_by 0,044123  0,044123 -3,36 
total GAO change  -0,013133 -0,013133 0,66 
 
Model 1   estimated 
coefficient  
   contribution to output change  
change in variable  absolute   % of total change  
  A B  C (A*B)   D  
LAND? 0,273554 -0,003093 0,00 0,08 
LAB_AG_EC? 0,385354 -0,030344 -0,01 1,07 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0,643044 -0,004771 0,00 0,28 
trend_cz 0,021465  0,021465 -1,96 
total GAO change  -0,010936 -0,010936 -0,54 
 
Model 1  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change 
change in variable absolute % of total change 
  A B C (A*B) D 
LAND? 0,273554 -0,005674 -0,002 0,17 
LAB_AG_EC? 0,385354 -0,040990 -0,016 1,74 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0,643044 -0,002303 -0,001 0,16 
trend_hu 0,017893  0,017893 -1,97 
total GAO change  -0,009094 -0,009094 0,10 
 
Model 1  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change 
change in variable absolute % of total change 
  A B C (A*B) D 
LAND? 0.273554 -0.008883 0.00 0.23 
LAB_AG_EC? 0.385354 -0.026600 -0.01 0.96 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0.643044 -0.001182 0.00 0.07 
trend_pl 0.013196  0.013196 -1.23 
total GAO change  -0.010731 -0.010731 0.02 
  








continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Model 1 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change 
change in variable absolute % of total change 
 A B C (A*B) D 
LAND? 0,273554 -0,005677 0,00 0,08 
LAB_AG_EC? 0,385354 -0,026448 -0,01 0,54 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0,643044 -0,044232 -0,03 1,52 
trend_ru 0,024544  0,024544 -1,31 
total GAO change  -0,018708 -0,018708 0,84 
 
Model 1 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change 
change in variable absolute % of total change 
 A B C (A*B) D 
LAND? 0,273554 -0,011431 0,00 0,14 
LAB_AG_EC? 0,385354 -0,019809 -0,01 0,33 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0,643044 -0,030319 -0,02 0,85 
trend_sk 0,025796  0,025796 -1,12 
total GAO change  -0,022932 -0,022932 0,19 
 
Model 1 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change 
change in variable absolute % of total change 
 A B C (A*B) D 
LAND? 0.273554 -0.002746 0.00 0.03 
LAB_AG_EC? 0.385354 -0.044437 -0.02 0.69 
CAP_NET?(-1) 0.643044 -0.042093 -0.03 1.09 
trend_ukr 0.02287  0.02287 -0.92 





















continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Accounting statistics for Model 2 
Model 2   estimated 
coefficient  
   contribution to output change    
change in variable  absolute   % of total change    
  A B  C (A*B)   D    
LAND? 0.338196 -0.009285 0.00 0.24   
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.044218 -0.02 1.57   
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 -0.077574 -0.02 1.27   
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 -0.007948 0.00 0.07   
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.041664 -0.01 1.10 2.44 
trend_by 0.040718  0.040718 -3.10   
total GAO change  -0.013133 -0.013133 1.15   
 
Model 2   estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.338196 -0.003093 0.00 0.10  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.031785 -0.01 1.36  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 0.012246 0.00 -0.24  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 0.010459 0.00 -0.11  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.051694 -0.02 1.64 1.29 
trend_cz 0.019266  0.019266 -1.76  
total GAO change  -0.010936 -0.010936 0.98  
 
Model 2   estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.338196 -0.005674 0.00 0.21  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.036461 -0.02 1.87  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 0.038028 0.01 -0.90  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 0.025511 0.00 -0.33  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.036603 -0.01 1.40 0.17 
trend_hu 0.016469  0.016469 -1.81  
total GAO change  -0.009094 -0.009094 0.44  
 
Model 2    estimated 
coefficient  
   contribution to output change   
change in variable  absolute   % of total change   
  A B  C (A*B)   D   
LAND? 0.338196 -0.008883 0.00 0.28  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.024642 -0.01 1.07  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 0.011704 0.00 -0.23  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 0.019368 0.00 -0.21  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.002054 0.00 0.07 -0.38 
trend_pl 0.013132  0.013132 -1.22  
total GAO change  -0.010731 -0.010731 -0.25  
 





continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Model 2  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.338196 -0.005677 0.00 0.10  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.029496 -0.01 0.74  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 -0.071384 -0.02 0.82  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 -0.100089 -0.01 0.63  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.069182 -0.02 1.28 2.74 
trend_ru 0.041068  0.041068 -2.20  
total GAO change  -0.018708 -0.018708 1.38  
 
 
Model 2  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.338196 -0.011431 0.00 0.17  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.026772 -0.01 0.54  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 -0.036538 -0.01 0.34  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 0.019420 0.00 -0.10  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.022357 -0.01 0.34 0.58 
trend_sk 0.020215  0.020215 -0.88  
total GAO change  -0.022932 -0.022932 0.41  
 
 
Model 2  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.338196 -0.002746 0.00 0.04  
LAB_AG? 0.466773 -0.039646 -0.02 0.75  
TRAC?(-1) 0.214955 -0.031892 -0.01 0.28  
FERT?(-1) 0.118083 -0.146795 -0.02 0.70  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.347287 -0.071804 -0.02 1.01 1.98 
trend_ukr 0.039769  0.039769 -1.60  















continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Accounting statistics for Model 3 
 Model 3 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change   
change in variable absolute % of total change   
  A B C (A*B) D   
LAND? 0.527094 -0.00929 0.00 0.37   
LAB_POP? 0.607175 -0.01594 -0.01 0.74   
TRAC? 0.182418 -0.07678 -0.01 1.07   
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 -0.00795 0.00 0.06   
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.041664 -0.02 1.27 2.40 
trend_by 0.033986  0.033986 -2.59   
total GAO change  -0.013133 -0.013133 0.92   
 
Model 3  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.003093 0.00 0.15  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 0.003498 0.00 -0.19  
TRAC? 0.182418 0.010240 0.00 -0.17  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 0.010459 0.00 -0.10  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.051694 -0.02 1.89 1.62 
trend_cz 0.008516  0.008516 -0.78  
total GAO change  -0.010936 -0.010936 0.80  
 
Model 3  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.005674 0.00 0.33  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 -0.001369 0.00 0.09  
TRAC? 0.182418 0.036802 0.01 -0.74  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 0.025511 0.00 -0.29  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.036603 -0.01 1.61 0.59 
trend_hu 0.004316  0.004316 -0.47  
total GAO change  -0.009094 -0.009094 0.53  
 
Model 3  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.008883 0.00 0.44  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 -0.000723 0.00 0.04  
TRAC? 0.182418 0.011188 0.00 -0.19  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 0.019368 0.00 -0.18  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.002054  0.00          0.08 -0.30 
trend_pl 0.003769  0.003769 -0.35  
total GAO change  -0.010731 -0.010731 -0.17  
 




continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Model 3  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.005677 0.00 0.16  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 -0.001466 0.00 0.05  
TRAC? 0.182418 -0.072746 -0.01 0.71  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 -0.100089 -0.01 0.55  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.069182 -0.03 1.48 2.74 
trend_ru 0.032596  0.032596 -1.74  




 Model 3 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.011431 -0.01 0.26  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 0.001918 0.00 -0.05  
TRAC? 0.182418 -0.033872 -0.01 0.27  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 0.01942 0.00 -0.09  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.022357 -0.01 0.39 0.57 
trend_sk 0.012046  0.012046 -0.53  
total GAO change  -0.022932 -0.022932 0.26  
 
 
Model 3  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.527094 -0.002746 0.00 0.06  
LAB_POP? 0.607175 -0.008916 -0.01 0.22  
TRAC? 0.182418 -0.029163 -0.01 0.21  
FERT?(-1) 0.102146 -0.146795 -0.01 0.60  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.400533 -0.071804 -0.03 1.16 1.98 
trend_ukr 0.029031  0.029031 -1.17  

















continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Accounting statistics for Model 4 
 Model 4 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0,363098 -0,009285 0,00 0,26  
LAB_POP? 0,564304 -0,01594 -0,01 0,68  
TRAC?(-1) 0,202192 -0,077574 -0,02 1,19  
FERT?(-1) 0,111073 -0,007948 0,00 0,07  
LIVEST?(-1) 0,390089 -0,041664 -0,02 1,24 2,50 
trend_by 0,031413  0,031413 -2,39  
total GAO change  -0,013133 -0,013133 1,05  
 
Model 4   estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0,3631 -0,003093 0,00 0,10  
LAB_POP? 0,5643 0,003498 0,00 -0,18  
TRAC?(-1) 0,20219 0,012246 0,00 -0,23  
FERT?(-1) 0,11107 0,010459 0,00 -0,11  
LIVEST?(-1) 0,39009 -0,051694 -0,02 1,84 1,51 
trend_cz 0,00668  0,006684 -0,61  
total GAO change  -0,010936 -0,010936 0,82  
 
Model 4  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A b C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0,363098 -0,005674 0,00 0,23  
LAB_POP? 0,564304 -0,001369 0,00 0,08  
TRAC?(-1) 0,202192 0,038028 0,01 -0,85  
FERT?(-1) 0,111073 0,025511 0,00 -0,31  
LIVEST?(-1) 0,390089 -0,036603 -0,01 1,57 0,41 
trend_hu 0,000967  0,000967 -0,11  
total GAO change  -0,009094 -0,009094 0,62  
 
Model 4  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0,363098 -0,008883 0,00 0,30  
LAB_POP? 0,564304 -0,000723 0,00 0,04  
TRAC?(-1) 0,202192 0,011704 0,00 -0,22  
FERT?(-1) 0,111073 0,019368 0,00 -0,20  
LIVEST?(-1) 0,390089 -0,002054 0,00 0,07 -0,35 
trend_pl 0,001444  0,001444 -0,13  
total GAO change  -0,010731 -0,010731 -0,14  
 






continuation of APPENDIX 2.8.  Country-relevant tables for the GAO changes  
 
Model 4  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.363098 -0.005677 0.00 0.11  
LAB_POP? 0.564304 -0.001466 0.00 0.04  
TRAC?(-1) 0.202192 -0.071384 -0.01 0.77  
FERT?(-1) 0.111073 -0.100089 -0.01 0.59  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.390089 -0.069182 -0.03 1.44 2.81 
trend_ru 0.030457  0.030457 -1.63  
total GAO change  -0.018708 -0.018708 1.33  
 
 
Model 4  estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.363098 -0.011431 0.00 0.18  
LAB_POP? 0.564304 0.001918 0.00 -0.05  
TRAC?(-1) 0.202192 -0.036538 -0.01 0.32  
FERT?(-1) 0.111073 0.019420 0.00 -0.09  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.390089 -0.022357 -0.01 0.38 0.61 
trend_sk 0.009686  0.009686 -0.42  
total GAO change  -0.022932 -0.022932 0.32  
 
 
 Model 4 estimated 
coefficient 
 contribution to output change  
change in variable absolute % of total change  
  A B C (A*B) D  
LAND? 0.363098 -0.002746 0.00 0.04  
LAB_POP? 0.564304 -0.008916 -0.01 0.20  
TRAC?(-1) 0.202192 -0.031892 -0.01 0.26  
FERT?(-1) 0.111073 -0.146795 -0.02 0.66  
LIVEST?(-1) 0.390089 -0.071804 -0.03 1.13 2.05 
trend_ukr 0.028149  0.028149 -1.14  

















APPENDIX 2.9.   Average annual TFP growth   
  














Czech Rep. 1.4 1.3 2.3 3.9 1.6 
Hungary 4 1.9 3.4 5.1 5.6 
Poland 0.8 -1.7 0.5 3.3 0.9 
Slovakia 2.2 0.1 2.4 4.3 2.1 
 Rozelle  and Swinnen (2004)    - for  FSU cited  from Lerman et al.. (2003) and for V4 
cited from Macours and Swinnen (2000) 
dependant 
variable 
  1992-1997         
GAO Belarus  0.6         
Russia 1.4         
Ukraine 0.4         
       
dependant 
variable 
  1989-1995 1989-1992 1992-1995     
crops Czech Rep. 2.7 1.1 4.3     
Hungary 1.1 -4.5 6.7     
Poland -0.4 -5.1 4.3     
Slovakia 1.2 -0.6 3.1     
Fuglie and Rada  (2012)  
dependant 
variable 







GAO Belarus 0.0308 0.0057 0.0580 0.0389   
Poland 0.0080 0.0110 -0.0030 0.0017   
Hungary 0.0096 0.0023 0.0211 0.0117   
Russia 0.0302 0.0136 0.0547 0.0313   
Ukraine 0.0325 -0.0016 0.0601 0.0498   






















Population density in Poland in 2002 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Map of the  land quality is  from  Agricultural Statistics Yearbook for Poland (2001). Map of  the population 
density is from Banski (2006, p.44)  
201 
 











                                                          
1 Map is  from Marks-Bielska (2010, p.119) 
202 
 
APPENDIX 3.3  Differentiation of private farms by land size  in 1997 and 2005
1
 




















                                                          
1
 Maps  are from Agricultural Statistics Yearbook  for Poland  (1998) and Agricultural Statistics Yearbook  for 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




























































































































































APPENDIX 3.5.  The share of the state land (under the APA supervision) in total 
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Average  yields for basic  











Yields per 1 ha in dt 
 
 
Average  yields for basic  
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Average wheat  yields 





Share in production  
 
 
Yields per 1 ha in dt 
 
 
Average wheat  yields in 
1997- 32,1  dt/ha 
                                                          
1













Average potato yields in 




Share in production  
 
Yields per 1 ha in dt 
 
Average potato yields  
in 1997 -159 dt/ha 
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Share in production  
 
 













Share in production  
 
 
Production  per 1 ha of 
agricultural land 
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Share in production  
 
Production of milk 






Share in production  
 
 
Production of milk 





                                                          
1

















                                                          
1 NRA data  are from WB database.  Available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTTRADE
RESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21812190~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:544849,00.html  
(Accessed:  July 25,  2011). PSE data  are from  OECD databse. Available at:  www.oecd.org  (Accessed:  July 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































             
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































        
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



























































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   














































APPENDIX  4. 2.  
 
Table. Belarus regional land tenure structure 
1
 
   1990 1995 2000 2004 
Brest 
region 
farmers land 0 0 0 1 
corporate land 94 81 85 85 
household plots land 6 19 14 14 
  100 100 100 100 
Vitebsk 
region 
farmers land 0 1 1 3 
corporate land 94 79 79 78 
household plots land 6 20 20 19 
  100 100 100 100 
Gomel 
region 
farmers land 0 1 1 1 
corporate land 93 88 87 87 
household plots land 7 11 12 12 
  100 100 100 100 
Grodno 
region 
farmers land 0 0 0 2 
corporate land 93 86 85 84 
household plots land 7 14 14 14 
  100 100 100 100 
Minsk 
region 
farmers land 0 1 1 1 
corporate land 93 82 83 85 
household plots land 7 17 16 14 
  100 100 100 100 
Mogilev 
region 
farmers land 0 1 1 2 
corporate land 94 87 86 85 
household plots land 6 12 13 14 
  100 100 100 100 
                                                          
1









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








































APPENDIX 4.4  FERTILIZERS PER GRAINS RATIO
1
 
Fertilizers per wheat ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 1.11 1.26 1.82 2.00 2.10 1.89  1,90 
Denmark 1.36 1.54 1.62 2.04 1.87 1.70 1.56 1,38 
France 1.30 1.58 2.09 2.22 2.35   1,80 
Netherlands 1.39 1.70 2.15 2.33 2.72 2.28 2.50 1,95 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise/ Soft wheat - 
prices per 100 kg  Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Fertilizers per wheat ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 1.11 1.26 1.82 2.00 2.10 1.89  1.90 
Denmark 1.36 1.54 1.62 2.04 1.87 1.70 1.56 1.38 
France 1.30 1.58 2.09 2.22 2.35   1.80 
Netherlands 1.39 1.70 2.15 2.33 2.72 2.28 2.50 1.95 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise / Soft wheat - 
prices per 100 kg  /  National currency (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area 
countries) 
 
Fertilizers per rye ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 1.20 1.33 2.19 2.28 2.66 1.94  2.23 
Denmark 1.45 1.68 1.76 2.37 2.17 2.03 2.06 1.50 
France 1.43 1.61 2.42 2.58 2.44   1.71 
Netherlands 1.50 1.75 2.29 2.53 3.05 2.76 3.13 2.03 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise / Rye - 
prices per 100 kg  /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
 
Fertilizers per rye  ratio (prices  in National Currency)    
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 1.20 1.33 2.19 2.28 2.66 1.94  2.23 
Denmark 1.45 1.68 1.76 2.37 2.17 2.03 2.06 1.50 
France 1.43 1.61 2.42 2.58 2.44   1.71 
Netherlands 1.50 1.75 2.29 2.53 3.05 2.76 3.13 2.03 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise / Rye - prices 





                                                          
1








Fertilizers per milk ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.70 0.54 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.78  1.02 
Denmark 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.70 0.57 0.55 0.63 0.88 
France 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.82   1.04 
Netherlands 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.86 0.91 1.20 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise / Whole cows' milk 
for human consumption - prices per 100 litres    /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 
31.12.1998) 
 
Fertilizers per milk ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.70 0.54 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.78  1.02 
Denmark 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.70 0.57 0.55 0.63 0.88 
France 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.82   1.04 
Netherlands 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.86 0.91 1.20 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise /Whole cows' milk 
for human consumption - prices per 100 litres    /  National currency (including 'euro 


























                                                          
1
 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 3, 2013) 
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Fertilizers per cow meat ratio   (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.21  0.73 
Denmark 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.81 
France 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18       
Netherlands  0.19 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.31  
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise / Cows B (2nd quality) 
- prices per 100 kg live weight     /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Fertilizers per cow meat ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.21  0.73 
Denmark 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.81 
France 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18       
Netherlands  0.19 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.31  
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise /Cows B (2nd quality) 
- prices per 100 kg live weight  /  National currency (including 'euro fixed' series for euro 
area countries) 
 
Fertilizers  per chicken meat  (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.29  0.71 
Denmark 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.34 1.01 
France 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37   0.79 
Netherlands 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.69 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise /    Chickens (live; 1st 
choice) - prices per 100 kg live weight /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Fertilizers per chicken meat ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2002/1991 
Belgium 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.29  0.71 
Denmark 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.34 1.01 
France 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37   0.78 
Netherlands 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.69 
Ternary fertilizers: 1 - 1 - 1 (in sacks) - prices per 100 kg merchandise /Chickens (live; 1st 
choice) - prices per 100 kg live weight /  National currency (including 'euro fixed' series for 





                                                          
1
 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 3, 2013) 
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APPENDIX 4.7  DIESEL PER GRAINS RATIO
1
 
Diesel oil per wheat  ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004*/1991 
Belgium 1.14 1.24 1.45 1.70 2.74 2.53 2.56 2.36  2.08 
Denmark 1.40 1.43 1.94 2.59 3.50 3.22 3.44 3.28 3.33 2.38 
Germany**  1.72 3.88 4.47 4.73 5.87 6.47 7.16 6.95 7.34 4.26 
Netherlands 1.70 1.68 2.31 2.64 3.96 4.00 4.40 3.75 4.39 2.59 
Sweden 2.39 2.78 4.28 4.37 5.88 5.63 5.88 5.72 6.53 2.74 
UK 1.53 1.45 1.72 2.07 3.21 2.85 3.10 2.89 3.12 2.04 
* year 2003 for Belgium          **Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /Soft wheat - prices per 100 kg /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up 
to 31.12.1998) 
  
Diesel oil per wheat ratio  (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004*/1991 
Belgium 1.14 1.24 1.45 1.70 2.74 2.53 2.56 2.36  2.08 
Denmark 1.40 1.43 1.94 2.59 3.50 3.22 3.44 3.28 3.33 2.38 
Germany**  1.72 3.88 4.47 4.73 5.87 6.47 7.16 6.95 7.34 4.26 
Netherlands 1.70 1.68 2.31 2.64 3.96 4.00 4.40 3.75 4.39 2.59 
Sweden 2.39 2.78 4.27 4.38 5.88 5.63 5.88 5.72 6.53 2.74 
UK 1.53 1.45 1.72 2.07 3.21 2.85 3.10 2.89 3.12 2.04 
* year 2003 for Belgium    ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /Soft wheat - prices per 100 kg /National currency (including 
'euro fixed' series for euro area countries) 
 
Diesel oil per rye ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004*/1991 
Belgium 1.23 1.32 1.64 1.85 3.30 2.89 3.23 2.42  1.98 
Denmark 1.49 1.55 2.03 2.72 3.80 3.75 3.99 3.92 4.40 2.94 
Germany**  1.87 4.39 4.94 5.12 6.48 7.39 8.42 7.86 9.22 4.93 
Netherlands 1.83 1.73 2.40 2.73 4.22 4.34 4.93 4.54 5.49 3.00 
Sweden 2.37 2.99 4.48 4.57 6.28 6.17 6.46 6.38 7.32 3.09 
* year 2003 for Belgium  ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres / Rye - prices per 100 kg   /Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 
31.12.1998) 
 
Diesel oil per rye ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004*/1991 
Belgium 1.23 1.31 1.64 1.85 3.30 2.89 3.23 2.42  1.98 
Denmark 1.49 1.55 2.03 2.72 3.79 3.75 3.99 3.92 4.39 2.94 
Germany**  1.87 4.39 4.94 5.12 6.48 7.39 8.42 7.86 9.22 4.93 
Netherlands 1.83 1.73 2.40 2.73 4.22 4.34 4.93 4.54 5.49 3.00 
Sweden 2.37 2.99 4.48 4.57 6.28 6.17 6.46 6.39 7.32 3.09 
* year 2003 for Belgium  ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres / Rye - prices per 100 kg /National currency (including 'euro 
fixed' series for euro area countries) 
                                                          
1
 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 3, 2013) 
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Diesel oil per milk ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1992 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 
2004/ 
1991* 
Belgium 0.72 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.64 1.01 0.87 0.98  1.35 
Denmark 0.67 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.66 0.90 1.27 1.05 1.06 1.34 1.99 
Germany**    0.42 0.83 0.83 0.90 1.10 2.30 2.55 2.50 6.00 
Netherlands 0.82 0.74 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.92 1.33 1.31 1.41 1.60 1.94 
Sweden  0.88 0.95 1.06 1.41 1.47 1.89 1.88 1.77 2.16 2.47 
UK 0.95 0.87 1.01 0.69 0.78 0.95 1.46 1.30 1.38 1.50 1.58 
*2003 for Belgium; 1993 for Germany; 1992 for Sweden   
** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres / Whole cows' milk for human consumption - prices per 100 litres   
/Euro (from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Diesel oil per milk ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1992 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 
2004/ 
1991* 
Belgium 0.72 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.64 1.01 0.87 0.98  1.35 
Denmark 0.67 0.59 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.90 1.27 1.05 1.06 1.34 1.99 
Germany**    0.42 0.83 0.83 0.90 1.10 2.30 2.55 2.50 6.00 
Netherlands 0.82 0.74 0.74 0.68 0.73 0.92 1.33 1.31 1.41 1.60 1.94 
Sweden  0.88 0.95 1.06 1.41 1.47 1.89 1.88 1.77 2.16 2.47 
UK 0.95 0.87 1.01 0.69 0.78 0.95 1.45 1.30 1.38 1.50 1.58 
*2003 for Belgium; 1993 for Germany; 1992 for Sweden   
** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /  Whole cows' milk for human consumption - prices per 100 litres   
















                                                          
1
 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 3, 2013) 
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APPENDIX 4.9  DIESEL OIL  PER MEAT  RATIO
1
 
Diesel oil per cow meat  ratio (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004/1991* 
Belgium 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.31 0.27  1.41 
Denmark 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.48 2.49 
Germany**      0.60 0.90     
Netherlands  0.19 0.24 0.31 0.41 0.67 0.58 0.59 0.55 2.94 
*2003 for Belgium; 1995 for Netherlands  ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres / Cows B (2nd quality) - prices per 100 kg live weight    /Euro (from 
1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Diesel oil per cow  meat ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004/1991* 
Belgium 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.31 0.27  1.41 
Denmark 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.48 2.49 
Germany**      0.60 0.90     
Netherlands  0.19 0.24 0.31 0.41 0.67 0.58 0.59 0.55 2.94 
*2003 for Belgium; 1995 for Netherlands  ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /Cows B (2nd quality) - prices per 100 kg live weight   /National 
currency (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries) 
 
Diesel oil per chicken meat ratio  (prices  in Euro –ECU)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004/1991* 
Belgium 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.36  1.55 
Denmark 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.50 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.72 2.12 
Germany**   0.34 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.94 1.01 1.06 1.10 3.23 
Netherlands 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.75 2.14 
Sweden 0.30 0.43 0.62 0.67 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.94 3.13 
*2003 for Belgium; 1995 for Germany    ** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /   Chickens (live; 1st choice) - prices per 100 kg live weight   /Euro 
(from 1.1.1999)/ECU (up to 31.12.1998) 
 
Diesel oil per chicken meat  ratio (prices  in National Currency)   
 1991 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004/1991* 
Belgium 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.36  1.55 
Denmark 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.50 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.72 2.12 
Germany**   0.34 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.94 1.01 1.06 1.10 3.23 
Netherlands 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.75 2.14 
Sweden 0.30 0.43 0.62 0.67 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.94 3.13 
** Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) 
Diesel oil - prices per 100 litres /  Chickens (live; 1st choice) - prices per 100 kg live weight  
/National currency (including 'euro fixed' series for euro area countries) 
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total 138 138 117 158 119 132 152 100 114 114 134 123 137 128.9   
corporate 
farms 146 130 105 153 96 113 148 101 127 95 135 100 97 118.9 2 
household 
plots 132 144 122 159 125 135 152 100 108 116 132 127 142 130.3 1 
individual 
farms   140 99 142 103 119 130 98 117 113 139 110 110 118.3 3 








































































total 188 179 136 166 143 135 138 134 135 133 134 141 157 147.6   
corporate 
farms 209 187 111 166 145 142 144 150 148 134 146 139 123 149.5 1 
household 
plots 160 175 144 161 143 133 138 130 130 132 131 140 162 144.5 2 
individual 










































































total 515 410 273 381 287 294 291 338 309 246 296 303 246 322.2   
corporate 
farms 522 409 267 383 290 297 296 348 317 246 302 303 209 322.2 1 
household 
plots 459 416 299 366 278 284 276 310 288 246 288 303 296 316.1 2 
individual 












                                                          
1
 Data are from Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (variuose years) 
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total 100 91.2 100 104 85.3 77.6 80.9 87.9 70.2 55.1 71.3 73.2 90.8 84 
corporate 
farms 
100 90.8 101 103 84.9 77.9 80.5 88.2 70.2 55.5 71.7 72.4 90.4 84 
household 
plots 
100 93.8 92 110 92 74.8 82.8 84.3 70.4 52.9 67.2 80.7 98.9 85 
individual 
farms 








































































total 100 100 84.8 114 86.2 95.7 110 72.5 82.6 82.6 97.1 89.1 99.3 93 
corporate 
farms 
100 89 71.9 105 65.8 77.4 101 69.2 87 65.1 92.5 68.5 66.4 81 
household 
plots 
100 109 92.4 120 94.7 102 115 75.8 81.8 87.9 100 96.2 108 99 
individual 
farms 








































































total 100 95.2 72.3 88.3 76.1 71.8 73.4 71.3 71.8 70.7 71.3 75 83.5 79 
corporate 
farms 
100 89.5 53.1 79.4 69.4 67.9 68.9 71.8 70.8 64.1 69.9 66.5 58.9 72 
household 
plots 
100 109 90 101 89.4 83.1 86.3 81.3 81.3 82.5 81.9 87.5 101 90 
individual 
farms 








































































total 100 79.6 53 74 55.7 57.1 56.5 65.6 60 47.8 57.5 58.8 47.8 63 
corporate 
farms 
100 78.4 51.1 73.4 55.6 56.9 56.7 66.7 60.7 47.1 57.9 58 40 62 
household 
plots 
100 90.6 65.1 79.7 60.6 61.9 60.1 67.5 62.7 53.6 62.7 66 64.5 69 
individual 
farms 
  100 62.1 96.7 49.8 76.4 65.8 113 59.8 56.5 75.7 69.8 54.5 73 
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 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG # 
corp. farms 174.73 98.03 90.19 81.97 88.22 88.92 90.03 101.73 2 
household plots 368.55 152.99 160.55 151.02 151.07 145.23 140.77 181.45 1 
individual 
farms 444.44 51.28 45.98 26.11 27.78 46.14 47.66 98.48 3 




 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG # 
corporate farms 115.83 62.69 59.00 55.73 59.94 60.56 60.47 67.75 3 
household plots 268.90 111.45 115.91 114.80 113.82 109.44 105.06 134.20 1 
individual 
farms 333.33 35.26 29.56 18.28 20.53 32.19 32.28 71.63 2 




 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG # 
corporate farms 647.46 394.94 396.72 346.86 385.46 401.46 410.35 426.18 2 
household plots 2856.69 1318.91 1371.66 1239.58 1288.54 1198.98 1108.97 1483.33 1 
individual 
farms 666.67 128.21 123.15 78.33 95.41 159.87 217.52 209.88 3 




 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG # 
corporate farms 257.22 253.97 275.48 267.49 246.55 221.89 213.54 248.02 2 
household plots 2233.47 917.30 878.02 833.68 862.25 863.10 844.61 1061.78 1 
individual 
farms 277.78 208.33 192.12 120.10 27.78 23.61 19.22 124.13 3 




 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG # 
corporate farms 73.33 14.19 4.40 1.30 1.17 1.33 1.21 13.85 3 
household plots 498.26 186.63 155.22 118.90 104.85 97.74 85.83 178.20 2 
individual 
farms 1666.67 48.08 16.42 13.05 24.15 21.46 15.37 257.89 1 
TOTAL 102.33 42.44 28.85 19.92 17.70 17.00 15.12 34.76   
 
 
to be continued on the next page 
 
 
                                                          
1
Data are from Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (variuose years) 
2
 Animal production (live weight (kg/ha) 
3
 Animal production (slaughtering  weight (kg/ha) 
4
 Milk production (kg/ha) 
5
 Eggs production (th.pcs/ha) 
6
 Wool production (unscoured, kg/ha) 
234 
 






weight (kg/ha) 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG rating 
corporate farms 100 92.0 83.6 90.0 90.7 91.8 91.4 2 
household plots 100 104.9 98.7 98.7 94.9 92.0 98.2 1 
individual farms 100 89.7 50.9 54.2 90.0 92.9 79.6 3 




weight (kg/ha) 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG rating 
corporate farms 100 94.1 88.9 95.6 96.6 96.5 95.3 2 
household plots 100 104.0 103.0 102.1 98.2 94.3 100.3 1 
individual farms 100 83.8 51.8 58.2 91.3 91.6 79.5 3 
TOTAL 100 96.6 91.9 96.7 96.7 95.5 96.3  
Milk 
production 
(kg/ha) 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG rating 
corporate farms 100 100.4 87.8 97.6 101.6 103.9 98.6 2 
household plots 100 104.0 94.0 97.7 90.9 84.1 95.1 3 
individual farms 100 96.1 61.1 74.4 124.7 169.7 104.3 1 
TOTAL 100 101.7 89.5 116.6 97.0 95.8 100.1  
Eggs 
production 
(th.pcs/ha) 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG rating 
corporate farms 100 108.5 105.3 97.1 87.4 84.1 97.1 1 
household plots 100 95.7 90.9 94.0 94.1 92.1 94.5 2 
individual farms 100 92.2 57.7 13.3 11.3 9.2 47.3 3 




kg/ga 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 AVG rating 
corporate farms 100 31.0 9.2 8.3 9.4 8.6 27.7 3 
household plots 100 83.2 63.7 56.2 52.4 46.0 66.9 1 
individual farms 100 34.2 27.2 50.2 44.6 32.0 48.0 2 
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APPENDIX 4.17. Belarus  pooled regression results 
Dependent Variable: GAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample: 1990 2004   
Included observations: 10   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 60  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 0.040682 5.036257 0.0000 
LAB? 0.293315 0.024957 11.75280 0.0000 
CAP? 0.495837 0.033652 14.73432 0.0000 
_BR--TREND_BR 0.018915 0.002748 6.883044 0.0000 
_GOM--TREND_GOM 0.017840 0.003004 5.938213 0.0000 
_GR--TREND_GR 0.022107 0.002684 8.236817 0.0000 
_MIN--TREND_MIN 0.019772 0.002882 6.859622 0.0000 
_MOG--TREND_MOG 0.029730 0.002869 10.36240 0.0000 
_VIT--TREND_VIT 0.031148 0.002626 11.86216 0.0000 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.919699     Mean dependent var 36.56144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.907103     S.D. dependent var 51.47037 
S.E. of regression 1.067637     Sum squared resid 58.13232 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.037849    
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.859166     Mean dependent var 4.324119 
Sum squared resid 0.157029     Durbin-Watson stat 0.673230 
     
 
Wald Test:   
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    t-statistic -0.981008  51  0.3312 
F-statistic  0.962377 (1. 51)  0.3312 
Chi-square  0.962377  1  0.3266 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(1)+C(2)+C(3)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    -1 + C(1) + C(2) + C(3) -0.005964  0.006079 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients 
 








Continuation of  APPENDIX 4.17. 
Accounting statistics for Mogilev region 




 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A B  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.015353 0 0.18 
LAB? 0.293315 0.056457 0.02 -0.95 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.064242 -0.03 1.83 
trend_MOG 0.02973   0.02973 -1.71 
total GAO change   -0.017369 -0.017369 -0.65 
 
Accounting statistics for Minsk  region 




 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A B  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.00531 -0.0011 0.12 
LAB? 0.293315 0.037651 0.01 -1.19 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.03784 -0.02 2.02 
trend_MIN 0.019772   0.019772 -2.13 
total GAO change   -0.00929 -0.00929 -1.18 
 
Accounting statistics for Grodno  region 




   
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A B  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.007877 0 0.13 
LAB? 0.293315 -0.023212 -0.01 0.54 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.030488 -0.02 1.19 
trend_GR 0.022107   0.022107 -1.75 
total GAO change   -0.012662 -0.01266 0.11 
 






Continuation of  APPENDIX 4.17. 
 
Accounting statistics for Gomel  region 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A b  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.010097 0 0.08 
LAB? 0.293315 -0.038518 -0.01 0.43 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.048745 -0.02 0.92 
trend_GOM 0.01784   0.01784 -0.68 
total GAO change   -0.026306 -0.02631 0.75 
 
Accounting statistics for Vitebsk   region  




 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A b  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.018295 0 0.21 
LAB? 0.293315 0.061184 0.02 -1.02 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.056206 -0.03 1.58 
trend_VIT 0.031148   0.031148 -1.77 
total GAO change   -0.01765 -0.01765 -0.99 
 
Accounting statistics for Brest region   
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total 
change  
  A b  C (A*B)   D  
LAND_TOT? 0.204884 -0.006057 0 0.08 
LAB? 0.293315 -0.021246 -0.01 0.4 
CAP? 0.495837 -0.054227 -0.03 1.72 
trend_BR 0.018915   0.018915 -1.21 






APPENDIX 5.1. Gross Agricultral Production 
1
    
Table 1. Gross Production Index Number (2004-2006 = 100) - Agriculture (PIN) + 
(Total) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004  
Denmark 100 96 113 134 14 130 139 134 138 14332 149  
Finland 100 111 120 124 112 105 108 110 108 112 112 d 
France 100 122 140 146 145 153 145 144 147 155 155  
Germany 100 123 133 139 129 121 120 116 119 129 134 d 
Ireland 100 111 160 181 183 185 185 181 184 194 190  
Italy 100 119 139 125 139 140 135 135 133 140 145  
Netherlands 100 136 186 220 217 234 231 226 228 226 220  
Portugal 100 115 107 136 142 126 122 126 134 138 143  
Spain 100 127 183 214 205 211 202 194 179 257 267  
Sweden 100 96 109 114 98 94 106 101 102 106 106 d 
Switzerland 100 110 125 130 128 134 129 123 125 124 123 d 
United 
Kingdom 100 117 139 149 150 152 148 148 149 144 139 d 
 
CEEC and FSU countries 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004  
Belarus      100 104 88 85 78 92  
Czech 
Republic       100 86 88 84 89  
Hungary 100 119 174 174 175 137 122 128 125 127 153  
Poland 100 116 107 132 122 106 119 99 107 105 108  
Russian 
Federation      100 95 83 78 68 76  
Slovakia       100 95 91 73 82  
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 Table 1.   Agricultural area (1961= 100%) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Denmark 100 94 92 88 88 87 87 85 86 84 84 
Finland 100 98 91 86 87 87 86 87 81 80 81 
France 100 94 92 89 88 88 87 87 87 86 86 
Germany 100 98 96 93 88 87 89 89 90 88 88 
Ireland 100 100 102 100 79 78 78 78 78 78 76 
Italy 100 98 85 81 78 77 77 76 74 76 72 
Netherlands 100 95 87 87 86 86 86 85 85 85 84 
Portugal 100 101 103 102 101 100 102 102 101 99 99 
Spain 100 97 94 92 91 91 90 91 89 90 87 
Sweden 100 89 87 81 79 79 79 79 77 74 75 
Switzerland 100 100 93 73 73 73 73 73 73 71 70 
UK 100 95 93 92 92 91 89 88 88 86 86 
USSR 100 101 102 103 103             
CEEC and FSU countries 
Belarus           100 100 100 99 99 95 
Czech Rep.             100 100 100 100 100 
Hungary 100 97 94 91 91 87 87 86 87 83 83 
Poland 100 96 94 92 92 92 92 92 92 91 80 
Russian Fed.           100 99 98 98 98 97 
Slovakia             100 100 100 100 79 
























                                                          
1








Table 2. Arable land (1961= 100%) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Denmark 100 95 94 91 91 90 90 84 83 81 81 
Finland 100 96 89 85 86 85 85 86 80 82 83 
France 100 89 89 92 92 92 93 93 93 94 94 
Germany 100 98 98 98 95 94 96 97 97 97 97 
Ireland 100 87 70 65 65 63 64 64 65 68 76 
Italy 100 93 74 70 69 68 66 65 64 66 62 
Netherlands 100 83 80 89 89 89 89 89 89 92 114 
Portugal 100 99 97 93 92 91 89 88 86 65 61 
Spain 100 97 96 94 94 94 92 91 86 82 80 
Sweden 100 86 84 80 79 78 78 78 78 76 75 
Switzerland 100 90 95 100 100 100 100 100 103 101 100 
UK 100 99 96 92 92 91 85 82 83 82 81 
USSR 100 97 96 95 95       
CEEC and FSU countries 
Belarus      100 100 102 102 101 91 
Czech 
Republic       100 100 99 97 97 
Hungary 100 100 97 97 97 91 91 91 93 89 89 
Poland 100 95 92 90 90 90 90 90 89 88 79 
Russian Fed.      100 98 97 97 94 93 
Slovakia       100 100 100 98 89 
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Table 1. Agricultural population (1961= 100%) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Denmark 100 81 78 75 72 70 68 57 49 
Finland 100 73 70 68 65 63 61 50 42 
France 100 70 67 64 61 58 56 44 37 
Germany 100 58 56 54 52 50 48 38 32 
Ireland 100 77 75 72 69 67 65 57 53 
Italy 100 69 66 63 60 57 54 43 36 
Netherlands 100 87 84 82 80 79 77 68 61 
Portugal 100 70 68 66 64 63 61 53 47 
Spain 100 67 64 61 58 56 53 43 37 
Sweden 100 75 73 71 69 67 65 55 49 
Switzerland 100 95 92 91 89 88 86 78 72 
UK 100 84 83 81 80 79 77 71 67 
USSR 100 94 92       
 
CEEC and FSU countries 
  1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Belarus    100 96 92 89 71 59 
Czech Rep.     100 97 94 80 71 
Hungary 100 80 77 74 72 70 68 56 48 
Poland 100 98 96 94 92 90 88 77 70 
Russian Fed.    100 98 95 93 80 71 
Slovakia     100 98 96 84 75 
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 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 10, 2013) 
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Table 2.  Rural population (1961= 100%) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Denmark 100 85 71 66 66 66 66 66 67 67 66 
Finland 100 86 69 53 52 51 51 50 50 47 44 
France 100 86 84 86 86 86 85 85 85 80 68 
Germany 100 104 102 102 102 103 103 104 105 106 106 
Ireland 100 94 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 102 107 
Italy 100 95 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 93 95 
Netherlands 100 107 107 101 99 97 95 93 91 79 72 
Portugal 100 92 97 90 89 88 87 87 86 82 78 
Spain 100 88 78 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 77 
Sweden 100 76 70 72 72 72 72 71 71 71 71 
Switzerland 100 100 103 68 67 67 68 70 71 73 75 
UK 100 112 106 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 111 
USSR 100 96 91 91 91             
CEEC and FSU countries 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2004 
Belarus      100 99 98 97 89 82 
Czech Rep       100 101 101 103 104 
Hungary 100 94 88 81 81 81 82 82 82 83 79 
Poland 100 103 98 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Russian Fed.      100 100 100 100 99 99 
Slovakia       100 100 101 102 104 
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 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 10, 2013) 
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Table 1.  Tractors Agric. Total -In Use (1961= 100%) 
 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003 
Denmark 100 136 147 126 124 120 120 114 117 96 95 
Finland 100 188 258 296 284 284 282 279 237 236 236 
France 100 165 198 194 190 187 183 179 176 170 170 
Ireland 100 185 319 371 376 378 380 384 388 361 341 
Italy 100 225 393 524 534 525 537 548 559 603 616 
Netherlands 100 218 287 294 294 290 287 284 278 241 241 
Portugal 100 300 791 1 228 1 223 1 219 1 364 1 377 1 396 1 572 1 572 
Spain 100 366 737 1 042 1 063 1 078 1 091 1 111 1 133 1 266 1 328 
Sweden 100 121 122 115 113 114 115 116 116 111 111 
Switzerland 100 135 175 210 211 211 211 211 211 203 200 
United 
Kingdom 100 97 112 110 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
USSR 100 163 218 215 213       
 
CEEC and FSU countries 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003 
Belarus      100 98 100 92 58 47 
Czech Rep.       100 100 133 149 142 
Hungary 100 154 126 112 208 208 209 209 209 256 257 
Poland 100 314 865 1 656 1 647 1 638 1 614 1 831 1 843 1 826 1 916 
Russian Fed.      100 96 89 82 58 45 
Slovakia       100 106 90 76 73 
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 Data are  from  FAO database. Available at: www.fao.org  (Accessed:  December 10, 2013) 
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Table 1.   Number of tractors per agricultural area 
Advanced Western countries and USSR  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003  
Denmark 40.8 58.7 65.2 58.3 57.9 56.3 56.5 54.5 55.4 46.6 46.3 d 
Finland 29.7 56.9 83.6 101.8 96.5 97.3 97.3 95.4 86.2 87.5 86.4 d 
France 21.5 37.9 46.5 47.1 46.3 45.8 45.0 44.2 43.6 42.6 42.6 d 
Germany 53.1 79.1 87.1 86.9 87.5 78.0 75.7 72.9 70.1 58.0 55.5 d 
Ireland 8.1 14.9 25.3 29.9 38.5 39.0 39.3 39.7 40.2 37.2 35.5  
Italy 13.2 30.5 61.1 84.9 90.7 89.6 92.0 95.2 99.5 105.3 112.7  
Netherlands 26.8 61.7 88.1 90.8 91.4 90.6 89.5 89.3 87.9 76.4 77.7 d 
Portugal 2.8 8.2 21.4 33.3 33.5 33.8 37.0 37.4 38.2 44.1 44.3  
Spain 2.1 8.1 16.8 24.3 24.9 25.3 25.8 26.2 27.1 30.2 32.4  
Sweden 35.0 48.0 48.9 50.1 49.8 50.5 50.7 51.1 52.8 52.3 52.2  
Switzerland 24.9 33.6 46.9 71.6 72.0 72.1 72.1 72.1 72.1 71.6 70.7 d 
UK 23.2 23.7 27.7 27.7 27.6 27.7 28.5 28.7 28.8 29.5 29.5  
USSR 2.2 3.6 4.8 4.7 4.6        
CEEC and FSU countries  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003  
Belarus      13 13 13 12 8 7 d 
Czech Rep.       15 15 20 23 21  
Hungary 6 10 8 8 14 15 15 15 15 19 19  
Poland 4 11 33 63 63 63 62 70 71 71 85  
Russian 
Fed.      6 6 5 5 3 3 d 
Slovakia       13 13 11 10 10 d 
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Table 2 . Number of tractors per arable land 
Advanced Western countries and USSR  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003 d 
Denmark 45.9 65.6 71.8 63.5 62.9 61.1 61.1 62.0 65.1 54.0 54.3 d 
Finland 30.8 60.2 89.5 107.5 101.9 102.6 102.1 100.2 91.1 88.9 87.8 d 
France 37.9 70.6 84.3 80.0 78.2 77.0 74.5 72.6 71.6 68.5 68.5 d 
Germany 84.1 125.9 134.1 130.9 129.8 115.3 111.3 106.9 102.7 83.8 79.8 d 
Ireland 28.6 61.3 131.0 162.3 166.2 171.5 169.1 172.1 171.4 152.6 131.1  
Italy 21.2 51.3 113.1 158.7 163.6 163.6 171.3 179.4 184.2 194.1 211.1  
Netherlands 62.5 164.2 225.3 207.3 206.6 202.9 200.7 198.9 195.7 164.3 165.0  
Portugal 4.3 13.0 35.1 56.3 56.9 57.6 65.4 67.3 69.7 103.6 110.3  
Spain 4.4 16.6 33.7 48.3 49.5 50.4 51.7 53.3 57.4 67.1 72.5  
Sweden 41.8 59.0 60.8 60.2 60.0 61.1 61.2 61.8 62.4 61.0 61.9  
Switzerland 131.7 198.9 242.2 275.3 276.7 278.0 278.0 278.0 269.5 265.4 265.6 d 
UK 64.0 62.9 74.1 76.3 76.1 76.3 82.1 84.6 84.2 85.1 88.4  
USSR 5.1 8.7 11.7 11.6 11.5        
CEEC and FSU countries  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2003  
Belarus      21 20 20 19 12 11  
Czech Rep.       19 20 26 30 28  
Hungary 9 13 11 10 18 19 19 19 19 25 25  
Poland 4 15 42 82 82 82 81 92 93 93 109  
Russian Fed.      10 10 9 8 6 5  
Slovakia       20 21 18 15 16  
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Table 1.   Total Fertilizers  Consumption (1961= 100%) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002  
Denmark 100 139 146 148 135 118 113 109 102 81 72 69 d 
Finland 100 201 202 183 140 143 141 147 141 124 123 121 d 
France 100 192 231 235 230 187 190 194 203 171 172 164 d 
Germany 100 145 158 102 91 87 82 89 86 84 80 79 d 
Ireland 100 209 297 342 328 330 353 371 369 296 291 290 d 
Italy 100 153 242 223 228 220 218 217 209 199 161 164 d 
Netherlands 100 138 144 119 119 116 110 114 114 89 88 71 d 
Portugal 100 93 187 201 187 175 181 179 177 158 151 150 d 
Spain 100 167 228 271 258 216 249 264 256 294 301 296  
Sweden 100 166 160 108 96 104 109 107 97 93 88 88 d 
Switzerland 100 138 170 158 149 143 142 136 127 84 92 87 d 
UK 100 135 147 170 155 143 148 158 156 126 133 129 d 
USSR 100 381 692 798 718         
 
CEEC and FSU countries 
  
 1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002  
Belarus      100 54 39 37 58 54 54 d 
Czech 
Republic       100 110 114 108 129 120  
Hungary 100 389 650 316 152 88 136 146 171 194 211 233  
Poland 100 288 392 173 126 134 144 160 169 177 176 169  
Russian 
Federation      100 70 27 32 26 29 27 d 
Slovakia       100 103 112 123 122 129  
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Table 1.  Fertilizers per Arable  land (tonnes per ha) 
Advanced Western countries and USSR 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2002 
Denmark 153 225 238 247 228 200 191 197 189 153 130 
Finland 90 189 206 195 148 151 150 155 159 137 133 
France 124 267 321 316 309 251 252 257 268 225 215 
Germany 268 399 430 280 257 248 229 246 238 232 220 
Ireland 127 307 542 665 646 666 700 742 726 557 499 
Italy 68 112 223 216 223 220 223 227 220 204 173 
Netherlands 474 788 860 638 637 615 585 603 607 459 367 
Portugal 55 52 107 119 112 106 112 113 113 134 128 
Spain 45 78 107 129 123 104 121 130 133 160 167 
Sweden 85 165 163 116 105 114 119 116 106 105 100 
Switzerland 260 402 463 409 386 371 368 354 319 215 227 
UK 195 267 297 361 331 306 341 375 369 300 311 
USSR 12 45 83 96 87             
 
CEEC and FSU countries 
  1961 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2002 
Belarus           229 123 87 84 131 133 
Czech 
Republic             92 102 105 102 114 
Hungary 41 161 278 135 65 40 62 66 77 91 109 
Poland 56 170 239 107 78 83 90 100 106 113 116 
Russian 
Federation           42 30 12 14 11 12 
Slovakia             62 63 69 77 88 
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APPENDIX  5.8. Advanced Western countries pooled regression 
Dependent Variable: GGAO?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 1990 2002   
Included observations: 13 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 12   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 156  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.519028 0.452774 -1.146328 0.2536 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.021918 5.833985 0.0000 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.083016 4.874639 0.0000 
CAP? 0.580197 0.023792 24.38584 0.0000 
_DEN--TREND_DEN 0.033185 0.001030 32.22704 0.0000 
_FIN--TREND_FIN 0.017454 0.001976 8.832768 0.0000 
_FRAN--TREND_FRAN 0.019704 0.001293 15.23627 0.0000 
_GER--TREND_GER 0.010836 0.001621 6.683269 0.0000 
_IRL--TREND_IRL 0.011126 0.001139 9.769769 0.0000 
_ITAL--TREND_ITAL 0.006924 0.000885 7.822418 0.0000 
_NETH--TREND_NETH 0.024818 0.002407 10.31054 0.0000 
_PORT--TREND_PORT 0.017457 0.002223 7.851751 0.0000 
_SPA--TREND_SPA 0.010544 0.002392 4.407578 0.0000 
_SWD--TREND_SWD 0.003193 0.001486 2.148583 0.0334 
_SWZ--TREND_SWZ 0.003955 0.001117 3.541668 0.0005 
_UK--TREND_UK 0.006972 0.001453 4.798994 0.0000 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.980034     Mean dependent var 303.2183 
Adjusted R-squared 0.977894     S.D. dependent var 399.2373 
S.E. of regression 1.047663     Sum squared resid 153.6637 
F-statistic 458.1167     Durbin-Watson stat 2.169244 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.793167     Mean dependent var 4.619130 
Sum squared resid 0.233628     Durbin-Watson stat 1.528022 
     
     
Wald Test: Pool: RESULTS   
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
t-statistic  1.478256  140  0.1416 
F-statistic  2.185240 (1. 140)  0.1416 
Chi-square  2.185240  1  0.1393 
    
Null Hypothesis: C(2)+C(3)+C(4)+C(5)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
-1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5)  0.145924  0.098714 
    









APPENDIX  5.9.  Accounting statistics for Western countries pooled regression  
 






 change in 
variable 
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.011 0.00 -0.14 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.002 0.00 0.07 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.039704 -0.02 -2.41 
TREND_DEN 0.033185  0.033185 3.48 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.00954 0.00954 1.00 
 
 
GAO accounts for  Finland 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.004325 -0.0006 1.42 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.011487 -0.0046 11.95 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.024216 -0.0141 36.12 
TREND_FIN 0.017454  0.017454 -44.87 
total output 
change (ggao)  -0.0004 -0.0004 4.62 
 
 
GAO accounts for France 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.002206 0.00 0.05 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.010284 0.00 -0.71 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.016524 -0.01 -1.64 
TREND_FRAN 0.019704  0.019704 3.37 
total output 












Continuation of APPENDIX  5.9.   
 
GAO accounts for Germany 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.001048 0.00 0.46 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.003782 0.00 5.22 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.030979 -0.02 -61.34 
TREND_GER 0.010836  0.010836 36.98 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.00029 0.00029 -18.68 
 
GAO accounts for Ireland 




contribution to output change 
absolute % of total change 
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.011194 0.00 0.21 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.003111 0.00 0.18 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.009222 -0.01 -0.78 
TREND_IRL 0.011126  0.011126 1.62 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.006864 0.00686 1.23 
 
GAO accounts for Italy 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute  % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.005185 0.00 -0.35 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.001099 0.00 -0.24 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.002330 0.00 -0.72 
TREND_ITAL 0.006924  0.006924 3.67 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.001885 0.00189 2.37 
 
GAO accounts for Netherlands 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in  
variable 
 contribution to output change  
 absolute  % of total change  
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.004 0.00 -0.24 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.025 -0.01 5.16 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.027674 -0.02 8.16 
TREND_NETH 0.024818   0.024818 -12.61 
total output 
change (ggao)   -0.002 -0.002 0.46 
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Continuation of APPENDIX  5.9.   
GAO accounts for  Portugal 




contribution to output change 
absolute % of total change 
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.03685 -0.0047 -0.65 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.00971 -0.0039 -0.54 
CAP? 0.580197 0.005876 0.0034 0.47 
TREND_PORT 0.017457  0.017457 2.42 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.00722 0.00722 1.69 
 
GAO accounts for Spain 





contribution to output change 
absolute % of total change 
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.015548 0.00 -0.08 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.000633 0.00 0.01 
CAP? 0.580197 0.020551 0.01 0.47 
TREND_SPA 0.010544  0.010544 0.41 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.02544 0.02544 0.82 
 
GAO accounts for Sweden 




contribution to output change 
absolute % of total change 
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR? 0.127869 -0.00368 0.00 -0.13 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 -0.00212 0.00 -0.24 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.00904 -0.01 -1.49 
TREND_SWD 0.003193  0.003193 0.91 
total output 
change (ggao)  0.003519 0.003519 -0.96 
 
GAO accounts for Swetzeland 
   estimated 
coefficient  
 change in 
 variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
LAND_AR? 0.127869 0.001354 0.00 -0.02 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.006972 0.00 -0.40 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.025008 -0.01 2.05 
TREND_SWZ 0.003955   0.003955 -0.56 
total output 
change (ggao)   -0.007062 -0.0071 1.07 
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Continuation of APPENDIX  5.9.   
 
GAO accounts for UK 
   estimated  
coefficient  
change in  
variable  
 contribution to output change  
 absolute   % of total change  
 A B C(A*B) D 
LAND_AR?  0.127869 -0.01101 0.00 0.26 
LAB_RUR? 0.404674 0.00054 0.00 -0.04 
CAP? 0.580197 -0.00870 -0.01 0.94 
TREND_UK 0.006972   0.006972 -1.30 
total output  
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 Data are  from  Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (variouse years) and   Agricultural Statistics 
Yearbook for Poland (variouse years) 
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 Data  are from  Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (variouse years) and   Agricultural Statistics 
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GAO 100 98.4 85.9 91.7 83.2 92.1 92.7 92.5 98 92.9 87.7 92.3 
land 100 99.8 99.9 99.4 99.4 99.3 97.9 97.7 98.1 98.2 97.7 98.9 
labour 100 96.4 88.8 87 89.6 93.3 97 97.2 96.8 96.3  94.2 
tractors 100 99.5 98.9 97.5 110.6 111.3 110 110.6 110.6 110.2 110.3 106.3 
fertilizers 100 72.8 77.3 83.2 92.6 98.1 103.5 110.3 101 99 102.8 94.6 




























































Land 100 99.4 86.7 93 84.4 93.5 95.4 95.4 100.7 95.3 90.5 94 
labour 100 102.1 96.7 105.4 92.8 98.7 95.5 95.1 101.2 96.4  98.4 
tractors 100 98.5 86.5 93.6 74.9 82.3 83.9 83.3 88.2 83.9 79.2 86.8 
fertilizers 100 136.1 111.8 111 90.4 94.6 90.2 84.4 97.7 94.5 85.9 99.7 
 
Table 2. Agricultural production and productivity dynamic in Belarus  
  1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 AVG 
Change of  
GAO 100 73.5 71.2 65 70.9 72.2 72.7 75.5 75.1 
land 100 97.6 97.2 89.5 88.1 84.8 84.2 83.9 90.7 
labour 100 95.6 92.8 91 89.4 87.6 85.9 84.1 90.8 
machinery 100 95 90 75 75 75 70 65 80.6 
fertilizers 100 25.5 43.8 46.7 50.8 39.1 38 37.6 47.7 
Change of the productivity of   
  1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  AVG 
land 100 75.3 73.3 72.6 80.5 85.1 86.3 90 82.9 
labour 100 76.9 76.7 71.4 79.3 82.4 84.7 89.8 82.7 
machinery 100 77.4 79.1 86.7 94.5 96.3 103.9 116.2 94.2 
fertilizers 100 288.7 162.5 139.3 139.6 184.5 191.5 201.1 175.9 
 
                                                          
1
 Data are  from  Belarusian Agricultural  Statistics Yearbook (variouse years) and   Agricultural Statistics 
Yearbook for Poland (variouse years). 
